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The  use  of telecommunications  in industry and commerce  is  an  increasingly  important part 
of corporate strategies in all Member States of the Organisation for Economic  Co-operation 
and  Development  (OECD).  However,  both  the  technologies  available  and  the  regulatory 
regimes  that dictate how  these  technologies  can be used,  are  changing  rapidly.  To  explore 
the  issues  involved,  a  set  of comparative  national  and  company-specific  studies  has  been 
carried out from 1987  to  1989  by the OECD-BRIE telecommunications user group, under the 
technical direction of the Berkeley Round table on  the International Economy (BRIE) at the 
University  of California,  Berkeley,  and  the  secretariat  of the  information,  Computer  and 
Communications  Policy  Division,  Directorate  for Science,  Technology  and  Industry,  OECD, 
and with the support of DG XIII of the Commission of the European Communities: 
Two questions lie at the heart of the studies: 
To  what  extent  do  variations  in  the  regulation  of  telecommunications  affect  how 
technologies are used to gain competitive advantage? and; 
how  successfully  are  technologies  used  to  gain  competitive  advantage  under  different 
regulatory regimes? 
This volume describes telecommunications policies and usage  by major companies in the US, 
Japan.  Volume I of the report contains an overview of the key issues for government policy 
and  corporate  strategy  developments  and  Volume  III  describes  telecommunications  policies 
and usage  by major companies in five European countries: France, the FRG, Italy, Spain and 
the  UK.  These  reports are  based  on  case  studies of telecommunications  usage  in 30  major 
companies and the co-operation of these companies is  most gratefully acknowledged. 
The  reports  are  distributed  as  a  contribution  to  ongoing  discussions  about  the  future 
strategies for development of advanced communications in Europe, the USA  and Japan.  It is 
hoped  that  they  will  support  the  development  of a  better  common  understanding  of  the 
trends  and  opportunities  for  telecommunications  usage  in Europe,  the  USA  and  Japan  and 
will  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  strategic  orientation of  r~search and  technology  development 
initiatives.  The views and recommendations in the reports are those of the authors. From public access to private connections: Network strategies and 
competitive advantage in  US telecommunications. 
Fran~ois Bar and Michael Borrus; 
Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, 
University of California. 
C Copyright Bar &  Borrus, September 1989. 
Report presented at the final seminar on Information networks and  business strategies,  held 
at the OECD headquarters in Paris, 19-20th October 1989. Table of Contents 
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Like Molly Bloom, U.S. policy-makers just can't say no to their infatuation with 
an old love.  For over three decades, U.S. telecommunications policy has couned market 
competition.  U.S. policy-makers have been enamored of the innovative techniques the 
market fosters, and jealous of the apparently effonless way that it satisfies the feverish 
demands of major users.  How simple to abandon the troubling thoughts and difficult 
choices in favor of the market's apparent fairmindedness; how easy to relinquish control 
to the market's invisible hand. 
The urge has never been stronger, as the government's blue·print for 
telecommunications policy in the next century affirms:  "Effectively competitive, 
unregulated communications and information marketS ...• are the best guarantee that the 
public will have the communications and information facilities and services they want 
and need. "1  Yet, in the cold light of morning, the choice of abandoning policy to the 
market looks less and less like a well-conceived plan.  It appears much more like the easy 
way out of the difficulty of guiding the evolution of the nation's telecommunications 
infrastructure in a time of rapid change and substantial uncertainty. 
To be sure, the old regulatory policies are plainly inadequate to the task.  And to 
an even greater certainty, the market must play a broad role in shaping the development 
of modern communications and allocating its use.2  There are, however, continuing 
critical roles .for national policy to play in the telecommunications arena if the best 
prospects for the U.S. economy and polity are to be re3.lized. 
We argue in this paper that the nation's economic prospects are increasingly 
intertWined with the accessabiliry, flexibility, and widespread use of the networks that 
digital communications technology makes possible.  Digital communications networks 
have become the critical foundation for an empirically observable, on-going 
transfonnation in modern indusnial production.  Modern production of both goods and 
services is increasingly computerized and automated.  Management of the production 
process requires intimate and integrated contrOl over the associated information flows, 
whether in the form of voice, data, or images. 
Consequently, corporate strategies are ever more tightly bound to digital network 
facilities, whether for the production of cars and clothes, insurance policies and financial 
flows, or melons and medical services.  In every major industry the aim is managerial 
control over network facilities, the ability dynamically to allocate integrated network 
resources in real time on an as-needed basis in pursuit of corporate strategy. 
1  National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Ttltcom 2000. Charring Tiu! Courst 
For AN~  Ctnlury, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce. October, 1988). 
2  Stanford University's Roger Noll makes this and the preceeding points cogently in the course of arguing 
for  t.~e eventual elimination of regulation in his  .. Telecommunications Regulation in the 1990s, .. CEPR 
Publicauon #140 (Stanford: Center for Economic Policy Research, August. 1988). -10-
The network resources available to rums both constrain and enable corporate 
strategy choices.3  Network availability, in tum, is a function both of policy and market 
forces.  By favoring market forces, U.S. telecom policy has helped to create a wide-open, 
essentially unconstrained choice of network resources for those with the knowhow who 
can afford the investment.  But open choice docs not automatically lead to the best match 
with corporate strategy objectives.  Indeed, only a select few of·the largest  producers in 
the U.S. are close to realizing the goal of linking strategy formation and implementation 
to dynamic network allocation on-demand.  For most others, and particularly for those 
whose choice is limited to the public-switched network by their lack of investment 
resources and knowhow, the use of telecom in pursuit of corporate sntegy is decidedly 
constrained. 
The differentially available mategy choices of users change the dynamics of 
competition when rums interact in marketS and shape the outcomes of the interaction. 
Who wins and who loses, and the economic gains to be had, can all be fundamentally 
altered as a consequence.  Panly as a result of these indirect impactS, available network 
resources shape far more than corporate strategy choices.  They shape as well 
opportUnities for national economic growth. 
Here the arguments are more complex and admittedly more speculative.  We 
make the case, in essense, that the digital communications networks underlying industrial 
production, from privately controlled corporate by-pass networks to the public switched 
telephone network, together comprise a modem economic infrastructure supporting the 
evolution of the economy. 
In particular, our analysis suggests that different infrastructure amutgements 
differentially suppon .two kinds of beneficial economic processes.  The first of these is 
the coordination of (static) resource allocation through both markets and administrative 
hierarchies.  Here, different network configurations can radically destabilize existing 
allocating mechanisms, re-enforcing market efficiency here, promoting hierarchical 
control there, and mixing and matching the two in ways that alter possibilities for 
productivity growth. 
The second process we call 'dynamic performance', by which we mean the ability 
to adjust to changing economic eire  umstances and to grow and prosper eve; time. 
Different network arrangementS influence dynamic performance by enabling or 
frustrating the experimentation and learning critical to technological advance and 
essential for increasing rates of demand growth.4 
3  As we elaborate more fully below. by network resources we mean the netWork facilities. methods of 
control~ and applications (i.e., services) that togelher comprise a functioning network. 
4  As we elaborate more fully below, we draw these aspects of 'dynamic perfonnance' from dif'f'erent 
sow-ces.  Notions of experimentation and learning are cnwn in panicular from the work of Natban 
Rosenberg, lnsid4 tht Blm:k Boz: Ttchnology tJNi Economics. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
MA. 1982) and Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, An Evobl.liDIIIJ11 Tlu:ory of  Economic Chlmgr, 
(Belknap, Cambridge, MA 1982); ideas of technological advance are drawn in particular from Joseph 
Shumpeter, Tht Thtory of EcoMmic Dtvtlopmtnt, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge. MA, 1934) and 
Christopher Freeman. Tht Economics of  /NiustrillllnMvation, (Penguin, Harmondswonh, England. 1974) 
as well as Rosenberg: the demand growth emphasis is drawn directly from Giovanni Dosi, Laur.a Tyson 
and John Zysman. in Chalmers Johnson, Tyson and Zysman, eds., Politics and Pro~ziviry, (New York: 
Ballinger, 1989), at chapter 1.. - 11-
We argue that the available network arrangements - that is, the network 
infrastructure itSelf -- influence the extent to which these economic benefits get generated 
and diffused within the economy.  How the network infrastructure is organized and 
controlled will determine whether those benefits are internalized in limited ways by a few 
economic actors, or widely externalized and diffused to the benefit of an economy as a 
whole. 
Although U.S. telecommunications regulatory policy has never been much 
concerned with supporting these economic processes, the pre-divestiture Bell System 
nevenheless did so as an un.inzended byproduct of its integrated, universal, monopoly 
character.S  Ubiquity and accessibility generated rnore perfect information throughout the 
economy, thereby favoring efficient resource allocation.  Opportunities for 
experimentation and learning were widespread, if  limited by the constraints of the 
technology and the single application (i.e., voice).  Integration and universality helped to 
make the Bell System a traditional economic infrastructure.6 
The introduction of competition and then the break-up of the Bell System have 
led to increasing fragmentation of the infrastructure.  Competition, continued restraints 
on A  IT and the Bell companies, and the development of new applications have led to 
increasing differentiation of infrastructure capabilities.  There is fragmentation of 
network ownership, control, access, and of the network itself; differentiation of uses, 
providers and clients.  The network infrastructure is becoming "open and loosely 
interconnected., resembling a federation of subnetworks."7  Competition increasingly 
drives itS evolution - although traditional regulation and coun order continue to exen 
critical influence - and final demand primarily determines which facilities, management 
mechanisms, and applications are provided via its many  pans~ 
This evolution has served very well the very largest business users.  It has also 
drawn distinct boundaries around the many pans of the confederation of subnetworks that 
comprise the whole:  Ownership and control, configurability, access, functionality, data 
generation and usage, all differ in different pans of the overall network.  Those 
differences dramatically affect the network's utility for the corporate strategy choices of 
smaller users.  Equally imponant, they have exacted unforeseen tolls on allocation and 
dynamic perfonnance for large segments of the economy. 
As we shall see, fragmentation and differentiation have created substantial market 
imperfections that frustrate the widespread diffusion of the economic benefits a digital 
network infrastrUcture makes possible.  Our case studies demonstrate the ability of 
sophisticated users to coordinate market outcomes through their network strategies:  The 
infrastrucrure is used to create barriers to certain kinds of economic activities rather than 
to generate more perfect infonnation to make marketS work more efficiently.  Similarly, 
opponunities for learning and experimentation have been skewed in ways that potentially 
disfavor those who rely primarily upon the publicly controlled pans of the network.  In 
essense, in gaining the benefits of market-led diversity, U.S. policy risks sacrificing the 
benefits of an integrated infrastructure. 
S National policy towards telecommunications stemmed from two main principles embodied in the 
Communications Act of 1934. that the network was a nannl monopoly which required a single provider. 
and that it was socially desirable to offer universal and homogeneous telephone service. 
6  As we define more fully below, the Bell System qualifies as an economic infrasuucture because it 
pro  .. ided a ubiquitous input. characterized by indivisibility. and generating substantial ex&emal economic 
benefitS capturable primarily by those who used n1ther than produced it. 
7  Eli Noam. "The Public Telecommunications Network: A Concept in Transition",  JoW711Ji of 
Communictllion, Vol. 37, No.1, Winter 1987. -12-
We build our case by analyzing sequentially two inter-related variables.  These 
are: (1) U.S. telecommunications-related policies toward network resources- toward that 
is, the network facilities, methods of control. and semces that comprise those resources; 
and (2) corporate strategies that employ such network alternatives in indUStrial 
production. 
As hinted above, policy matters to the analysis for obvious reasons. 
Communications policies shape the development, deployment and configuration of the 
network resources which comprise the nation's communications infrastructure.  Simply 
Stated. policies shape the available network alternatives to which users have access.  In 
section L we analyze several decades of U.S. regulatory policy to show how the 
availability of network resources has evolved. 
The available network alternatives in turn represent a panem of constraint and 
opportunity facing economic acton as they develop their strategies.S  In section 2.. we 
show how the network resources available to leading edge business users shape company 
Strategy choices. 
We focus on leading edge users for several reasons.  rU'St, the networks of leading 
users are part of the communications infrastructure and provide precise case studies of 
how networks influence economic behavior.  Second. leading users represent the cutting 
edge of communications demand in the U.S., and by their choices mongly influence the 
development and availability of all network resources whether employed publicly or 
privately.  Large private users account for 4()41, of the switch awket,  20CJ& of  microwave 
and tiber-optic transmission equipment and electtonics, 8090 of the market for satellite 
transmission services. 9  · 
Third, as BellSouth' s Richard Snelling implicitly confinns, leading user needs 
and strategies shape the evolution of the public network: 
.•. the imponant reason to [employ advanced network intelligence is] if you 
don't do it, somebody else will - and the intelligent network will leave the 
public  network. If you  really  want to  be  in  business  at the  tum of the 
century  as  a  telecommunications  organization_.  then  the  intelligent 
network is simply a revenue protection deployment strategy.lO 
In short. a significant part of  the investment strategy for the public phone network is 
dictated by the need to offer a resource that is continuously relevant to those who supply 
most of the revenues. 
8 For an elaboration of how such srructural alternatives constrain and promote sttatqies. see the 
discussion in Michael Bonus, Competing for CofllTol: Amuica' s Stllke in Microelecrronia. (Cvnbridge: 
Ballinger. 1988). at chapter 3. 
9  Huber. Peter, The Geodesic Network: 1987 Report on Competition in the Telephone Jl'lliusrry,  AntitruSt 
Division, US  DepL of Justice, 1987 at pl.ll. 
10  Quoted in '"Expens Look Behind tbe IN Concept.· Telephony's Transmission S{Hcial. OctOber, 1988, 
p.l8. - 13-
The choices of major users are, then, a prime force behind the evolution of the 
network infrastructure, directly as they build networks, and indirectly as their demands 
influence other private and public network decisions.  The evolving infrasttucture, in 
turn, offers new kinds of network resources and influences overall economic 
performance.  Section 3 makes the case that different network alternatives indirectly 
shape economic performance by opening and foreclosing opponunities for more effective 
coordination of resource allocation and by favoring or frustrating the experimentation 
and learning that shape dynamic perfonnance. 
Our argument. in shon. can be summarized ·as follows.  Regulatory policy shapes 
the availability of network resources.  Available network resources constrain and shape 
corporate strategy.  Corporate _choices shape the continuing evolution of the 
infrastructure.  The evolving infrastructure influences economic performance.  Since 
policy helped to set the original menu of network alternatives that constitute the 
infrastructure. policy can intervene to re-shape the infrastructure to ensure better 
economic perfonnance.  The concluding section proposes appropriate policies toward 
that end for the U.S.:  The question for U.S. policy- the subtext of the current debate on 
an Open Network ArchitectUre (ONA) - is whether it is possible to gain the benefits of a 
unifonn infrastructure by re-integrating its diverse fragments through a unified scheme 
for network management and controL -15-
L REGULATING THE EVOLUTION OF THE TELECOl\iMUNICATIONS 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Vlhat do we mean by "the telecommunications infrastructUre"?  Traditional 
approaches usually treat as "infrastructure" only the physical facilities, the hardware that 
constitutes the network. In that view, the purpose of the physical network infrastructUre is 
to suppon a range of telecommunications services 11.  By contrast, our definition 
includes all three distinct functions performed by a telecommunications networlc: 
transmission, management, and applications 12.  In this view, the telecom infrasttucture 
(the physical facilities, their management mechanisms, and the services that ride on 
them) suppons the rest of the economy as it fulfills the necessary function of 
communication. 
The network facilities,  line~ trunks, switches and terminals, perform the 
transmission function as they carry coded infonnation from one point to another.  The 
second function, management, refers to the set of  rules and mechanisms required to make 
use of the ttansmission facilities: finding a physical route between two terminals, 
establishing a connection, keeping traclc of which user will pay which transmission 
facility provider, diagnosing breakdowns, and the like.  Third, the application is the 
delivered form of the service provided by the telecom infrastructure to the user: a 
telephone call, electronic mail, or a data transaction. 
We view the network infrastructure as composed of three layers, that cor.respond 
to these three functions.  Each layer "rides" on top of the preceding one, in a way 
conceprually similar to the OSI modeL  At the bottom is the tnnsmission layer, 
representing the physical plant of the infrasttucture.  Directly above it is the management 
layer, containing a set of "rules of the road" that regulates how information tnnsits 
through the lower layer.  Atop these two is the application layer, the only one the final 
user directly deals withl3. 
These distinctions have not typically animated U.S. telecommunications policy. 
In the course of dealing with other concerns, however, U.S. policy has treated the various 
layers of the telecom network infrasttucture quite differently.  During the Bell System's 
heyday, from the Communication's Act of 1934 to roughly the 1970s, the bottom and 
middle layers (transmission and network management) were  strictly regulated and 
provided by the monopoly.  The Bell System was limited to providing basic phone 
service at the application layer, but few rules conslnined the development  of 
applications and the use of the nerworlc to carry those applications by users standing 
outSide the Bell System. 
11 see for example: Bruce, Robert R. Jeffrey P. Cunard. and Mark D. Director, From Telecommwaicm:ions 
to Electronic Services:  A Global Spectn~m of  Dejiniti.Dn.s. Bo11.111i.t:Jry l...i.nlls. and Slni.Ctures,  Buuuworths. 
1986. 
12  This modeJ is inspired from  Curi~  Nicolas, and Michel Oensollc:n, '"De la Th6orie des Sauc:tures 
Industrielles a l'Economie des Reseaux de Telecommunications•, in Revw Economiqw, No 2. March 
1987, p.S21-578, where they distinguish tbe tJuee functions of rrtli1Smi.ssion.  ~114miMment,  and trailemen.:. 
13  This model is not only valid for telecommunications, but applies also tO other network infrastrUctureS • 
.For example. tbe railroad system an similarly be viewed as composed of a physical aanspozt layer (D"aCks, 
switches, stations, etc-.). a management layer (a set of schedules, pricing mechanisms, rules for handling 
foreign cars •.•. ). and an application layer (different classes of travel, refrigerated tr.msponation .. -). -16-
This tension between conmaint on the lower layers of the infrastrUcture and on 
A IT's service provision, combined with freedom of use of the top layer, eventually 
undennined the Bell System as a whole.  As users pushed for more and more control over 
the bottom layers of the infrastructure in order to implement more completely their 
freedom at the top layer, A IT  responded by demanding more and more freedom to 
manuever at the applications layer in return for being exposed to competition at the lower 
layers. 
In typical U.S. fashion, these battles were fought administratively in the major 
telecom policy-making arenas and in the couns.  They provide the sub-rosa stories 
behind the evolution of US telecommunications policy over the past thiny years.  One 
story is of gradual deregulation, presided over by Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), in which more and more of the Bell System was gradually exposed to 
competition.  The other story is of divestiture, fought largely in the couns, which ended 
by rending the Bell System and fonnally eliminating A  IT's monopoly over the bottOm 
network layers in order to give it freedom to play in the top layer. 
Deregulation and Divestiture 
Deregulation and divestiture arose from two intetrelated effortS.  The first 
dominant and successful effon was, at the level of industrial development and firm 
strategies, waged by major users and producers of telecommunications equipment 
progressively to remove control over the Structure, evolution and uses of 
telecommunications from regulatory and judicial constraints.  They considered this a 
prerequisite to the implementation of the networldng strategies described in the next 
section.  While major users needed to control their increasingly information-oriented 
environmentS and major equipment producers were eager to meet those needs, neither 
was fully able to accomP.lish this within the organization of the then-existing national 
telecom infrastrUcture. I~ 
The second drive, at the policy level, was the gradual abdication of government 
responsibility over the equitable development of the nation's telecommunications 
infrastructure and the delegation of that role to market competition (i.e. to the control of 
major users and producers).  The desire for rapid and efficient exploitation of 
technological change, in particular the development of new tranSmission technologies 
and the convergence of computing and communications, seiVed two purposes.  It 
provided the opponunity for AT&T, its competitors and major customers to push 
government policy toward deregulation and divestiture.  It also provided the necessary 
justification for U.S. policy-makers to turn toward the market as their easy way out of the 
difficulty of maintaining control over the national telecommunications infrastructure in a 
time of rapid technological change.  · 
14 The interventions of major corporate and public users, that provoked change and detennined its fonn, in 
the regulatory and judicial decisions  le:~ding lO deregulation and divestiture, are amply documented in Dan 
Shiller. Teiemarics and Governmen.r. Ablex Publishing, NJ  .•  1982, pan one, p.  1-96. -17-
From 1934 on, telecommunications policy in the United States sought to "make 
available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, 
nationwide and world wide wire and radio communication service with adequate 
facilities at reasonable charges"l.5.  Policy stemmed from two main principles.  First, was 
the belief that the construction ·and operation of  a telecommunications network was a 
natural monopoly.  Because of its inherent economies of  scale and scope, the job was 
done better and more cheaply by a single entity.  Second, it was believed socially 
desirable to offer universal and homogeneous telephone service.  In essense, the telecom 
network was considered and treated primarily as a public good. 
The intent of regulation, consequently, was to contrOl monopoly power and 
provide universal service at affordable rates for all Americans.  Its principal instruments 
were rate-setting and the power to compel interconnection to the Bell system.  The 
purposes of such con trois were to prohibit discrimination in the availability and price of 
services - except in the pursuit of socially desirable cross-subsidies - and to prevent the 
monopoly canier, AT&T, from earning monopoly profits. 
Although there were some 1500 independent telephone companies in the US 
(together constituting some 1.590 of the national network), the Bell System's monopoly 
over 8.5% of the nation's network meant that AT&T' s decisions on network evolution, 
equipment and services were adopted as de facto standards throughout the national 
network.  In effect, AT & T contrOlled the planning, operation, mucmre and evolution of 
the nation's telecommunications network infrasuuc:ture, under regulatory constraints 
imposed by the FCC and state-level policies.  Overall, regulation was essentially reactive 
to AT&T's behavior and dependent upon its dam. 
Telecommunications policy really had no motive beyond the goals of monopoly 
containment and universal service.  However, the vision of the telecom network (largely 
framed by AT&T) conesponded closely with the uaditional definition of an 
infrastrUCtUre although it was never explicidy articulated in such termS:  The Bell SyStem 
looked alot like a ubiquitous input characterized by externalities and indivisibility, that 
could only be provided on a monopoly basis.  During this initial phase in the United 
States, the transmission and management layers of the network infrastructure were 
mostly under the absolute contrOl of AT&T.  The application layer was then essentially 
limited to telephony and rested en~y  under the users' concrol. 
Divestiture and deregulation intrOduced competition within this integrated 
infrastructure and progressively, but thoroughly, led to its frapnentation.  Two pressures 
on the infrastrUcture, from the bottom-up and from the top-down. converged on the path 
of increasing fragmentation.  The first was the idea that competition in 
telecommunications services and equipment over the Bell system network was not only 
tolerable, but ought to be encouraged by the FCC.  With the demise of the natural 
monopoly status of the network. this brought about increasing fragmentation of the US 
network infrastructure from the bonom layer up. 
The second was the dramatic development of  the application layer, as the 
telecommunications network supponed a growing variety of uses addressing the multiple 
needs of users.  Intense competition for the provision of these applications, which had 
never been considered a natural monopoly, reinforced the fi'agmentation of the network 
infrastrucrure, this rime from the top layer down. 
lS The Federal CommuniQtions Act of 1934.47 tJ.S.C. 151. -18-
Four sets of FCC decisions in particular have been critical to the introduction of 
competition in the national telecommunications network and the restructuring of the 
terms of access and interconnection to, and use of the network it entails.  These have 1) 
permitted the sale and interconnection of terminal equipment manufactured by suppliers 
other than Western Electric; 2) permitted the establishment of competitive long distance 
service providers and ensured their access to the local switched network for origination 
and termination of their services; 3) permitted the resale and shared use of lines leased 
from AT&T and other common carriers; and 4) acknowledged the blurring of industry 
lines between communications and computing, and permitted enhanced communications 
services and equipment to be offered on an unregulated basis. 
In parallel with these deregulatory moves, and setting the context within which 
they operated, the Bell System 'Yas also judicially constrained by the terms of the 1956 
Consent Decree between AIT and the Department of Justice16.  That decree enjoined 
AT&T from entering any market other than regulated common earner communications 
(except in the area of defense contracting), prohibited its production arm, Western 
Electric, from manufacturing any equipment other than used by the Bell system, and 
required AT&T to licence Bell Labs' patents and provide technical know how to all 
applicants upon payment of reasonable royalties.  Thus, while AT  &Ts traditional 
business was regulated, it was baiTed from entering new markets entirely, and was forced 
to provide substantial amounts of its technical research, development and expertise to 
potential competitors (whether producers or users) in both its traditional and related 
markets. 
As the FCC moved to pennit competition in telecommunications, and when it 
could no longer maintain the fiction of a clear line between traditional 
telecommunications and closely related markets like data processing, the obvious quid 
pro quo was going to be the permission for AT&T tO enter new markets.  To achieve that. 
a revision of the 1956 Consent Decree was necessary, and this is exactly what divestiture 
achieved in 1984. 
The next subsections examine the major regulatory and juridical decisions along 
the intertWined paths of deregulation and divestiture.  Rather than interpreting those 
decisions in a traditional manner, the intent is to filter them through the lens of the three 
layers of the network infrastructure model.  In the process, we show how the pressures 
emanating from below and above the three layers led gradually to fragmentation of the 
infrastructure as a whole. 
Competition at the lower layers: Facilities and Management 
The FCC decisions over the past 30 years to permit competition in different 
segments of the national nerwor~ have provoked the progressive fragmentation of the 
physical layer of the network infrastructure.  Two setS of decisions in panicular have 
been critical to this fragmentation of the infrastructure from the bottom up.  FirSt the 
"interconnect" decisions, "Hush-a-Phone" (1956) and "Carterphone" (1968), opened the 
way to provision and interconnection of customer premises equipment manufactured by 
others than Western Electric.  After requiring the use of an AT&T -supplied connecting 
device for a period, the FCC adopted a registration and certification program in 1975, 
permitting direct connection to the public network upon meeting technical standards. 
16 United Sraus v.  Western Electric Company. 1956 Trade cases (CCH) 68246 (D.NJ. 1956). -19-
These interconnect decisions had two important consequences.  Firs~ they 
transferred control over the ownership and uses of interconnect equipment from AT&T to 
the users.  This directly permitted the users themselves, acting through their choices in 
the  marlce~ to determine what kinds of equipment serving which ends would be 
interconnected to the national network.  The decisions opened a small loophole for users 
through which they would eventually push their development and use of  entire private 
networks. 
Second. substantial control over the development of terminal equipment was 
transferred from AT&T to rival suppliers. who could later underwrite the emergence of 
competitive service supply.  Taken together these two consequences were the 
culmination of mounting pressure from major users and producers on the FCC to give 
them increasing responsibility for the customer premises portion of the 
telecommunications network, and to permit a wider range of choice in equipment than 
AT&T was willing to offer. 
A second set of  FCC decisions further promoted the fragmentation of the physical 
network infrasttuctUre, this time by introducing competition in the transmission area. 
With "Above 890" (1958), the FCC authorized certain large, private corporate users to set 
up microwave networks for their own use. The "Open Skies" (1972) and the "Execunet" 
decisions (1977 •  78) permitted the supply and usage of  public network facilities 
competing with those of the established monopoly.  Taken together, these decisions 
represented the next crucial step in devolving responsibility for control and development 
of the nation's telecommunications infrasttucture to major users and suppliers of 
equipment and services. 
Behind these decisions was the argument that new network technologies based 
on microwave transmission or microelectronics made it technologically and 
economically feasible for several £inns to provide competing netwOrk facilities and 
services.  Moreover, even if  telecom networks wen: still to be considered as a natural 
monopoly, pn:cluding competition restricted innovation and denied network users 
potential benefitS of diversity that far outweighed the benefits of scale and scope 
economies 17.  In  consequen~  the physical network infrastructure was no longer 
considered indivisible, and rival network providers were allowed to compete with AT&T. 
Indeed, private networks (or netWOrks designed for a specific set of users) made it 
progressively easier to internalize subsets of the external economies traditionally 
associated with the infrastructure:  Those building the networks were increasingly able to 
reap a larger share of the benefitS the networks generated.  The telecom network(s), 
regulators believ~ behaved less and less like a traditional infrastructure, and resembled 
more and men: a set of competitive productS and services, more fit for market 
mechanisms than for government regulation. 
1  i This set of arguments is put forward in the set of decisions concerning MCI. most notably EucUMz. -20-
Of course, management of this fragmented physical infrastrUcture was equally 
fragmented, with each competitor controlling its own network.  However, the 
management layer also became somewhat more fragmented as outsiders to the Bell 
network were allowed increasing control over the management of the lines they leased 
from the public netw9rk.  The third set of FCC decisions "Resale and Shared Use" (1976-
1981 ), substantially amplified the impact of the above decisions by eliminating 
restrictions on the resale of leased circuits, and on the sharing of bulk rate leased circuits. 
It gradually eroded AT&T' s monopoly over the management of its own network facilities 
as it permitted users to manage circuits that were owned by Bell but no longer controlled 
by the monopoly. 
In effec~ these decisions· further devolved to users contrOl over the proliferation 
of new networks that together constitute the nation's telecommunications infrastructure. 
They permitted users to further fragment the network and to gain added control over 
smaller pieces of the network for dedicated uses, this time through the more open access 
it granted them to the management layer of the network.  In essence, this prefigured the 
"unbundling" of the network that would be developed later in the third Computer Inquiry 
(see below). 
The introduction of fragmentation into the management and facilities layers of the 
network was given a dramatic and radical boost with the break-up of the Bell system. 
The divestiture settlemen~ as modified and approved on August 24, 1983 (the 
Modification of Final Judgment, or MFJ), marked the beginning of a new era of 
competition in telecommunications services and equipment, and represents a new chaner 
delimiting the terms and dynamic of that competition. 
The divestiture took effect on January 1, 1984, carving the old Bell System into 
the new AT&T and seven regional holding companies encompassing the 22 existing local 
operating companies.  AT&T retained the long distance network and services  .. Western 
Electric, Bell Labs, A  IT-Information Systems, andAT&T-Intemational.  AT&T 
remained regulated only in its long-distance business, and was left free to enter any other 
market (except local service) on an unregulated basis. 
The Regional Holding Companies own and control the embedded local public 
switched telephone network over which they retain a monopoly.  They may enter new 
businesses (except long distance and manufacturing), but must first obtain a waiver from 
the ?v1FJ restrictions by convincing the Coun that they can not abuse their monopoly 
power to gain unfair advantage in the market they seek to enter.  To date., the coun has 
more or less barred the Regionals from participating in the provision of information 
services at the applications layer.  Paradoxically, the Bell System remnants remain the 
only major entities without freedom to operate on top of their own networks. 
Competition on top: The diversification or Applications 
The dramatic proliferation of applications reinforced the fragmentation of the 
network infrastructure, this time from the top (application) layer down.  The telecom 
networks were no Ion ger used simply to transmit telephone conversations, but supponed 
a growing variety of uses, made possible by •.he convergence of data processing and 
communications.  The founh imponant set of FCC decisions, the first two Computer 
Inquiries (  1971 and 1980), acknowledged this convergence and attempted to draw the 
line between the traditional telecommunications services, which remained regulated, and 
the rapidly growing new data processing services, which were unregulated. -21-
Computer I adopted an ambiguous and untenable "relative use" standard to draw 
the line - was the relative use of the service in question mostly telecommunications or 
computing?  Critically, it acknowledged that AT&T was barred by the 1956 Consent 
Decree from offering services the "relative use" of which was mostly computing.  AT&T 
responded by refusing to lease its circuits to data processing service companies, on the 
ground that their use of these lines was an impermissible resale of circuit capacity.  The 
subsequent resale decisions forced the removal of this roadblock. and cleared the way for 
AT&T' s cnay into the new competitive data services market after Computer n. 
The Computer n  decision eliminated the definitional problems and moved 
substantially tow~  complete deregulation.  The FCC adopted a distinction between 
basic transmission and enhanced services.  Only basic transmission was to remain 
regulated, while enhanced services remained fully deregulated. 
~e  FCC's decisions in this area were a product of  intense but conflicting 
pressures from users and AT&T.  From the user side, then: were enormous pressures to 
acquire data networking capabilities and services necessary for their own competitive 
Strategies, but unlikely to be provided in a tailored way by AT&T alone.  For the FCC, 
the desire to create a competitive market in enhanced services was the justification. 
AT&T, in tum, was willing :~ permit further devolution of control over the evolution of 
the network in rerum for freedom of play in the fastest growing markets - data 
communications and information processing. 
Critically, the application layer- and primarily data applications - typically grew 
"outside" of the ttaditionalconceptual framework governing telecommunications policy, 
characterized by monopoly, mandated connectivity, and universal service obligation. 
This was partly because the application layer had been outside of  AT&Ts realm, but also 
because regulators did not wish to bring it within the traditional regulatory framework. 
far fear that this would stifle iMovation and diversity.  From the beginning, competition 
ruled the provision of all applications that went beyond basic telephony, and 
fragmentation was therefore pervasive. 
The diversification of  applications foStered funher fragmentation of the lower 
network layers.  Providers of specific applications ~metimes  believed the existing public 
network was not perfectly adapted to the service they sought to offer.  In tum. they chose 
to build and operate their own facilities.  In fact. it was precisely to provide applications 
and services not available through the monopoly Bell system that MCI was authorized to 
build its own facilities and compete with the Bell network. In this way, many of the 
decisions creating competition in facilities were intertwined with pressures emanating 
from the top network layer.  Indeed, as argued above, the break-up of the Bell SyStem 
itSelf was the culminating response to those pressures. 
The problems of fragmentation: roots of ONA -22-
Radically transformed by deregulation and divestiture, a new network 
infrastructure has emerged, characterized by increasing fragmentation and differentiation: 
fragmentation of ownership, control, access, and of the network itself; differentiation of 
uses, providers and clients.  The operation, management, and evolution of this 
infrastructure has become less and less regulat~ increasingly ruled by market 
competition.  While competition galvanizes innovation and gives users bener control 
over their communications resources, the concomitant fragmentation of the national 
telecommunications infrastructure imposes two main limitations on the applications and 
services it delivers, posing problems for the companies and economy relying upon these 
for competitiveness.  These two limitations are (  1) the inability of the largest network 
operators, the BOCs, to provide infonnation services, and (2) the difficulty -sometimes 
the impossibility- to develop integrated applications spanning various segmentS of a 
fragmented underlying facilities and management infrastrUcture. 
First, the largest providers of the two lower network layers, the post-divestiture 
BOCs, have been mostly barred from the provision of enhanced applications through 
restrictions imposed by the MFJ.  The regulators' intent was to preserve open and fair 
competition in the enhanced applications markets by keeping the Bell Companies out of 
it so long as their networks represented bottle-neck monopolies at the local level.  There 
is however another way to understand this argument: the BOCs would have an advantage 
in the enhanced services market not simply because they could unfairly -and 
inefficiently for the users-- abuse their monopoly power, but rather because it is more 
efficient to provide some enhanced services as an integrated part of the basic network. 
A  TI  and the BOCs are the main proponents of this second view, and were able 
successfully to argue that  Co~puter  D's separate subsidiaries requirements barring them 
from providing enhanced services as an integrated part of their basic network entailed 
excessive costS and resulted in inefficient use of the public network.  This was one of the 
FCC's main reasons for seeking funher de-regulation through its Computer m  inquiry. 
In the FCC's words. "the Computer n  structural sepantion requirements have denied the 
public the benefits of enhanced services that cannot be offered unless they are integrated 
into the public network" 18.  The FCC's Report and Order cites as examples of such 
services "protocol conversion. VMS services, and innovative routing and switching 
functions." 
Another parallel cumnt in US regulatory politics is seeking more freedom for the 
BOCS, this rime through elimination of the MFJ restrictions.  In this effon, the Bell 
Companies are joined by the FCC (for the reasons explained above), the Department of 
Justice (Dol), and the Commerce Depamnent through its National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration (NTIA).  As pan of the Dol's first triennal review of the 
divestiture, it argued that the proliferation of bypass alternatives had eliminated the local 
network bottleneck, and therefore made the MFJ restrictions superfluousl9.  The NTIA 
has taken the lead in that coalition, for a number of reason that include its desire to see 
the manufacturing restrictions rescinded so that the BOCs may contribute something 
positive to the telecommunication's trade balance.20 
18  FCC, Third Compuur Inquiry, Report and Order, released June 16. 1986, p. 29. 
19  Huber. op. cir. 
20  Morgan, Kevin, and Douglass Piu.  "Coping with Turbulence: Corporate Strategy, Regulatory Politics 
and Telematics in Post-Divestiture America", Proceedings of  ZM Communica:ions Policy Reseeuch 
Conference, Windsor. June 1988. -23-
The court however refused to make any fundamental change in the MFJ 
restrictions. arguing that the BOCs monopoly bottleneck remained as strong as at the 
time of divestiture.  Judge Green funher expressed doubts in the FCC's ability to prevent 
anti-competitive behavior on the pan of the BOCs without suuc:mral safeguards2I. 
However, the Court's decision allowed the BOCs to provide gateways for videotex and 
other information services, with features limited to data transmission, address translation, 
protocol conversion, billinJ manaccmen~  and introductory display and help screens.  In 
addition. Greene's ruling allowed the BOCs to offer electronic mail and voice mail 
within their local access and transport areas (LA  TAs). These authoriDrions joined the 
more than 100 waivers already granted to various BOCs to enter an array of businesses 
outside basic local telecommunications, from real estate to engineering consulting 
services. 
The combined pressures to lift the sttucmral sepamtion safeguards and to rescind 
-or waive- the MFJ restrictions, tend to place increased capabilities within the public 
network.  They promote a conception of the public telecommunications infrastrucmre as 
an integrated resource directly able to satisfy an increasinc variety of user needs.  This 
conception conauts with another which conceives the telecommunications infnstructure 
as a reservoir of network pieces available for major uscm and service providers to pick 
and choose from, and assemble in various configurations to serve their particular needs. 
It is this latter vision which more directly run$ into the second kind of limitation imposed 
by the infrastructure's fragmentation. 
Indeed. the fragmentation of  the underlying transmission and management layers 
of the network infrasuucture seriously limits the development of information services in 
two ways.  rlfSt and moSt obviously it leads to fragmented applications. thereby 
restricting their potential economic benefitS.  There are today, for example, some 10 
major electronic mail services in the US, offered over distinct networks (MCI's MCI· 
Mail. AT&T's A  IT-Mail. Telenet's Telemail, etC.-) which are not interconnected22. 
Similarly, it is often difficult to integrate various applications which were initially 
developed for different economic sectors over different networks. 
Second and more insidiously. lower layer fragmentation prevents Enhanced 
Services Providers (ESPs - the non-regulated players of  the top application layer, which 
could include divisions of major users which provide internal corporate information 
se:vices) from fully drawing on the resources imbedded within the public 
telecommunications infrastructure.  They arc unable to integrate their applications tightly 
and efficiently within the ttansmission and management mechanisms of the regulated 
networks they use to deliver their applications.  They ~  in shon, denied the benefitS of 
full use of an integrated network infrastructure. 
21  Judge Oreene. Opinion. US vs WuiUII Elcctrk. CiYileritJn 8210192. WashingtOn DC. Dis&rict Court. 
September 1987. 
22  ImponantJy, tbis is not a problem of S&andardizalion: the SWidard. ccrrrs X.400, exist and bas been 
adopted 'by moSt E·mail providers.  Ralhcr. it  is sua&qic decisions by the E-Mail providers. such as their 
understandable reluctance to share user directories. &hat prevent inaerconnection because of  the problems 
they raise within the management layer.  It is inceresling to remember that similarly for the interconnection 
of the various railroacl syscems in the US, physical standards (Jauge. links between em_) posed only 
minor problems while in~eroperability wilhin the management layer (handling of  foreign em. 
harmonization of tariffs and schedules_) lOOk much lon1er to achieve.  Chandler. 1M Visible Hand, chap 
4: Railroad Cooperation and Competition. -24-
The main regulatory thrust of the FCC today, embodied in its Computer Inquiry 
m, is an attempt simultaneously to overcome these two limitations fragmentation has 
imposed upon the infrastructure's efficiency.  Computer m  aims to develop a framework 
that can both do away with structural separation, allowing the BOCs to provide 
information services, and provide better access for ESPs to the public nerworlc.  The FCC 
initially proposed the intermediary concept of Comparably Efficient Interconnection  <CEn.  CEI standards require that RBOCs which offer an enhanced service make 
available to other enhanced service providers on an "unbundled and functionally equal 
basis" the basic services they use to provide their enhanced selVice. 
The current proposal, to adopt an Open Network Architecture (ONA), emerged as 
a response to the FCC's request for CEI.  ONA goes beyond CEI: while the CEI 
requirement is triggered only by a BOC' s decision to offer an enhanced service; the ONA 
proposals would promote the automatic provision of comparably efficient 
interconnections to all who deliver services over the public network, be they the BOC 
itself or competing information service providers.  In essence, the FCC hopes that widely 
deployed ONA would "provide a self-enforcln& framework" to "promote the efficiency 
of the telecommunications network, in pan by pennitting the technical integration of 
basic and enhanced services and in part by  preservin~ competition through the control of 
potential anticompetitive behavior by the carriers" .23 
The ONA concept contains two major elements, corresponding to two meanings 
of the word "open".  First, the network would be "open to all equally."  ONA would 
provide a standardized, equally available interface with the public network tO all 
competing ESPs, including the BOC itself in its role as an ESP.  Second, the network's 
service would be cracked open, "unbundled" into its various elementary components, the 
Basic Service Elements (BSEs), which would become individually accessible. 
Neither equal access nor fragmentation represent anything new within the US 
telecommunications regulatory context  Indeed, they constitute the essential basis that 
pennits competition within the US network infrastruCtUre.  However, what is new is that 
ONA carries equal access and fragmentation into the very heart of the network, its 
switching and signalling mechanisms, what we have called the network's 
management layer. 
In this sense, ONA can be seen as the ultimate step of a fragmentation process 
staned 30 years ago with Hush-a-phone.24  Deregulation and divestiture have 
fragmented the transmission facilities of the US network infrastructure, the proliferation 
of uses has reinforced that fragmentation, now ONA will fragment its intimate 
management mechanisms.  Paradoxically however, ONA could also become the antidote 
to the infrastructure's fragmentation.  If  it succeeds in providing equal access to the 
various pieces of the infrastructure, it could offer vinually integrated management 
mechanisms, overcoming the infrastructUre's physical fragmentation. 
It is, however, a very open question whether it is possible to provide the benefits 
of integration through virtual management of a diverse infrastructure.  Rather more 
cenain, by contrast, are the benefits of diversity that have flowed from  Li1e fragmented 
infrasttucrure to the largest, most sophisticated U.S. users.  The next section examines 
their experience. 
23  FCC, Compuur Ill Report and Order, at p. 104. 
24  Alain Vallee. "Les reseaux ouvens: Concept- Enjeux- Perspectives". in us  Dossiers tiJl SPES. France 
Telecom. March 1988. -25-
n. INFORMATION NETWORlONG AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 
Diptal telecommunications networks have become pervasive facts of life at the 
leading edge of corporate practice in the United States.  Once simply taken for granted 
and usually neglected in corporate suategy, privately controlled network facilities and the 
communications services nm over them are mcreasiDgly Strategic assetS to the largest 
business users.25  Reflecting this trend, corporate spending on information technology 
hardware as a percentage of total business equipment investment has at least quintupled 
over the past decade, while the U.S. telecommunications equipment and services 
industries, driven largely by business user demand, have grown to become nearly a 200 
billion dollar economic sector.26 
The dramatic and rapid adoption of  this teChnology by America's leading 
corporations is in part a competitive response to radical shifts in formerly Stable market 
environmentS over the past two decades.  During that time, U.S. manufacturing has been 
jolted by vastly increased international competition and by a succession of external  · 
shocks ranging from multiple oil crises to dramatic currency fluctuations.  Leading edge 
U.S. services have been similarly vexed, panicularly in the critical financial arena, by the 
double whammy of increased international exposure and successive domestic 
deregulations that redrew established market boundaries. 
Competition and external shocks eliminated the Stable and steady growth 
America's great corporations had come to expect.  Those mass producers and distributors 
of goods and services had developed because administrative hierarchies could coordinate 
more efficiently than marketS the rapid, high-volume flow of. goods and services to mass 
marketS - in effect, the. visible hand of managerial coordination outperformed the 
invisible hand of the market.27  By internalizing and coordinating the numerous 
ttansactions in the chain from supply to customer, the larae corporation imposed stability 
on market relations and thrived on it.28 
2S  By using the modifier 'priva&ely contrOlled·. we mean to scparaae issues ofDC:rNOrt ownaship from 
issues of who eoncrols the configuration, access. functionality of. applications delivered. and dam gene:a&ed 
over communications netWorks.  Thus, our dermi&ion of 'privaady conaoDed' Detwoda would include 
corporate netWorks that combine lines leased from common carriers widl wboDy-owned cransmission and 
swirching. join&ly owned inter-organizational netWOrks. and software-defined netWarks operated jointly 
with common caniers. so long as the corpora~&  CUStomer dicwed ccnfiauration, access. and applications 
within the available functional consnints ot the netWOrk. 
26  Hardware spending is from dam compiled by BellSouth; to&al telc:com sector sales as compiled by 
CBEMA and detailed in CommunicationsWeet. November 28, 1988. p.l and 4()_ 
27  This is argued persuasively in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., 1M 'Y&Sibk HIJIIIJ.: 1M  MQIJ/lgerilli Revolll.lion in 
American Business. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
28  The analysis of corporate hierarchies as internalizing transactions cosu is developed in R. Coase. "The 
Nature of the Firm.· 4 Economica 386 (1937) and expanded upon by Oliver Williamson in, e.g  .. his 
Marurs and Hicrarcnus. (New York: The Free Press. 197S). -26-
But as stable market relationships came unstuck in the 1970s, the costs of 
coordinating the corporate en~  rose in band with the inability to fully use all 
available corporate resources.2Y  Simultaneously, the penalties associated with slow 
adaptation to the changed environment also rose dramatically.  Indeed, as several U.S. 
companies - and on occasion entire industries - discovered, entrenched market positions 
could be eliminated in remarkably sbon ordc:r.30  One consequence was the tum to 
technology which could simultaneously increase effective coordination and better utilize 
corporate assetS, while increasing the speed and flexibility of  corporate response to rapid 
market shifts and reducing the information coStS of gauging them.  Self-evidently, 
information network technology fit the bill precisely. 
Information technology was tadily available partly because most of the products 
were developed first in the U.S .. and nonnally in conjunction with large U.S. customers. 
Of perhaps greater imponance to those customers, however, was the availability of 
integrating and managing the technical resources and infomwion flows through the 
development of privately controlled networks.  He~,  as the last section suggested, U.S. 
business was assisted considerably by the gradual devolution of conaol over 
communications facilities and services from government regulated monopoly to users 
expressing demand through the market.31  For those able to exercise substantial market 
power. notably the leading edge large businesses of the economy, the increasing 
competition in U.S. communications marketS meant access to dramatic and diverse 
innovations in communications productS and services.32 
The innovations have been put to good use, initially in better managing a 
company's internal processes through improved coordination and asset usage, radically 
increased responsiveness and flexibility, much better infonnation access, analysis and 
feedback to new products and services.  In tum, leading users are being tranSfonned as 
they deploy the network technology of information control, gain experience with it, and 
learn from itS development and use.  rundamental changes in the ways that firms 
organize internally and with their suppliers and customers, radically altered patterns of 
infonnarion gathering, analysis and responsive competitive behavior, dramatic 
consequent transformations in business strategies, are all increasingly observable 
phenomena on the terrain where the leading users play.33 
29  For an analysis that argues a similar logic of adaptation. see Cristi:mo AntOnelli, eel.. NfttllnformtJtion 
Technology and lndu.strial Chmage: Tlw /IQJian CtJSC, (Dordrechc Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988) at 
Chapter 2. 
30  For example, the U.S. machine tOOl indusuy saw iuJapanese counaerpan's U.S. market share for 
cenain kinds of numerically conuoDed toOls increase Cram 5'1 tO 50'1 in four shcxt years in lbe 1aJe 1970s. 
while the U.S. chip industry lost its inaenwionalleadenbip durin1lhe early years of  lbe 1980s.  :Even 
mighty OM has lost 10 percentage points of  marlcet share in the past few years.  And tbe U.S. banking 
indusuy now boostS only one player in lbe world's tap 20, compared tO_ less than a  decade ago.  Similar 
evidence is obvious in most olher major iDdusuies. 
31  We have explored this devolution ofconU"'I in Michael Bonus. Fran~ois Bar. et. ~"The  Impaas of 
Divestiture and Deregulation: InfrasauClW'IJ Changes. Manufaaurinl Transition and Competition in the 
U.S. Telecommunications Indusuy" BRIE Wor.ting Papcn t12. (Berkeley: BRIE. 9/84).  We mme:pret it 
in section n below in the context of  OW' concem with infrasuucture and economic pe:fonnance. 
32  Fostering such diversity and innovation was, indeed. an avowed aim of  U.S. de·regulaiCJ'Y policy. 
33  The case studies of the U.S. User Oroup atteSt to these changes. as do numerous other cases drawn from 
the litenture cited in the prior footnote.  This contraStS with the conclusions for European large users 
drawn by T. Muller. B·A Vedin and 0-M Holst in lbeir "Large Users' Experience of Advanced 
Telecommunications Technology; (StoCkholm: Holst-Vedin Infonnation AB. November 1987-March 
1988).  As we indicate below, however. we believe thal their conclusions reflect the more limited 
experience of and greater constraints on European large users of digital networks.  A5 the European -27-
USL'tG TELECOMMVNJCAnONS TO CJlEATE COMPETmVE ADV  ~-rACE 
Companies have discovered how they could use the new telecominunications 
technologies to streamline their operations and modify their competitive environment to 
their advantage.  They are now using corporate networks to achieve a variety of 
competitive effects: to re-organize their internal operations, to fashion and better control 
their marketplace by linking up with their clients, or to coordinate and integrate their 
suppliers' production processes with their own.34  With those strategic objectives in 
min~  companies have deployed complex network am.ngemencs, combining pieces of the 
public networks with elements of  their own, jealously guarding critical management and 
control responsibilities while sharing or subcontracting others. 
Corporate networking is on the rise and companies setting up their own networks 
no longer constitute exceptions.  A StUdy by the US General Accounting Office indicated 
that between  16 and 29 percent of  large-volume telephone company customers are 
bypassing their local telephone companies, and that up to 53 percent of the large-volume 
customers are considering plans to initiate or increase such bypass activity .35 If  anything, 
these figures underestimate the trUe extent of bypass, since they rely on voluntary surveys 
of  companies that have no incentive to advertise the fact that they bypass.36  Because 
they are only concerned with bypass of the Local Exchange Carriers, these stUdies also 
underestimate the extent to which companies are installing private networks that reach far 
beyond the local leveL 
To be sure, corporate networks are not suictly private nerworlcs, since they rely 
extensively upon a variety of public networks.  They may be more accurately described 
as privately controlled networks.  Indeed, what matters in the end is who conaols the 
configuration of and access to the network. not whether a specific link is an optical fiber 
that belongs to the user, or a Tl rented from AT&T.  Companies have many reasons for 
taking charge of their telecommunications: reduce their phone bill, cut operating costS 
through better coordination, gain market share through better links with clients, or 
improve products through better communications with subcontractOrs. 
communications scene changes. we believe larp European rums will ccme to experience many of me 
stmegic changes we have found iD lbe U.S. c::ues. 
34 A mpidly growing business li=amre d!2ws from examples ol  the network applications insta1led by 
some pioneering companies. to picle lbe efforts of other businesses.  We dmw subswuially on ihat 
lite:acure to complement our own research.  See for example: Peter Keen, CD111peting ill TUM: Using 
TtitCD'I'MUUiicariQnsfo,. Competitive AdvtWQgt. Ballinp:r Publishina, Cambrid&e. MA. 1986.  Charles 
Wiseman. Scmegy and Compu=s: Information SystemS as Ccmpeuave Weapons. Dow Jones-Irwin. 
Homewood IL. 1985.  Byron Belitsos & Jay Misra. Business Telemllics. 1987.  ADd a series of articles in 
the Harvard Business Review: Erik Clemons & Wan= McFarlan. -relecom: Hook up or Lose out" ,July-
August 1986; Michael Poner & Viesor Millar. "How Information gives you Competitive Advantage", 
July-August 1985; Warren McFarlan. "'nformation Technology Changes the Way you Compete", May-
June 1984. 
35  U.S. General Accounting Office. TtitphoM Cof'IUfUtUJiciJlions: Bypass oftM Loctd TtkphoM 
ComptJilit:, (GAO/RCED-86-66). August 1986, p 36. 
36  Peter Huber. op. cit .• at appendix E: "A survey of Bypass Surveys". -28-
However, while the benefits of networking seem quite obvious, there are many 
distinct ways to deploy a particular set of telecom technologies towards these goals. 
Technology offers a set of possibilities, but neither determines nor clictates the specifics 
of the network arrangements corporations deploy.  Rather, the shape and characteristics 
of tflese networks can be traced back to the competitive strategies that motivated 
companies to build them in the first place.  They also reflect the constraints of a 
particular regulatory and market environment. 
This section examines the network stntegies of several large American 
companies.37  Through these cases, we explore how the strategic goals of these 
companies have shaped the networks they have built. and how these corporate networks 
reflect the spee.ific constraints and opponunities set-forth by the US telecommunications 
environment.  The links between strategies and networks, as well as the impact of the US 
environment on network deployment. pervade the three layers of the network 
infrastructure: physical facilities, control mechanisms, and applications.  The exploration 
of these links provides concrete examples of  how telecommunications networks function 
as an economic infrastructure, and sets up the discussion to be carried out in section m. 
We examine two distinct areas of infonnation networking, placing the emphasis 
on different characteristics of the process.  Fll'St, through an analysis of inter-company 
networking in the textile/apparel, distribution and automotive industries, we examine the 
potential of infonnation networking to transform and restructure the market ~d 
coordination relationships among economic actors.  Second, with examples from a bank, 
an electronics manufacturing firm and an automaker, we focus more particularly on 
networking within companies, and on its relationship to learning and experimentation. 
Levi S  ttauss & Co. has built LEVINET, its corporate network, to link its San 
Francisco headquaners with some SO production and distribution facilities throughout the 
United States. A major strategic thrust behind the deployment of Levi's network has been 
to bener coordinate and integrate different functions, from design and manufacruring to 
distribution and sales.  All of Levi's mainframes are located in the San Francisco 
headquaners, which constitutes the hub of the company's infonnation network.  They 
process design and manufacturing data. manage orders and inventory management. 
allocate production among the various plants, act as an order enO')' gateway, and manage 
the company's electronic mail.  Through a mix of private and public network links, 
Levi's has extended LEVINET towards its marketS, providing applications such as order 
enO')' and inventory management for sales representatives and retail stores. 
Levi's has opted for local production: over 90% of the products it sells in the 
United States are entirely manufactured here.  This decision has made it harder for Levi"s 
to rely on cheap labor for competitiveness, forcing the company to focus more directly on 
optimizing its operations.  LEVINET was considered an essential tool to achieve 
company-wide integration.  Levi's integration effon was initially focused on its internal 
operations (links between plants, disaibution centers and headquaners) and later 
extended to the development of downward links with sales offices, sales representatives, 
and retail outlets outside of the company. 
37  The case studies of Levi Stn1uss. McKesson, Bank of Ameri~  General Motors and Hewleu Packarli 
are based upon extensive interviews with many of tbe companies' personnel in charge of networ1cing 
strategy and operations.  We only stress here specific aspeas of these corporate network strategies. 
Complete descriptions are included in the case studies in appendix. -29-
We examine here more particularly this second dimension -downward 
integration toward the marketplace- for two reasons.  FU'St, it provides very interesting 
insightS into the links between Levi's business strategy and itS approach to networking, 
and  secon~  itS emphasis on open interconnectivity is quite original in the US context. 
The strategy rested on the development of industty-wide standards to facilitate 
communications between the retail outletS and apparel makers.  At its root was the 
recognition that network-based integration within individual rums would not suffice to 
ward off foreign competition, that the full benefits of  integration could only be captured 
through a concerted effon led jointly by the various members of the industry. 
The textile/apparel induStry in the United States is somewhat of a late-comer to 
the use of electronic links between apparel makers and distributors.  "Nhereas the 
supermarket indumy adopted Universal Product Codes (UPC, bar-codes), check~ut 
scanners and early versions of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) back in the mid-1970s, 
the textile-apparel-retail "filiere" only started to move in that direction about ten years 
later.  However it was able very rapidly to agree on industry-wide standards underlying 
the implementation of a quick response system. 
Levi's played an imponant role in this evolution, and in the creation two years 
ago of the Volunwy Inter-industry Communications Standards committee (VICS). 
VICS is an ad-hoc group of  top retaJler, apparel and textile executives, established to 
tailor Standards such as UPC. EDL PLU (Price Look-up Architeeture), and SCS 
(Shipping Container-marking Srandard) to the specific requirements of their industry, 
making possible direct eleCU"Onic links and the so-called "Quick Response" industry 
system based upon these standards. 
Because Quick Response emerged in the textile/apparel as a joint response of the 
US industry against foreign competitors, it was typically implemented in a manner quite 
different from other sectOrs.  In other SectOrS. companies have implemented proprietary 
communications schemes tO lock-in their business partners through non-SWtda:d 
interfaces and applications.  The apparel complex however sought to establish a broad 
consensus on Standards before any single company set out to implement EDI on its own. 
Levi's insists that this also results from the chancter of the apparel business, where 
fashion and consumers' tastes are really what matters in the end: while it may be possible 
electronically to lock-in drugstores which have liale choice about where the drugs they 
sell come from, it would be much harder to force retailers to buy clothes against their will 
-and the will of their clientS-.  EDI in the teXtile industry was conceived not as a 
competitive strategy of one fum against another, but rather as a competitive Stratel)' for 
the US industry as a whole. 
As pan of this strategy, Levi's developed information networking applications 
that would help retailers better to fit within the quick response system.  These include 
toll-free numbers (800-FOR LEVI) which the smaller stores can call to place orders or 
follow a shipment's status, and applications which allow "telereps" (the company's sales 
representatives on the receiving end of these calls) instandy to access a customer's 
information.  For stores with higher business volume, Levi's offers LeviLINK, a store 
automation package, with fearures ranging from product-marking to facilitate data 
collection in retail stores and inventory management, to some direct communication 
services with Levi  ·s for retailers to order productS and receive invoices electronically. -30-
All these applications adhere to the industry standards developed within the VICS 
committee.  Moreover, except for those applications which cover business functions 
strictly within Levi's, the company did not seek proprietary control over the electronic 
link and application.  In particular, retailers mUSt obtain LeviLink software and 
supporting hardware through third parties, and have the option to use other comunication 
systems, as long as they follow the industry Standard.  In all cases, Levi's provides free 
assistance and training for retailers who want to establish on-line links.  -
Levi's primary objective is not to "lock-in" its retailers through the use of 
proprietary communications interfaces, or to generate revenues through the sale of store 
automation services, but rather to encounge the rapid diffusion of electronic data 
interchange between the various industry actors.  The three main characteristics of its 
approach to networking with retailers reflect this goal: emphasis on industry-wide 
standards and interconnectivity, a concencd approach at the industry level, and the 
promotion of joint learning through such effons as the education of retailers. 
This approach starkly contraSts with those adopted by companies in other sectors 
of the US economy.  For example McKesson, the leading US distributor of drugs and 
non-durable consumer products, has built its success around proprietary network 
applications which allow its client-retailers to transmit their orders directly to the 
company over public telephone lines.  As they walk through their store, they scan the 
tags of products they need,  then plug the scanner into a phone jack to transmit their 
orders directly to McKesson's central computer.  Once received, the order is 
automatically processed and dispatched to the appropriate warehouse.  There it generates 
a series of "bills of lading", helping employees to optimize their routes through the 
warehouse as they box the merchandise, to optimize the loading of delivery ttucks so that 
the first box to be delivered finds itself on top, and then optimize the delivery route. 
Thanks to its information network, McKesson can guarantee its customers that, if  they 
dial in an order before 4:00pm, the products will be delivered the next business day 
before 10:00 am. 
To a large extent, the functions and benefits of this system are essentially similar 
to those performed by Levi's Lcvilink.  For example, both systems shift workload 
towards the retailers, who become responsible for entering order data and checking their 
accuracy; both facilitate retailers' access to their suppliers, acting as permanent sales 
representatives on the retailer's premises.  There are however some critical differences 
between the strategic goals of Levi's and McKesson, reflected in quite distinct 
implementations of their respective network applications.  Most imponantly, while 
Levi's has decided to promote industry-wide standardization, McKesson on the contrary 
has consciously designed itS application around proprietary standards, as pan of its effon 
to retain tight control over the networking application and the information generated 
through itS use. 
This choice reflected McKesson's desire to generate additional profits through the 
sale of information setvices bundled with its distribution activity.  For example, the 
market information gathered through this ordering syStem enables McKesson to offer 
marketing advice to its retailers, or tO analyze the effectiveness of various shelf lay-outS. 
Whereas Levi's lets third parties offer equivalent services as pan of store automation 
packages, McKesson retains control of the information in its own mainframes. 
Fwthennore, McKesson's proprietary standards make it harder for the retailers who use 
its system to switch to another supplier. they would need to adopt a new order entry 
system, reorganize their operations to some extent, and learn to use another order entry 
device. -31-
These different networking strategies largely reflect the business environment the 
two companies operate within.  In particular, Levi's business is to produce jeans, not to 
distribute them, while McKesson's is to dimibute productS, not to make them: 
McKesson's competitOrS are US-based compani~  while Levi's mainly fears competition 
from low-wage foreign counaies.  As a result, the functions they require from their 
corporate networks differ, and the ways in which they chose to implement links with 
retailers similarly differ. 
In essence, the network deployed by suppliers becomes the marketplace in which 
retailers order and buy the goods they sell.  Over this network, retailers increasingly 
perfonn all the operations they normally go through in a market transaction.  Through the 
networ~  they check products availability and prices, place orders, effectUate payment, 
track shipments' status.  McKesson's conaol over this nerwork-marketplace gives the 
company a decisive competitive advantage over its competitors.  Levi's has chosen to 
forego such control, estimating there were area= benefitS to be had through industry-
wide rationalization and Standardization. 
The telecommunications environment in the United S  wes makes both strategies 
possible.  However, because it relies on market forces to shape network evolution, the US 
environment will best serve the needs of those users able to articulate clearly and express 
forcefully their demand for specific network arrangementS.  Inevitably, this tends to favor 
the desires of the most powerful telecom users, large companies.  Levi's or McKesson's 
netWOrk strategies, rather than their retailers', will therefore shape the evolution of the 
nation's telecom infrasuucture.  For example, where corporate users' strategies demand 
intereonnectivity, standards will emerge more easily than where they wish to protect their 
network-market behind the barriers of proprietary standards. 
The automation of  links between automotive firms and their suppliers and 
subcontractors follows yet another panem.38  The major automobile makers now require 
their pans suppliers to provide on-line information about their products, such as 
specifications, prices, and stock on hand.  They see this as the telecommunications 
foundation for an American version of the "just-in-time" procurement system.  Like their 
Japanese competitors, US automakers hope to unload onto periphenl firms the costS and 
responsibility of  ~ntaining  adequate stocks for pans, absorbing some of  the risk 
connected with product development, or adjusting workforce during downturns. 
However, they wish to retain tight coordination among various pans of the production 
process.  In Japan, coordination largely restS on close proximity and inaicate 
relationships between automakers and their pans suppliers.  By contraSt, US production 
plantS typically are more dispersed, and relationships looser.  On-line links between firms 
participating in the same production process are expected to relieve some of  those 
problems.  Built around electtOnic Document In=change <EDn standards, they allow 
the buyer to order pans only when needed, to review automatically the offerings of a 
variety of suppliers to check for the loweSt prices, or to transmit working drawing and 
design specifications. 
38  The aulhor1' research on elecuonic links between au&e makers and their supliers was commissioned for 
the State of New York by the Governor's Industri:U Coopemion Council, tO be published as lnfra.sr~urt 
to tM lnformazion EcoNJmy: Ttitco11'UJ'UUiicarioiU IJIId ECDnomic DtvtiopmeN Strmtgy. 
39  We elaborate more fully in pan III of lhis paper on tbe implementation and effect of such Electronic 
Document Interchange (EDO applications. -32-
As opposed to what now exists in the textile/apparel industry, there is still no 
generally accepted standard for EDI transactions in the auto sector, where each 
automaker dictates its own standards.  This poses problem for the small pans 
manufacturers, who typically sell their products to several auto makers.  They often find 
themselves in a delicate situation when their clients come to them one after the other, 
demanding that they implement EDI links requiring distinct configurations and standards. 
This often results in inefficient duplications, as they need several different software 
packages -sometimes different hardware- to communicate with their clients.  Their 
personnel must learn to operate the various systems, a challenge in many small machine 
shops.  Perhaps more critically, this hinders integration of their ·customer systems 
backwards into their internal operations: many small f'mns print out the EDI orders they 
receive, to key them again into their own computers.  Moreover, the automakers seldom 
provide any help for their small suppliers to adopt on-line systems. 
The case of General Motors illustrates how US automakers have gone about 
establishing electronic links with their suppliers.  GM produces approximately 70% (in 
value) of the components it uses in its cars, the highest such percentage among the US 
auto-makers.  Many of those pam are produced by the so-called "allied" suppliers, which 
are pan of the GM Corporation, such as GM's Delco and Harrison radiator component 
divisions.  General Motors also does business with about 40,000 non-allied suppliers of 
materials.  About 5,000 are "direct" suppliers, from which GM buys pans that go directly 
into the production of a automobile (brake pads, starters, fasteners, .•. ).  The remaining 
35,000 are "indirect" suppliers, whose products are used indirectly by G~  but which are 
not incorporated into cars (office machines, lubricants, tools, banking,  ••• ). 
Over the past few years, GM has developped Electronic Data Interchange <EDn 
applications to automate its exchange of orders, invoices, and other business documents 
with these suppliers.  From the beginning however, these applications were implemented 
independently by various GM divisions.  As a result there was little consistency among 
the various EDI systems used within GM, and. various applications sometimes followed 
different Standards.  Two years ago, an EDI group was created within EDS to serve as a 
central resource to the various account managers.  Until this year, there was no active 
campaign to implement EDI applications throughout GM.  The main reason for this lack 
of emphasis was that EDI was not perceived as a major problem at the corporate level. 
Early this year however, GM made a commitment to promote a concened deployment of 
standardized EDI applications throughout the company. 
GM has already made effortS to standardize its various EDI applications along the 
ANSI X.l2 standard supponed by the Automotive lndumy Action Group (AlAG).  EDS 
has put in place an EDI translation application available for all suppliers.  They can call 
up a bulk data switch in one of the IPCs to transmit a "flaf' file containing the EDI 
infonnation under their own fonnat.  This infonnation is then translated into an X.l2 rue 
and routed by the switch to the appropriate GM location over EDS*NET, GM's private 
network. 
GM's allied suppliers are often those with which EDI deployment is funhest 
along.  Some EDI applications are combined with just-in-time delivery systems.  For 
example, the Saginaw axle plant receives direct orders from the assembly plant, which 
also indicate in which order to ship axles with the right sequence of options, so they can 
be used directly in the assembly process as they are received. -33-
One of the current limitations of this system is that it is limited to EDS *NET and 
cannot reach outside, for example to connect to EDI services provided by other 
companies such as GE Information Services.  Also, the bulk data switChes handling the 
EDI application operate independently, and cannot. for example, consolidate orders or 
invoices before transmitting them. 
Further, the EDI transaction must be done on OM's terms, which poses problems 
for the many suppliers who also do business with other companies, which use different 
EDI systems.  For example, Chrysler runs its EDI transactions through OEISCO's 
FastBatch application, and Ford uses CMMS, a proprietary syStem. while OM's EDI 
requires an SNA connection to run over EDS*NET ; many of their suppliers are also 
suppliers to companies such as Navisur or Westinghouse which use yet other protoCOls. 
In some cases, suppliers need to use different equipment to hook-up with their different 
clientS.  Even when they arc able to use common hardware, they still run into problems 
when they tty to integrate the software packages they use, which must follow different 
standards.  Some of these problems will be eased by the transition tOwards X.12 
promoted by all consauctors within the AIAQ, but the taSk is not simple because of the 
variety of non-standard systems already in place.  Indeed. for each of the past three years 
OM has announced it would generalize the use of the X.l2 standard and three times. has 
missed the self-imposed deadline. 
As the OM case illustrates, today's EDI links in the automotive seaor exclusively 
reflect the demands large auto makers place on their small pans suppliers.  From the 
supliers' point of view, they often merely represent an increasing cost of doing business 
and do not yield any direct bencfiL  However, if  the lack of standardization between the 
different systems clearly handicaps small suppliers, it hardly benefits OM, Ford or 
Chrysler.  Indeed, they do not need to 1ock-in" their suppliers throu&h proprietary 
communjcation links.  Their power over small suppliers is usually well established and 
many factorS matter much more to the choice of a supplier than merely its ability tO 
interact on-line.40  In the end, it would seem that if  suppliers cannot take full advantage 
of infonnation networking technologies, in particular to integrate their design and 
production process with their customer's, the auto-maker will likely bear the costS in the 
form of higher pans costS or longer product development cycles.  However, it may take 
them a long time to become conscious of those costs.  Until then, little market pressure 
will bear upon the network's evolution to bring about interconnectivity.  Certainly the 
small suppli~  who today are keenly aware of the problem. cannot muster the economic 
clout necessary to force this evolution. 
At this early stage, EDI implementation in the auto sector merely hints at the 
potential of on-line ties among production partners.  A few companies, moStly in the 
electronics seetor, are pushing this logic funher as they interlink various finns to support 
a auely networked production process.  They are using the network to suppon 
interactive CAD/CAM (Computer-aided design and manufactUring) applications, which 
allow them jointly to design productS, interacting in real time with their partners.  The 
Xerox corporation has deployed networks that link itS design teamS with those of  itS 
subcontractors, so that when a modification is introduced in one product, it can instantly 
simulate the consequences of that modification for the various pans it needs to buy, and 
integrate the constraints and expertise of its subcontraCtors (e.g. manufacturability of the 
40 Factors such as high shipment quality levels. simulataneous quality increases and cost reductions. or 
facilities inspection by customers  mat~er much more directly to Jarie manufacturers' ccnification of a 
supplier. according tO:  Nttd.s Analysis ofzh4 Cunomer·Supplitr Link. FaCtOry Automalion and Computer 
Technologies. Inc. (F'Acn, Troy, New York. 1987 {Ftmded by tbe New York State Science and 
Technology Foundation). -34-
pan, how the modification will affect cost.  .. ) into its own design and manufacturing 
process. 
Interestingly, Xerox would rather be able to implement such interactive links over 
a public network, but has been forced to develop private network solutions for lack of 
adequate capabilities within the public network.  Public links would make this scheme 
easy to replicate from its prototype established in Europe to all other Xerox locations. 
Moreover, they would pennit quickly to include new participants in the networked 
production process at any time.  This possibility is particularly imponant to firms in the 
electronics sector who need access to state-of-the-an compon.ents, and cannot always 
predict which firm will deliver these.  This represents an imponant difference with the 
auto sector, where customer-supplier relationships are built over longer terms, and panly 
explains the contrast between the two sectors' networking strategies.  Another imponant 
difference lies in the production approaches: While Xerox typically outsources between 
60% and 70% of the pans that go into a given product, the proportion is inversed in the 
case of General Motors.  Xerox obviously has a greater need for efficient links with the 
outside fums which make those pans. 
Communications applications among firmS increasingly embody the organization 
of the design and production processes, and the network which suppons them incarnates 
the industrial organization of the emerging "network-firms".  Therefore, the design and 
manufacturing processes they use are only as flexible as the networks behind them.  For a 
company whose production involves many interlinked participants, how easily it can 
reconfigure its network will constrain how easily it can reorganize its production.  How 
flexibly it can bring in new panners into its networked-production process will depend on 
how open its network architecture is. 
The development of intra-company networks and applications, to which we now 
turn, highlights some different issues.  A major factor behind those differences is that 
companies naturally have much greater control over the networks they build for their 
own use.  These are usually the first focus of thei private networking effons, while they 
often have to rely on more public networks for communications with other flrnlS.  How 
effective they are at exerting this control varies.  We examine in particular how two 
companies, a bank and an electronics m111ufacturer, have used their conttol over their 
internal networks to experiment with these technologies and to learn from their 
experimentS. 
Bank of America recently had to recast itS information networking strategy. 
Unable to summon its increasingly divided physical network to provide an ever growing 
number of applications, the bank's conttol over its corporate network was in effect 
stretched too thin by the fragmentation of the two outer layers of the network 
infrastrUcture.  At the top layer, the proliferation of services made possible by recent 
banking deregulation had required a wide diversification of the bank's network 
applications to suppon these new services.  Typically over the years, for each new 
application it had to implement, the bank had built a new network.  This resulted in a 
profound fragmentation of the bottom (physical) layer of the network infrastrUcture Bank 
of America was operating, which at one rime counted over 70 distinct networks.  There 
was little or no central control over the development and management of these network 
facilities.  As a result of this fragmentation, bank employees often needed up to three 
terminals on their desk to access the various applications they worked with. -35-
The cost of managing this multitude of network facilities was rising fast.  Perhaps 
even more problematic was the fact that network proliferation became endogeneous.  The 
lack of coordinated control over the facilities in place made it impossible to mobilize 
them to suppon new applications.  When the bank needed to develop a new application, 
it couldn't build it upon existing network(s), and had to deploy yet another network.  The 
resulting delays frustrated BofA 's introduction of new services, threatening the bank's 
competitiveness in the fast-moving deregulated banking environment. 
The impetuS for change came from BofA 's intention to consolidate various 
branch applications into an integrated package which could be accessed from a single 
terminal.  The bank was then faced with a choice: build a new $25 million network to 
suppon that application, or re-vamp itS existing network so it could suppon all existing 
applications plus this new one.  Bank of America opted for the latter, and embarked upon 
the constrUction of itS Global Data Network (GDN), which by the end of 1990 will tie 
together BofA 's 9 major processing centers, 130 major branches and 1,100 remote 
branches. 
Having learned imponant lessons from the way its netWorks got out of  hand in the 
past, Bank of America has thought long and hard about the best way to manage its new 
integrated network.  It has looked for the best compromise between its need for control 
over the operation and evolution of its network. and the advantages it can gain from 
drawing on the extensive network operation expertise of outside public netWork 
operators.  The result was the establishment of a quite intricate partnership with AT&T. 
Ultimate control over its Global Data Network rests with the Bank's BASE 
(BankAmerica Systems Engineering) headquarters in Concord, CA.  It will rely on two 
separate control centers: one for voice, and one for data.  The network management 
functions are built around a trunk/voice testing and management package initially 
developed by 3M for itS internal use.  BofA employs 250 technicians. mostly based in 
Concord, to monitor itS network. 
While keeping overall network responsibility within its Concord headquarters, 
BofA decided to hand over a number of network maintenance taSks to AT&T.  AT&T 
will thus act as the single point of contact for maintenance problems, although the 
network uses equipment and services from a total of  48 vendors, including IBM, Network 
Equipment Technologies, Inc. (T-1 facilities and multiplexors), Pacific Telesis. and US 
Sprint.  BofA looked at the possibility of maintaining the equipment itself, but concluded 
it could get somebody else to do the job cheaper.  Moreover, AT&T brings valuable 
expenise to the task.  Ultimately, the Bank wantS to be responsible for network testing 
and will work closely with AT&T which will handle the maintenance and repairs.  To 
reinforce this partnership, AT&T has assigned eight of itS employees to work at BASE 
headquaners in Concord. 
Bank of America's networking strategy evolved in two clearly distinct Stages. 
The rli'St stage can be characterized as one of automation.  The bank built a series of 
network facilities and applications to automate existing operations.  These networks 
directly mirrored the operations they were designed tO automate and as a result. separate 
networks were built to automate separate operations.  Tilrough its use of networking 
during that first stage, BofA accumulated two distinct types of knowledge and expertise: 
a better understanding of the potential of network technologies it experimented with, and 
better information about the banking processes it was automating, derived from the data 
gathered through each new infonnation network. -36-
BofA' s growing experience with networking began then to underline the need for 
a second stage, characterized by a thorough reorganization of its network resources.  Data 
accumulated through the automation of individual services showed the benefitS to be 
gained from their integration.  The bank's accumulated knowledge about what 
networking technologies could accomplish opened the way for such integration.  During 
this second stage, BofA was still going to learn from using network technologies as it did 
throughout the first stage, but would gain knowledge of a different kind by master-
minding the deployment of a new integrated network.  Such knowledge in the rU"St stage 
had been confined to the network providers who had put together networks for BofA, or 
remained dispersed through the multitude of divisions which ruled over itS different 
networks.  It could now become explicitely articulated and coordinated to serve as the 
foundation for the Bank's new networking strategy, to frame such complex partnerships 
as the one BofA is now building with AT&T for the management of itS network. 
The evolution of Computer Aided Design and Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) within 
General Motors provides another illustration of the tight relationship between re-
organization and network evolution.  GM is currently engaged in a comprehensive effon 
to reorganize itS information processing and networlcing resources.  Dubbed C4 (the four 
Cs stand for CAD/CAM/CAE/CIM), this strategy aims at deploying a coherent 
information infrastructure that will serve to integrate design, manufacturing and business 
processes throughout GM around a core of 3-D CAD data.  The new C4 environment, 
articulated around company-wide standards and open systems concepts, is designed to let 
GM engineers run most software on any of the company's computers and share 
information among facilities, divisions and contractors. 
Driving GM's C4 plans is the company's strategic thrust to cut down by 60% 
over the next 5 years the time it takes to bring a car from "an to pan", from a new 
concept to the market.  Today, GM needs 65 months to develop and manufacture a new 
model, while the average Japanese car maker only needs 43 months (Toyota leading the 
pack with with  24 to 36 months).41  The objective is to bring this down to 18-20 months 
by the mid-1990s. 
Such a dramatic reduction in development time will require more than mere 
automation of today's design, manufacturing and business processes.  It calls for a 
thorough re-organization of the car making process.  Indeed~ the automation of manual 
design, engineering and manufacturing methods would simply result in "islands of 
automation": CAD  islands~ CAE islands, CAM islands, etc  .• At best, GM estimates this 
could only cut down development time by about 20%.  Funher reductions will require a 
deeper reorganization of the auto-making process around new work methods, jointly 
developed with the new network which will suppon them.  Here, the new buzzwords are 
simultaneous engineering, synchronous manufacturing, just-in-time, etc...  This kind of 
production reorganization demands a unified information processing infrastructure,  ~ble 
to suppon consistent and interactive methods throughout the company. 
41  data from  Harvard's auto manufacturing project.  GM's 65 months development time is for the GM 30 
(new body and new platform): for the GM 25 project (new body, carryover plaLfonn from  the N-car), the 
development time is 55 months.  The US average stands at 62 months. -37-
The scale of this taSk is staggering.  Consider that in 1988, GM made 114 
different car models, and that an average car consists of about 200,000 pans.  Many of 
those parts are designed with CAD systems, which represent and store them as math 
models.  To take an example, an average fender is represented by a 10 Mbytes math 
model.  The shapes, dimensions, material specifications stored in this model are used 
repeatedly by various GM employees.  Stylists, strUctural and aerodynamic. engineers 
modify and refine the shape as they work on the overall line and structure of the car ; 
manufaCtUring engineers usc this infonnation to design the stamping dies used to make 
the pan. and add to it representations of the complementary surfaces (the shapes of the 
left-over steel around the pan itsclO that will prevent wrinkles and tearS during the 
stamping ; the tool and measuring instrUment makers incorporate this information in the 
machines they put together to make the pans and check the accuracy of the finished 
product ; infonnation such as the part reference number, how it is assembled and fastened 
to other pans in the car, must be anached to the  pan~s  representation if they are to be 
used throughout the manufacturing process ; user manuals and service bulletins for 
maintenance must include drawings of the part along with additional information such as 
reference numbers and assembly sketches. 
Under CUITent processes, when a Component's CAD file leaves the design 
department (and the design :utomation "island") to be used by production and 
manufacturing engineers, the data is transformed into a new fonnat -suited to the next 
"island" of production automation, but now inaccessible to the designers.  Subsequent 
changes in design can then take months, as the data needs to be re-forrilated (sometimes 
re-entered) at each iteration. 
The problem is not simply to pass computer tiles from one team to the next in 
sequential order, but to allow continuous interaction between various teamS involved in 
the design, production and assembly of a pan or system.  To continue with our fender 
example, production engineers and tool makers must work conc\ltTCntly on designing the 
fender and the tools which will be used to produce it. provide continuous feedback to the 
stylists about the manufacturability of the fender they have designed, and suggest minor 
shape changes which could make smmping easier. 
A networked CAD system able to suppon such interaction is the basis of 
simultaneous engineering: creating shapes and styling, designing the toOls that will 
produce the pans, and organizing the manufacturing and assembly process, can then 
progress simultaneously, no longer sequentially.  This is, according to this strategy, how 
the "an to pan" cycle can be cut by 60%.  For example with the cumnt sequential 
process, it is possible to spend a lot of time designing a fender only to realize in the end, 
when the die maker is brought into the process, that it cannot be produced efficiently. 
Simultaneous enginnering aims at eliminating such surprises, thereby reducing both 
design time and cost.  It allows a styling engineer, for example, to get feedback from 
costing, body engineering, structural analysis and die engineering, and to alter a design 
early on in the process. -38-
The information processing network required to support such a sttategy is 
significantly more advanced than the one in use today at GM.  It must be able to transfer 
large files among decentralized engineering workstations to allow engineering teams to 
work together on-line.  It must suppon an enonnous data base of multimedia flies 
(containing graphics, math models, text,.  •. ) representing pans, dies, tools, measuring 
instrumentS, assembly processes, or service documentS.  It must be able to keep track of 
the latest version of each part. of the changes made: and insure that all the teams involved 
arc working on the same version of a part.  It must also be able to update all the 
information that will be affected by a change in one of the files describing some aspect of 
a pan. 
The C-4 strategy is aimed at delivering the infonnation networking infrastructure 
that can insure such consistency  .. It will integrate all GM manufacturing and business 
operations into an "enterprise solution", in which all divisions, subcontractors and 
suppliers are connected electrOnically to central design, manufactUring and management 
infonnation systems. 
The strategy must contend with GM's existing computer networking 
environment.  Typically at GM, each division and sometimes each depamnent chose itS 
own application software and workstations, and as many as 40 different hardware 
platfonns are in use today throughout the company.42  Different divisions often use the 
same car componentS, but must re-create CAD files representing these same componentS 
to work on their incompatible systems. 
Building an integrated infonnation infrastructure raises many challenges.  The 
physical network needed to support it must have broadband capabilities (switched T-1 
network would be necessary today to accomodate simultaneous engineering applications 
at the design stage alone).  The applications used by all the participantS in the car maldng 
process need improvementS to work together, new ones will have to be invented. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge is to create the tools that will make it possible to manage 
and control such a network. 
To suppon the C4 vision, EDS is deploying a coherent and comprehensive 
communication network.43  This network will have to provide transparent transmission 
and universal connectivity for different users to access various applications.  It will 
require distributed data management systems, able to integrate all relevant infonnation 
with the design data.  Files containing manufacturing, financial, or test information will 
need to be linked to the CAD tile representing a particular pan.  The network control 
center(s) will have to  be able to manage and control the distribution of these files 
throughout the company, assign access to employees, keep track of the most current 
revision of each file, to control the transfer of information accross plants, divisions and 
suppliers. 
~2 This is different from other companies.  Ford for example uses a single CAD system, running on 
PRLME computers and requires that all itS suppliers use lhe same. 
~3 This description draws extensively upon Lekha Rao and Greg Blount. The EDS Evolution to a Private 
ISDN, IEEE Globecomm. December 1986. -39-
EDS 's current network environment could not support such a vision.  For 
example, access p~edures  vary with each of the EDS sub-networks, according to 
proprietary vendor architectures.  They often require different hardware and software on 
the end user's side and call for different access procedures.  As a result. changes andre-
configurations can pose major problems.  Moreover, inter-networking is not transparent. 
and the user must know a-priori the details of the networks he needs to connect with, 
such as each sub-network's numbering, addressing and routing schemes. 
To overcome these problems and the limitations they impose on OM's (and other 
EDS clientS') networking strategy, EDS is gradually converting itS existing networks into 
a private Integrated Services Digital NetoMic (ISDN), built around OSI standards.44 
Standardization around the emerging ISDN and OSI standards will allow EDS to provide 
uniform user access for voice, data. and value-added services; access to various vendor 
mainframes from a single user workstation; a common backbone infrastructure and user 
aansparent gateways between sub-networks; and integrated network administration and 
management. 
GM'  s current multi-vendor, multi-network environment raises a series of 
problems concerning network management and conttol, making this area one of the most 
critical challenges EDS faces.  All network management areas suffer from this diversity: 
it is harder to keep ttack of network resources and deploy them effectively, harder to test 
the network. identify problems and correct them, harder to re-configure the network as 
user needs evolve, harder to keep track of who uses what in the network for accounting 
and billing.  Various sub-networks require diffc:r=t -and often incompatible-
management systems, preventing coherent management of the network as a whole.  Each 
vendor's equipment gathers various kinds of information, in various forms, preventing a 
comprehensive view of the network's operation at any time.  The trend towards 
distributed intelligence has amplified these problems by dispersing network management 
intelligence at various points throughout the network. 
Towards this goal, EDS is working on the deployment of a comprehensive 
network management system that can address the following areas: netWork planning, 
resource management, network perfonnance and monitorin1. inter-networking 
management. prolem management. change management, cost management, and security. 
In the short tenn. EDS will try to ensure that all subnetworks, from LANs to WAN s, 
incorporate common versions of these functions.  The next Step will be to consolidate the 
sub-network management systems into a limited number of systems.  For this purpose, 
EDS is developing applications which can integrate Statistics from various network 
management systems, and assist their operator in identifying and correcting evcnetual 
problems.  In the longer term. as separate channel signaling (SSI7) becomes 
implemented uniformly throughout the EDS network, it will become easier to monitor, 
manage and conttol the network. 
If  mastering their internal networking is imponant to Bank of  America and 
General Motors~ it is perhaps even more critical to Hewlett Pac:kard.  For HP, networking 
technologies are not simply a design and production tool, but also the very essence of the 
company's productS.  We have just described how important experimentation and 
learning have been to BofA 's networking strategy.  Within HP, these mechanisms take 
on an added imponance as they transform not merely the company's design and 
production processes, but often itS produCtS themselves.  Hewlett Packard therefore 
constitutes an extremely interesting case, since its stakes in the information processing 
market have compelled the company to experiment thoroughly with networking 
44  "GM Plans Master Net", Communications Week, September 19, 1988. -40-
technologies.  To a considerable extent, HP has been using itself as a testing ground for 
new ideas and products. 
One of the HP' s major objectives in deploying a corporate network was to speed 
up its design and manufacturing cycle, while being able more effectively to draw on the 
human and technological resources dispersed throughout its many locations.  Because 
HP' s business is to design and manufacture information processing equipment, it was 
cenainly better able than others to design and operate a network that could achieve these 
goals.  Hewlett Packard therefore explicitely sought from the outSet to secure total 
control over its network, with the ultimate goal of building a world-wide fully integrated 
digital network capable of voice, data and video transmission by the early 1990s.  The 
company's strategy has motivated distinctive networking choices, which can be traced 
through the three layers ofHP's network, from the applications HP employees use,  EO the 
control mechanisms which lie behind these applications and the physical facilities they 
rest upon. 
Information networking applications pervade.all activities at HP, from design to 
manufacturing and sales.  Significantly, 94% of the company's total workforce (77,000 
out of 82,000) are active users of HPDesk, its home-grown electronic messaging and 
conferencing environment, exchanging an average 80 messages per month per employee. 
HPDesk uses go far beyond the simple exchange of memos.  For example, to work out 
the design of a new product, HP engineers routinely exchange source codes back and 
fonh through the messaging system. 
John Young, President and CEO of  Hewlett Packard, once described the 
management of a project that involved 140 R&D engineers from 10 different HP 
divisions in the US, Japan, and Europe, working on. the integration ofHP peripherals with 
the HP 3000 product:  ''The team decided to use e-mail to manage the project.  They 
move software code and all its documentation that way, and used electronic PERT chans 
for project management.  If  one pan of the team's task is going to skip schedule, the 
computer automatically highlights other pans of the project that will be affected.  The 
entire group is informed immediately, and resources are reassigned quickly.  According 
to the group manager, the project would have been totally impossible without the 
electronic linkages.  Infonnation technology wasn't just a productivity tool, it was the 
vital glue that held the project team together. "45 
Hewlett Packard also uses its TV and video networks to hold interactive product 
announcement sessions for its sales force, offer training courses, or broadcast executive 
speeches.  The broadcast network is used to offer classes on new productS for scvice and 
suppon staff, as well as to provide HP'  s personnel with access to classes at several US 
universities, through which they can obtain advanced degrees.  The company uses video 
conferencing intensively to pool dispersed specialists working on a common problem. 
These video-conferences often become a critical part of the design and production 
process at HP, and can bring together designers with manufacturing specialists or 
marketing people.  In one case, three collaborating teams eStimated they would have 
taken at least six months to solve a problem, had they had to travel back and fonh ; !bey 
did it in two weeks of intensive messaging and video conferencing.  Th~; benefits of such 
network applications go far beyond mere savings on travel expenses.  In the fast paced 
electronics business, shonening the time it takes to bring a prod~ct to market can make 
all the difference . 
.!5 Quoted by Byron Belitsos in Business Teiemtlzics, -41-
Pushed by the widening use of such applications, Hewlett Packard's needs for 
interactive networking have grown tremendously since 1983, when it first implemented 
packet switching applications over GTE's Telenet public X.2S network.  HP Staned 
purchasing its own packet switching and network monitoring equipment in 1985, and 
since then has installed 24 private X.25 nodes worldwide.  HP's private packet switching 
network is fast replacing its batch network for all data transmission, and now 
accommodates traffic that rivals in volume America's largest public data networks, 
Telenet and Tymnet. 
One of the primary reasons why HP decided to build its own packet switching 
network was the severe restrictions on the amount of bandwidth available from public 
data networks.  At the time, public X.2S networks could not offer data rates above 2.4 
Kb/s.  For a company like HP, which routinely needs to transmit files as large as 20 
Mbytes, that would have meant spending 20 hours to transmit a single file, assuming the 
connection would not be dropped during that time (which, when sending files between 
such places as Singapore and Geneva. sometimes happened).  A private packet network 
allowed HP to build in bandwidth that met its requirements.  The final result was far 
greater cost-effectiveness than either HP's old network or public data networks: Between 
1986 and 1987, HP was able to reduce the total costs of  itS interactive transmission by 
6%, while traffic more than quadrupled. 
Hewlett Packard's private X.2S network is fast becoming the central resource 
supporting all of the company's data applications.  Initially, it was principally used for 
interaction with selected customers' data bases, urgent electronic mail, and electrOnic 
dispatch of financial reports.  Now, it offers universal interconnectivity within the 
company.  It serves as the common link between factories, design labs, corporate 
departments, suppon divisions, regional processing centers, branch offices, as well as 
some of  HP'  s customers and vendors. 
Hewlett Packard's packet switching network lies underneath most of the 
company's data communications applications and is critical to their interactiviry.  It also 
constitutes an essential management mechanism for the various physical links mobilized 
by HP' s network, as it allocates virtual routes for data to flow between users of an 
interactive application.  Therefore, it is an integral pan of  the conaollayer of HP'  s 
telecom infrastructure, sandwiched between the physical links it configures and the 
interactive applications it enables.  Practically, this packet network is an overlay of HP'  s 
physical network infrastrUctUre, embedded within the packet switches HP owns and-
most imponant-- programs and operates.  Through these X.2S switches, HP directly 
assens control over the operation of the physical links it leases from various earners. 
HP's network managers can therefore configure the company's network infrastructure tO 
reflect closely the production organization itS applications are designed to support. 
Hewlett Packard's packet switching network, like all HP network conttol 
mechanisms and applications from telephony inteactive computer aided design46, is built 
upon a single set of transmission paths, HPNET,  which constitutes the physical layer of 
the company's network infrastructUre.  Two essential componentS make up HPNET: a 
set of leased lines tie together HP locations which exchange the highest volume of traffic 
and A rr·  s Software Defined Network (SDN) provides extensions towards the other 
locations.  Traffic throughout this physical infrastructure is managed centrally and 
46  Video conferences were established over dedicated satellite links until now, but are now progressively 
rolled over tO HP' s inlegrated transmission networic.  Using data em pression techniques. two 56kbi1/s lines 
can adequately handle a video conference. -42-
dynamically multipiexeci so as to constantly reallocate the available bandwidth to the 
applications which need it. 
HP's networking approach reflects an extensive amount of experimentation with 
and learning about networking technologies, developed over many years during which 
the company was both a demanding user and a producer of many information networking 
technologies.  Key to HP'  s experimentation and learning was the company's mastery of 
its network resources, secured through the private deployment of a sophisticated control 
layer.  HP was thus able directly to rry new ways to organize its operations and quickly to 
identify the resulting problems or benefits. Over time, the knowledge accumulated 
through this process has been mostly internalized and itS benefitS captured by HP, 
precisely because HP relied as little as possible upon the public network. 
For example, HP became adept at implementing and using networks which made 
collaboration possible among dispersed teams of researchers and built a great deal of itS 
competitive advantage upon that expertise.  But this of course also meant that such 
network resources would not be directly accessible to other telecom users, were they 
HP's competitors or were they from entirely different economic sectors.  There, some 
would say, precisely lies the beauty of the US networking environment: innovative 
network users can fully capture and defend the benefits they derive from the innovations 
they deploy, and their examples foster funher innovation by envious imitators.  However, 
precisely because telecommunications network constitute an infrastructure, the real story 
is more complex. 
HP's rekindled interest in the public network, as evidenced for example in its use 
of AT&T's SDN, is interesting in that respect.  It stems from two different factors.  First, 
while individual companies have been busy building advanced private networks, the 
public network was not standing still.  Public network operators have exploited their 
distinctive advantages: for example the scale and universality of their network facilities, 
or their accumulated experience with the management of complex networks provided 
competitive leverage against private network development.  In some areas, software 
defined networks constitute such an example, services offered over the public network 
have progressed rapidly and it would be hard for HP to cost-justify using leased lines to 
all its locations.  Funhermore, SDN actually gives HP more control over the 
reconfiguration of its network, as the company can for example instantly add or drop 
transmission lines through its direct access to the control layer of AT&T's network. 
Second, companies such as HP have an emerging need for sophisticated public 
links to tie their subcontractors and business panners within their networked production 
organization.  In particular, HP is extremely eager to see ISDN implemented in the public 
network.  Indeed, electronic transactions between HP and its suppliers will involve 
increasingly elaborate compound documents made up of data and text along with 
drawings and CAD/CAM files.  In many cases, HP would like to be able to use 
interactive CAD/CAM applications better to collaborate with other companies it works 
with, and more flexibly to establish new connections with panners or reconfigure older 
ones.  Ideally, because these applications span accross individual companies boundaries, 
they could best be implemented over the public network.  However, the US public 
network still has a long way to go before it can smoothly suppon such applications. -43-
Large users have in the past played an important role in promoting the 
developement of the public network by placing high demands upon iL  It was the likes of 
HP, BofA. Levi's or GM who pushed Ma Bell to innovate, and the innovations they 
prompted were in tum deployed throughout the public network, for the benefit of all.  As 
they progressively turned to private networking. not only did pressures upon the public 
network to innovate decrease, but also certain types of innovation -particularly with 
respect to data applications-· increasingly took place within private networks and did not 
diffuse through the public network.  Now, the public network they once deserted stands 
in the way of their corporate networking Strategies: sophisticated in-house applications 
cannot easily reach beyond one company's limits to include partners or subcontractors in 
a renewed network-based production process. 
Recognizing these limitations, Hewlett Packard is consciously looking for ways 
to accelerate the development of  the public network -or  at least those segments of the 
public network it needs.  Therefore, HP is willing increasingly not only to shift some of 
itS traffic to the public network, but also to tranSfer some of the knowledge gained 
through itS past rounds of private experimentation back to the public network, for 
example by collaborating with the BOCs to help speed up the deployment of advanced 
technologies like ISDN throughout the public network. 
Such Strategic decisions highlight important issues about the evolution of  private 
and public components of the nation's telecommunications infrastructure.  The network 
options, public and private, available within a national environment constrain the degree 
to which companies can experiment with information networking teChnologies and 
whether they are able to learn and benefit from this experimentation.  In particular, 
companies which have direct contrOl over the deployment and confiJUtUion of their 
network can experiment more intensively than if  they had to rely on the intennediation of 
a public network operator.  On tbe other hand, public network solutions provide wider 
connectivity and diffusion of network applications.  The pattems of  learning, and how 
innovations become implemented within the telecommunications infrastrUcture vary 
accordingly.  Section m of this paper will address these issues more directly, but we 
must conclude this exploration of corporate networking strategies with a look at their 
essential motivation: conttol. 
Indeed, of all the reasons companies invoke to justify their private networking 
decisions, the most important and pervasive is their desire to have tight conaol over their 
telecommunications.  In their view, this need directly arises from ~e  changing status of 
infonnarion networks, from a utility to a competitive resource.  Because a firm's 
competitiveness rests upon itS network, it can no longer afford to leave it completely 
under someone else's contrOL  Companies want control to understand precisely where 
their communications costS derive from and bow they can be cut. to keep track of 
changes in their communications patterns so as to plan better for the future.  They want to 
be able tO reconfigure their networks quickly when needs change, to be free to 
experiment with them to develop new productS and services. 
However, there is no single and straightforward solution for a finn to assert 
control over its network.  In certain cases, because a company's network and network 
applications underlie itS competitiveness, it matters that the networlc's critical features be 
private, even proprietary.  Competitors could more easily replicate a strategy built upon 
public network resources and off-the-shelf telecommunications systems, whereas it is 
more difficult to catch up with a company that relies on propri!:tary network 
applications. 47  In other cases. private networks have grown out of their owners' control. 
4 7 See Peter Keen, op. cit., p 113. -44-
who could not manage their technical complexity, find adequate manpower to run them 
or keep their costs in check. 48  Companies must search for the best compromise between 
their need for contrOl over the operation of their network and the advantage they can gain 
from drawing on the extensive network operation expenise of public network operators. 
"Control" means very different things at each layer of the telecommunications 
infrastiUcture, how control is embodied within each layer depends on corporate strategies 
and objectives.  Sometimes companies fmd it necessary to own the physical layer of their 
network.  For example, Levi Strauss and McKesson have chosen to deploy VSAT 
antennas to link their distribution centers with headquaners, which enable them better to 
control transmission costs.  Perhaps more imponantly, as is the case for McKesson, 
owning the physical links also enhances reliability.  Because McKesson's competitive 
advantage rests largely on its promising next-day delivery of all orders received before 
4:00 pm, it cannot afford a failure within its information system.  Initially, McKesson 
relied entirely on AT&T' s Digital Data Service (DDS) lines to connect its order 
processing center with itS disaibution centers.  After five days of intermittent outage on 
AT &T's DDS network in February 1986 caused degraded connections and a number of 
missed deliveries, McKesson decided to replace its DDS-based network with a private 
end-to-end bypass satellite network. 
However, ownership of the physical links is not a prerequesite for network 
control.  As Hewlett Packard demonstrates, a company can maintain total control over its 
network through itS grasp of the middle layer.  Indeed, HP owns very few of the physical 
elements of its network.  The management layer it has deployed enables the company to 
manage the network extremely efficiently, for example to control its costs through 
dynamic mutliplexing or to reconfigure the network as the needs of its production 
process change.  One could even argue that to some extent, not owning the physical layer 
of its network gives HP greater control.  For example, it can create or drop connections 
on SDN much more easily than if  it had to install or dimantle physically each one. 
Within the middle network layer, companies also have the opportunity to share control 
with public operators or third parties.  Bank of America for example chose to retain 
responsibility for testing and network planning while handing over to AT&T some 
network management tasks. 
Finally, different patterns of control can be built into the application layer of the 
networks.  The applications deployed by McKesson and Levi's to link up with their 
retailers illustrate these differences.  McKesson retains complete control over the 
proprietary applications it offers to its retailers, and over the data they generate.  By 
contras~ Levi's decision to promote indutry-wide standards and to let third parties 
provide these applications disaibutes control among industry participants, or at least 
guarantees that no single one can monopolize control over the application for its own 
goals. 
Overall, the panems of control the national telecommunications environment 
permits constitute an essential key to the economic functions the network can perform. 
Corporate users will judge the telecommunications environment on whether or not it 
allows them to deploy networks which embody the kinds of control their strategies 
require.  In  turn, public network providers need to strike the right balance between giving 
enough control to their clients and retaining enough to remain economically viable. 
Ultimately, the future evolution of the national network will reflect the distribution of 
control among its many suppliers, operators and users. 
48 ~Problems Force users Lo Re:rench"', Com.municarionsWtek.. November 7, 1988. -45-
The indicative changes occurring along the leading edge of corporate networking 
strategies suggest the potential information networking holds for economic development 
and growth.  Depending on how control is allocated, individual successes may remain 
isolated or cumulate to dramatic new possibilities for relative national economic 
performance.  But, if  the perl'onnance measure of intensive use of information 
technology is improved national productivity growth, the U.S. is badly lagging other 
countries. notably Japan and in Europe, that have not moved as aggressively to adopt the 
new technologies.  Whether the U.S. benefitS from the technology's powerful potential 
depends upon the effectiveness of its diffusion and use throughout the economy, not 
merely at the leading edge.  Such diffusion, we argue in part m, is mediated to a great 
extent by the national network infrastructUre, which channels the innovation, 
experimentation, and learning from leading edge corporate users and suppliers of 
network equipment and services, to the rest of the economy. -47-
ni.  VARIED INFRASTRUCTURES, VARIABLE EFFECTS 
The analysis of large user experiences suggests that digital infonnation networks 
are the essential infrastructure needed to capture the vast new economic opponunities 
available from the exploitation, control and processing of information.  Here we argue 
that how those networks are organizeci how they coalesce into a national infrastructure, 
and the terms on which that infrastructure functions, is accessed, interconnected. and 
controlled, will shape opportunities for shon-term economic gain and for long-term 
economic growth. 
The communications networks within a region can, in the aggregate, be 
considered as economic infrastructure because they-constitute a ubiquitous economic 
input that generates significant economic benefits far in excess of those capturable by the 
entities providing the networks.  (In economic shonhand: they generate substantial 
external economies or externalities.)  The effect is somewhat analogous to that of the 
transponation infrastructure underlying the industrial economy of the past century. 
The emergence of mass production and distribution in late 19th century Americ~ 
rested in large measure on the new transponation and communication infrastructure put 
into place between the 1850's and 1880s.49  The extensive railroad and telegraph 
networks provided significant economic benefits to user industties by enabling vast 
increases in the speed, volume and regularity of movement of goods and messages at 
decreased costs.  These benefits were far greater than could be captured by those who 
built the networks. 
The benefits were also cumulative and self-reinforcing.  They led to increasing 
returns for those organized to coordinate and exploit the increases in speed, volume and 
regularity-- the very reason the emerging great corporations developed and succeeded so 
spectacularly.  The possibilities for increasing returns thereby provoked new investment 
in user industries and ~pid  economic growth for the economy as a whole over a 
sustained period of time.  They helped put the American economy on a vinuous 
development path. 
49  Chandler, at p.20i. -48-
As we suggest below, telecommunications networks act as infrastrUctUre to 
economic development in more subtle, though often no less powerful ways than did 
railroads and other transportation media.SO  Our analysis here is more complex, tentative 
and admittedly more speculative.  It suggests, however, the strOng possibility that 
different network arrangements generate different patterns of external economic gains, 
different opportUnities for cumulative reinforcement of those gains, and thus, different 
degrees of capturing those gains over time for the economy as a whole.Sl 
Consider, for example, the effects of  privatizing substantial portions of  the 
network infrastructure as has occurred in the U.S.  Our case StUdies support the 
proposition that private network mangements can be closely tailored to corporate 
strategy and can thereby generate substantial economic gains for individual companies at 
the expense of competing actOrS in the economy.  McKesson's ability to differentiate its 
setvice by providing near-real time distribution and other value-added services, and H-
P's ability radically to speed-up new product development time, are clear examples. 
Presumably, as the companies grow and prosper, the successful strategic use of those 
networks generates indirect gains for the U.S. economy as a whole. 
Buried. however, in the positive accounts, are equally compelling examples of 
how different network urangements can eliminate potential economic benefits and even 
stifle economic activity.  Our case StUdies demonstrate this as well.  Perhaps the cleareSt 
example is the way that small auto pans suppliers are implementing electronic data 
interchange (ED  I) with their major eustomers. the major U.S. automobile assemblers. 
Recall that by eliminating paperwork and the delays associated with paper handling, and 
by permitting real-time responsiveness to changes, EDI was supposed tO improve the 
competitive position of both suppliers and assemblers. 
SO  Our perspective derives from on-going work the awhors are doing on the economics of 
celecommunicaaons network infrasnczures and on the ways thQ teChnology can be used to competitive 
advancap.  That work is unde:r the auspices of me BRIE-OECD Telecommunications User Group Project. 
at me University of California. Berkeley. 
None the less, the authors wish to make it c:rysW clear that there is very liule ~  suppon in existing 
economic data for the proposition that infonnation technology enhances competitive perfonnance..  There 
~  in fact some quite embarrassing discrepancies:  For example. the financial semces industry has seen 
the steepeSt rise in spending on infonnation technology as a perceruage of aotal business invesanent over 
tbe past decade. but factor produaivity has declined during that period. 
There are several plausible reasons for why auregm available data does not reflect anecdocal experiences 
of success wizb tbe technoJogy:  The dala is not very accuza~e; much of the benefits of usin1 the teehnalol)' 
m  sua.tegic and not easily measured ar captured in conventional dala: existing dala sets agrepr.e winners 
and losers (i.e  •• for every Ford that uses into technology successfully, thc='s a GM that doesn't); and the 
technology has changed so rapidly that learning and orpniz.ational effectiveness have lagged far behind 
increased spending.  For those who advoca~e the perspeaive takeu in this paper, however, a systematic 
account of why and how the data is flawed obviously needs to be developed. 
S  1 The economic basis for our argument is that different netWat arrangements differentially aff:ect the 
degree to which positive feedback economic mechanisms develop and widely infiuence an economy's 
growth. The major sources of such positive feedback economic mechanisms are scale 
economies involving large set-up or fixed costs that provide falling unit coSts to 
increased output; learning effectS which provide perfonnanc:e improvement and/or cost 
reduction to economic activities as their prevalence increases; and coordination effects 
(including so-called network externalities and economies of scope) which confer gains to 
replicating or synchronizing economic activities.  See, W. Brian Arthur, Self-Reinforcing 
Mechanisms in Economics. CEPR Publication #111. (SW1ford: Center for Ecnnomic Policy Research, 
September 1987). -49-
In fact, most pans suppliers implemented EDI by purchasing several different 
computer systems mandated by their different major customers, and hooking them to the 
public phone network but, because of incompatability problems, not to their own internal 
corporate computer systems.  They receive information electrOnically through the phone 
network from a customer. but are then forced manually to rckey the information into their 
own computer systems.  The result is several redundant EDI systems, no integration of 
the technology with the companies' on-going business, and the addition of several extra 
layers of costs. 
For these small auto parts suppliers, EDI is simply an added cost of doing 
business with GM or Ford.  By conttast, the major auto assemblers are gaining much 
tighter control over a supplier through the network link.  Indeed, this particular 
implementation of EDI systematically provides information that favors the choices and 
decisions of the assemblers over their suppliers.  As infrasttucture to the auto supply 
business, the EDI network constrains supposedly autonomous suppliers to make choices 
that an assembler desires- in effect, the market is turned into an organizational 
extension of the assembler, a specific kind of coordination is substituted for market 
forces.  In that substitution, the assemblers are able to capture most of the external 
economic gains to be had through the network's role as infrastrUcture to the economic 
proccssesitsupponl. 
Ironically, however, this system may well undermine the competitiveness of the 
assemblers in the long-term.  It certainly strains relations with suppliers and, since 
suppliers are not exploiting infonnation technology effectively or efficiently, leads to a 
less competitive overall national system for producing automobiles.  Notice, too. that for 
the suppliers to benefit, and for the economy as a whole to capture the available gains, at 
least two conditions would have to be fulfilled. 
First, different network arrangements emphasizing standardized solutions, 
connectivity and integration would be necessary.  Second, the suppliers would need to 
develop substantial new assets that complemented the technology's capability and made 
usc of it.  Such complementary assets would include a well-trained work force, capable 
of experimenting with and learning from the technology's implementation within the 
company.  Thus, network arrangements matter, but so do the assets that enable full 
exploitation of the economic potential of any given network infrastructUre. 
From a theoretical standpoint. these examples of network-based indusaial 
strategies and the comparison with the impacts of the old aansponation infrastructure 
suggest that the telecommunications network infrastrUctUre affects the economy by either 
supporting or frustrating the realization of economic gains.  It does so in two 
important ways, through its effects on resource allocation and through its more 
dynamic impacts in hefping to generate long-term increases in productivity, 
growth and performance.  · 
R£sot,"RCE ALLOCAnON 
Decisions about how best to make use of all of the resources in an 
economy (e.g., capital, labor, technology, energy) are made primarily through 
tvvo meCharusms, through the market and through non-marlcet forms of 
coordination (like bureaucracies or a corporation's management structure).  We 
typically associate the market with resource decisions made between different 
organizations (e.g., between buyers like an auto company and sellers like its 
suppliers), and coordination with allocating resources within an organization 
(e.g., when management makes decisions about how to spend the company's -50-
money).Sl Telecommunications networks affect both of these market and non-
market mechanisms for influencing optimal resource usage and have the 
potential to upset boundaries between them in unpredictable ways. 
A market is essentially an arrangement of  buyers and sellers and terms of 
exchange- the process, in effect, through which supply and demand meet. 
Telecom networks increasingly supp<?rt the various stages of that process. They 
~  information about proaucts and prices, they proVlde a chaniiel for 
bargainin~d  negotiation, they are uSed to finaliie an a~ent  or an order, 
they can  be used to effectuate the payment (through electronic: fund 
transfers), and in some cases can even ensure the delivery (when the product 
bou~t  can be transmitted, like information from a data bases, or software). 
Similarly in organizations, telecommunications networks have come to embody 
many coordination mechanisms, ranging from simple communications via 
electronic mail to complex cooperative group worx through networked 
computer applications. 
The traditional view of the relationship between markets and the 
telecommunications infrastructure is that markets pre-exist, and that the network 
simply helps them to function more eifidently ancf ~arently  by facilitating 
the Bow of  iniormation.53  In this market facilitating :view, the communications 
infrastructure helps to realize the economists' ideal of perfect competition based 
on free and instantly available information.54 
There is a similar view about the relationship between 
telecommunications and coordination through non-market mechanisms. In this 
view, more perfect information permits more perfect coordination of the 
organization's activities and resources.  55  ThiS occurs as the internal 
communications network comes to embody a company's organizational routines, 
ways of producing and decision methods. Thus, fOr example, GM's c~te 
communications network perm!ts senior managers to access data about the 
progress a new car modellS making in moving from desip into production, and 
to execute decisions that affect the new car's status. In thfs way, the network has 
come more and more to reflect GM'  s production process and to embody the 
routine decision~making  of GM managers as they guide new cars from concept 
to manufacturirig. 
The real world relationshiP. between telecommunications and resource 
decisions, however, can be quite Ciifferent from these ideal theoretical images of 
perfectly functioning markets and smoothely coordinated businesses.  For 
example, in markets that use telecommunications heavily, the network is 
52  In practice, there is substantial overlap. For example, market relaticms are often formally 
coordinated to some extent, as when patent law permits the establishment of a monopoly 
position; and organizations are often run along market lines u  when Ford's own part's suppliers 
must bid for Ford's business against external suppliers. 
53  This is for example what Annie Bloch describes u  'Videotex-Aided Markets• in T~. 
lntet>.Organizlztion And E.conomic Pttfornumct, 'FASr Occasional Paper No. 195, Commission of the 
European Communities, July 1987. 
54  Arrow, ].I<., -rhe Economics of Information• in 1M  Computet' Agr: A TtDa~~  Yt!llr ViGD, 
Destourzos and Moses eds., MIT Press, Cambridge, 1980. 
55  See, e.g., Christiano Antonelli, et.al., ·structural Impacts ofTelernatics on the Automobile, 
Textile and Clothing Industries: The Theoretical Framework,· FAST Re;K?rt COM-Sl, July, 1986 
(Brussels: CEQ. -51-
inaeasingly the place where one fmds information about products and prices, 
where negotiation and trading go on, where the decisions about exchange are 
made.  AS communications networks become a key to transactin~  business, they 
also become tools to coordinate market  _place activities in a way similar to GM'  s 
coordination of its internal activities.  The neat boundaries between an 
organization and its markets are cons~ently  blurred in ways that disrupt the 
more perfect functioning of the marketplace. 
In such a world, access to the networks over which business is transacted 
is an essential prerequisite to participation in the economic game.  Advantage 
rests with those who control the network, who determine wno has access to it 
and on what terms, and which applications are used to match supply and 
demand.S6  Answers to these questions will determine whether the network 
infrastructure works to realize the economist's dream of perfect competition or to 
frustrat~  !t by creating imperfections that systematically &ias the outcomes of 
com  petition. 
Take the example of the market for airline trips The main marlcetplace is now a 
network, the on-line reservation systems.  Information about flight schedules and fares is 
primarily accessible on-line.  The rese:vation network is the place where travel agents, 
search for times and fares, make reservations, establish client credit. purchase tickets, 
reserve seatS. secure boarding passes.  Whoever controls a reservation network can use it 
to its advantage, by determining which airlines display their flights and at what fee, how 
the flights are ordered and displayed, or which routine is used to search for the flight that 
best fits a traveler's needs. 
When American Airline's SABRE system was the only one in the market. and 
before it was forced to refonn some practices. SABRE systematically provided 
infonnation that favored the choice of American Airlines flights.  As infrastructure to the 
airline reseNation business, the SABRE network provided anything but a more perfect 
market. Supposedly autonomous market participants. travel agents, were constrained to 
make the same choice that AA agents would have - in effect. the market was turned into 
an organizational extension of  AA, a specific kind of coordination was substituted for 
market forces. 
56  It is worth noting that questions concerning the fairness and openness of this network 
marketplace are raised at all three layers of the network infrastTUcture.  Facilities must provide 
connectivity for buyers and sellers to reach the marketplace.  Management processes must allow 
open access on equal terms to all.  In general however, the transmission and management layers 
matter only if they constrain applications, because as we describe below, it is there that the 
market transaction is embodied and can advantage some participants over others, or prefer some 
choices over others. -52-
The roles as marketplace and coordinator are always latent ~bilities 
for the communications infrastructure, depending on who controlS it and to what 
ends. A publiclY. controlled infrastructure approach aiming at universal 
connectivity is likely to promote wider and more demoaatic user access to 
network applications.  Because it $Upplies a c:ore backbone network of 
transmission facilities, management procedures and standardized services, a 
public: approach makes it possible for any of the network users to interact with 
any other user. 
By providing this kind of standardized, universal connectivity, a public 
infrastructure an  acutally stimulate demand for new services, enabling new 
kinds of business activities to be aeated between users of the network. This is 
true whereever dispersed, unor~  users would be unable to c:ome ~ether 
to realize their common economic interests in any other way.  Indeed, the 
potential for permitting smaller buyers and sellers to orgaruze themnselves and 
aggr!!Sate their demana has motivated the aeation of new public infrastructures 
in other countries-notably, the Mini  tel Network in France. Minitel has a 
growing number of FOfessional applications that span a variety of  economic 
sectors and combine them in unforeseen new ways.  For example, small 
distributors have been able to compete with large distribution  businesses bv 
sharing business opportunities and coordinating their delivery logistics and 
purchasing needs over the Mini  tel Network. 
By contraSt, the U.S.'s private nerwork approach makes it easier for individual 
users to better control and coordinate their competitive environmenL  As we have seen. 
this leads to strong individual user gains and better resource allocation within 
companies. The down-side, however, is that the attainment of better internal resource 
usage can simultaneously frustrate the economy-wide rea1ization of economic benefitS. 
This occurs as individual companies manipulate the external market-place with their 
internal networks.  In effect. they instill market imperfections in the network marketplace 
they control.  Optimal resource allocation is consequently distoned as the network 
infrastrUcture is fragmented into the separate networks that major users conttoLS7 
The bottom line, then, is that to c:a~ture the widest possible benefits from 
the infrastructure's ability to organize ana influence deds1ons about resources a 
mix of both private and public networks is r~ed.  Private networks are 
needed for Detter coordination within organizations in the economy, public 
networks for better resource usage between or~tions  and for overcoming 
the worst market  imperfectio~  that private networks introduce. 
Indeed, not just any public network will do:  The public role must be to 
promote an integrated, universal, and hi5dlly functional communications 
network that can act as an open, ac:c:essaOle and universal marketplace for 
economic: activities.  In that way, resource decisions can be made more smoothly, 
and possibilitiies for stimulating demand among small and medium-sized 
businesses and consumers can ee maximized. 
Si Fragmentation can sometimes be bridged later on at the higher levels of the applications layer, 
for example through Electronic Data Interchange <EDI> gateways.  However, this requires that a 
clear need for such gateways be perceived by users, and that they send strong enough market 
signals to provoke their development. -53-
.IDJt:JsnNQ  'l'O  c:auc:z  nr  A  eCHrsnnvz WOJW) 
While facilitating today's resource decisions is aitically  im~rtant,  long 
term economic success ror firins and economies rests with their acilities to evolve 
and adapt to changing conditions. The ability to experiment with the 
application of different technologies and with different ways of o~g 
economic activities, and the ability to 1 earn from such ~erimentation,  are 
essential to adjustment in an ever more competitive world. 
The telecommunications infrastructure plays a central role in enabling the 
experimentation and learning necess_ary to adapt successfully in the information 
economy.  As we concluded above, the network infrastructure increasingly 
embodies both market relations and o~tional  routines. In order to develop 
and adapt those relations and routines over time, users must be able to 
~eriment  with different network arrangements and to learn about what works 
best from those ~ents.  Only by experimenting with market relations and 
firm routines and cumulatively learrung from each experiment, can users figure 
out what network-based actiVIties permit them to be most productive and 
effectively competitive over time.  • 
The kind of network infrastructure accessable by firms influences the 
range of experiments available to them and how thoroughly they can investigate 
eacli alternative.  Consequently, the learning and know  now that is generated 
from experimentation, and wneth~  that knowhow is widely diffused or limited 
to a few users, are also all affected by the kind of network infrastructure 
available.  To see this, compare the Characteristic impacts on experimentation 
and learning of a private network approach vs. a public networx provider. 
Private network approaches typically permit intense experimentation for 
those on the network. For example, an auto company companng various ways 
to organize its production with a set of suppliers and subcontl'actors will have 
extensive confl'ol over the details of the network arrangement it chooses to 
implement. However, it will need to invest substantial time and effort in 
refining each arrangement and extending the network and the new capabilities 
to each supplier.  The time and expense Will limit the number of expenments 
attempted  from the wide range available. -54-
This is what happened \4/ith the implementation of EDI in the auto parts 
industry. The imp<?Sition of a single solution on suppliers e~ressed  both the 
limitation on experimentins \4/ith network alternatives and tile desire to use 
intensively the single solutiOn chosen.S8  As we also saw, that network 
arrangement benefitted the network provider but not the supplier.59  This too is 
characteristic: of private networks: Whoever controls the network, or~  the 
~eriments  to maximize his own goals and, so far as possible, c:onfiries the 
learning and knowhow to himself. 
By contrast, a re2Ulated, public: network approach has the potential to 
harmoruze the needs of  many more user-constituents and broadly to diHuse the 
learning and knowhow to them. For example, the phone company offers easily 
established communications links between and within firms, tbough from a 
relatively more limited menu of technological choices.  That ~ts  many more 
experil;\ents to take place, althou~  these will be less intense than a private 
network allows. There will be less intense ~entation  because the public: 
phone network can't be as readily tailored to ~y  individ~'s  needs, but more 
experiments are possible because the phone network has a far wider reach and 
c:an be cheaper to use in connecting and disconnecting different users. 
Recall how in the U.S. textile-apparel industry, for example, EDI was 
implemented in a c:onc:erted, ~-pUblic  way, \4/ith agreed standards, ~ 
t:hfrd-par_ty vendors providing the necessary software systems, and public:ly-
re2\1lated phone networks providing a major part of the communications 
inlrastruc:ture. That 0~,  rublic: sofution limits any individual manufacturer'  5 
(Levi's) ability to tailor ED  to its precise needs because it must conform to the 
standards and open systems.  But it simultaneously ~ts  much easier 
connection and aisconnection within the entire supplier base, permitting a wider 
variety of economic interactions to take place, ancf  a-eating the potentiaf  for 
successful, industry-wide adjustment to international competition. 
58  Although the public-switched telephone network provided most of the physical links between 
the auto company and the suppliers, this is an ex:ample of a private network approach because 
the choice of physical fadlities and applications, as well as much of the management of their 
implementation and use, were all determined privately by the choices of the auto company. 
59  This occurred in pan because the supplier had none of the skills nor compatability -
complementary assets - necessary to do his own experimentation with the network possibilities 
then available.  We will return to this point below. -55-
These characteristic effects of different kinds of network arrangements 
have even greater impact on the learning and knowhow that flow from 
experimentation, and that are so essential to successful competitive adaptation 
over time.60  .. Network mangements maner here because learning in an industrial 
context is tightly linked with productive activities - it is, in essense, a function of 
iteration over time.  Moreover, a great deal of knowledge is tacit, embodied in an 
organization and the routines its relies upon, thus in the network and network 
applications which embody these routines and organization.61 
As we have seen both within and between companies, the learning associated 
with telecommunications typically occurs in two stages, a first stage of automation 
followed by a second stage of re-organization.  During the first Stage, firms automate 
existing economic processes.  'for example, they replace paper communications with 
electronic mail and paper transactions with EDL or they put researchers on-line and 
electronically generate management information flows.  During this first Stage, the 
organization itself changes little, but the functions it performs are enhanced through the 
use of telecommunications technologies. 
The first stage generates information about existing operational routines 
and feedback about how the technology being deployed can help the operations 
to be more effective.  The company acquu-es knowledge about the processes that are 
being automated (e.g., more detailed information about the ordering patterns of clients, or 
about the way employees perfonn), as well as knowledge about the potential of the 
network technologies being implemented (e.g., what can actually be done with video-
conference or mn. That information and feedback help to shape new network 
arr~gemen~  .which permit existing operations to be re-orgaruzed to increase 
thm competitiveness. 
Thus, the second Stage is marked by re-organization, as the fum reorganizes itS 
various processes to take advantage of the new network teChnologies. The knowledge 
accumulated by using information networking during the first phase has underscored 
potential benefits to be gained through funher deployment of these technologies.  To 
capture those benefitS however, it has become necessary to reorganize the company's 
activities and re-configure the network which suppons them.  At this second stage, the 
fum essentially needs to "embody" its knowledge into a new network and a new 
organization. 
During both stages, the companies continuously learn by using the 
network technologies available to them.  However, as the companies re-organize 
o~ations  around the deployment of new network arrangements and 
applications, they can also ~  a different kind of knowhow: They learn about 
tne network technology itself, how it an  be chan~,  what its limitations are, 
how well it can be adapted to support the changes in operations desired based 
on what was learned from the onginal deploYD!ent of the network.  In shan, They 
learn "by doing" (that is, by actually deploying, configuring, and  re-configuring their 
network). 
60  The model of learning we develop below, including the implidt distinction we draw between 
.. learning by using" and "learning by doing", is drawn from Nathan Rosenberg, In.sidt tht Blade 
Bo:r T«hnology and E.conc:mrics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982 
61  This model of learning, including the distinction between 1eaming by using" and ieaming by 
doing", is drawn from Nathan Rosenberg, l7&Sidt  t~  Black Box: Tteh11Dlogy and E.amomics, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982. -56-
This process is really a feed-back loop - one that requires the substantial ability 
to re-configure the network infrastrUcture to take advantage of what was learned during 
the earlier cycles.  A company will go through a succession of stages, automating, then 
re-organizing around the knowledge gathered through the automation phase.  How much 
can be learned through using the network while simply automatin& existin& procedures 
will clearly affect how well the company can re-orpnize itself in the second phase. 
Similarly, how much latitude the company enjoys as it deploys a new network. and how 
much it is able to deploy itself (or at least to monitor and understand) will detennine how 
much it can learn by doing itS new network.  And finally, the network it is able tO deploy 
as it reorpnizes (e.&. how well adapted to its needs, how flexible) will detc:rmine how 
much the company can learn in the next round of using this network.  This succession of 
Steps traces an evolutionary path, a technologicaluajectary for the company. 
Critically, to learn more and employ that knowledge more effectively as it goes 
through these successive loop iterations, a company must be able to transfer learning 
smoothly between each Step of the cycle. ~  requires from the company a substantial 
ability to reconfigure its network to take advantage of what was learned during the earlier 
cycles.  Critically, such network contrOl needs to extend below the application layer: 
Reconfiguration of  a company's routines and organization will often not simply require a 
re-design of the applications it uses, but also new management mechanisms and 
sometimes new transmission facilities.  All of  the cases demonstrate this point. 
Once a~,  whether the available telecommunications infrastructure is 
privately controlled or  publidy  saf~d.ed  will substantially affect who gains 
the learning and knowliow, and how effectively it c:an be usea to su~  new 
and c:hanpd ac:tivities.  Not  ~risingly,  a privately controlled network permits 
the indiviC:iual user who controlS the netwonc .to _gamer most of the learning and 
knowhow, and co~ently  to reor~  ra~dly  to take advantage of  wliat he 
has learned.  By doing its own network, a finn haS a~  a better grasp of 
what the tedu\ology Will be able to do, of  how it c:an Dest fulfill the firm's 
r~ements. BeCause it controls directly the reorgm:Uzation process, it can best 
adapt its network to the needed changes in its operations.62 This, ap,  is the 
auto-EDI case, where the major auto com~es  acquired most of the learning 
and knowhow, and were able to optimize their own organization needs as they 
implemented EDI in  their networ}(s. 
By contrast, in the public: phone network a user has no direct control over 
either the facilities or the management layer of the network itself.  The public 
service provider always intermediates between the user and the network. What 
any individual user can do is sub~  to the limitations of technology (i.e., the 
vast public network can not be easily adapted for the needs of that user) and of 
soluttons that do not badly disadvantage the needs of other users. 
62  But to capture the benefits of these successive rounds of leaming, users must master 
sophisticated skills to implement their telecommunications strategies. This has become evident 
in the post-divestiture US world, where companies' telecommunications managers and c:hief 
information offic:ers need large and skilled staffs to find their way through the multitude of 
options they fac:e. -57-
More im~ortantly, the public network provider retains most of the 
network and teChnology knowledge, while the user gains most of the knowhow 
from using the networx for its own needs. It is generally Ve!'j difficult for a user 
and the network provider to transfer the two ldiids of learning to each other. 
Co~uently,  it lS difficult for either to make changes (in the User's operations 
or the phone company's network) that capture the 'benefits of combining the two 
kinds of learning. 
_  This means that the public network is never likely to embody all of the 
learning associated with inaeasing any individual user's economic 
perfonnance.63  However, the pub1ic approach does provide impOrtant learning 
benefits to those users unable to draw on-or, as with the EDI example, control· 
• a private network. The public network provider brings valuable expertise to 
user firms who do not have the skills or the resources to manage their own 
network. Perhaps of even greater significance, the public network cumulates 
~erience  and reaming from a wide range of different users.  Innovation and 
knowledge generated anywhere in the network can be made available to all 
users on the network. 
That is aitical, because as with ~entation,  learning rests on the 
existence of skills and other assets which complement the existing technology 
and ~rmit  the knowhow to be captured and used effectivelY.·  Tlie integrative 
role played by the phone company is potentially a very significant asset in these 
terms - if the operator devotes sufficient resources to meeting user needs. 
More broadly, for learning and experimentation to be effective, a broad range of 
such assets are necessary complements to advanced network capabilities.  One 
obvious asset is adequate user training in and familiarity \Vith communications 
technologies.  A ai  tiCal related asset is an aEpropriate standards mechanism that 
can ensure timely compatability between different information technologies.  It 
was particular lack of these latter kinds of complementary assets which prevented the 
auto pans suppliers from incorporating the learning from their use of EDL 
Other complementary needs are for easy access to data and facilities that 
lie outside the user's business but which are reachable through the 
communications infrastructure. For example, taking the auto case one last time, 
some of the more sophistocated parts suppliers, those who produce complicated 
electronic and mechanical systems, could substantially improve their 
performance if they had access to a supercomputer and to trained researchers for 
purposes of dynamic modeling of system destgn and ~ormance. If  these are 
avatlable only outside of the firm, but reachabfe through the communications 
infrastructure, a substantial amount of learning can still take place. A parallel 
kind of asset for smaller businesses would be technology demonstration centers, 
particularly if combined with industrial extension programs. 
63  An advanced public network providing the capability for users to define virtual sub-
networks and services that are tailored to its needs-such as A  'IT's Software Defined Network 
CSDN) offering - would come closest to solving this set of learning problems. -58-
The existence oi such supportive complemen~  assets would go far 
toward ensuring that the leanung and ~entation  aitic:al to long-term 
economic P.f!rlormance get broadly diffuSed throughout an economy - not 
limited to those few larp  users capable of implementing complex private 
net-works.  The very need for such usets, along with the integrative role that a 
universal, integrated and hilhly functional ~lie  network plays, suggests the 
degree to whiCh cti!ferentialfy aVailable network arrangements - Le.;  the network 
infrastructure itself-influences the realization of dynamic economic gains. 
How the network infrastruc:ture is organized and controlled influences the 
extent to which the economic benefits that accrue to teaming and 
~entation  get generated and diffused within an economy.  Private 
networks ensure that those benefits are mtemalized by a few economic actors 
who c:an realize dramatic: succ:ess in long-term ad~t  to competition. Public 
networks, ~~fi~th  compl~entary  pUblic policies, provide a means for more 
widely ext  ·  g and diffusing ~  to tlie advantage of an economy as a 
whole.  Much as with resource allocation, the bottom lirie is that a reasonable mix 
of both private and public network approaches appears to be required to realize 
all of the available gains. -59-
IV. CONCLUSION: POLICY AND PERFORMANCE 
How the network is deployed - how the issues identified above are settled -
creates consaaints and opponunities for network users.  Our analysis ~ggests  that 
different network infrastructures affect the efficiency of resource allocation amd 
the generation and diffusion of the ~entation  and learning that are central 
to suc:c:essful competitive ad~tment  m a changing world ec:onomy.  In other 
words, as a medium, the networlc is not neutral:  HOw 'Doundaries are drawn 
c:onc:eming network ovmershiE and control, access, functionality, usage, and the 
availability of assets that complement the technology, will influence tlie kind of 
network ilifrastruc:ture available to users and their economic: performance. 
As we have also ar~,  US. telecommunications r~atc?ry  poicy has 
never been much c:onc:emid with these issues. However, bY ori~1. 
advocating an int~ated,  universal, monopoly phone network, the Bell System, 
U.S. policy unintentionally promoted an economically effective communications 
infrastructure. The transtmssion and management layers were tiJhtly integrated with 
the primary application, voice telephony, and the whole package reached throughout the 
U.S.  Efficient resource allocation wu  favored through cheap, universal phone 
service, and opportunities for ~entation  and learning were similarly cheap 
and widespread, (if also limited to telephony). 
.  Over the last thirty years, severallepl and regulatory decisions have 
drastically altered the national network iniiutructure. They have done so 
without paying any. attention to the consequences on economic performance. 
The introduction of competition and then the break-up of the Bell System have 
led to increasing fragmentation of the infraslrUCtUJ'e.  Competition, continued restraints 
on A  IT  and the Bell companies, and the development of new applications have led to 
increasing differentiation of infrastructure capabilities.  Then: is frapnentation of 
network ownership, control, access. and of  the network itself; differentiation of uses, 
providers and clients.  Competition increasin&ly drives the netWOrk's evolution-
although traditional regulation and court order continue to exert critical infiuence- and 
fmal demand primarily determines its accessability and capabilities. 
Ownership and control, configurability, access, functionality, all differ in 
different pans of the overall network.  Those differences dramatically affect the 
network's utility for economic performance.  The Jar&est users are well-served.  But 
smaller users have neither the resources nor knowhow to take full advanta&e of the 
diversity of options confronting them; and regulatory decisions have denied them the 
Cully functional. integrated, public netWork that could at least panially compensate. 
Fra&mentation and differentiation have also created substantial market 
imperfections that frustrate the widespread diffusion of the economic benefits an 
advanced network infrastrUcture makes possible.  Most critical. current policy badly 
under-exploitS opponunities for economy-wide realization of the leamin& and 
experimentation that underlie long-term economic performance.  In gaining the benefits 
of market-led diversity, U.S. policy is sacrificin& the benefits of  an integrated 
infrastructure. -60-
Thus, the largest network providers, the post-divestiture Bell Companies 
remain mostly excluded from Eroviding a wide variety of new information 
services which they are uniquely suitecf to provide.64  Similarly, the frag;nented 
structure of sub-networks represents a serious limitation for a number of 
applications: examples range from s~arate  e-mail systems unable to exchange 
messages, to the difficulty Of integrating applications from different domains of 
the economy (e.g. c:cmbining banldng and manufacturing). 
Under these circumstan~  current reJU}atory policy in Computer Inquiry m, 
with its emphasis on Open Network Architecture and Comparably Efficient 
Interconnection, can be understood as an attempt to provide a framework through which 
a fragmented lower layer inframucture can be used m an integrated fashion by a number 
of actors.  It does so by introducing te:ms for progressively allowing the BOCs to offer 
applications, while simultaneously Jiving various users and application providers equal 
access to essential componenu of tbe BOCs' transmission and management network 
layers.  The challenge faeinl US telecommunications policy today is to reconstitute a 
"virtually" intepated infrastructure for the nation's economy. 
ONA 's dual approach. as it simultaneously attempts to put more into the public 
network and to allow service providers to draw men out of it. mitrors the on-going 
tension in the US about whether regulation or competition, is best able to guide the 
evolution of tbe network infrasttucmre.  In this debate, the two approaches are usually 
seen as conaadictary rather than complementary: the first aims at the provision of  more 
services throuah tbe public network, the second wants tO consider the public network as a 
reservoir of  basic building. blocks (Basic Service Elements. as ONA calls them) to be 
drawn apon by private networks and service providers. 
To a large extent. these conflictinc trends reflect two conaasted conceptions of 
the network infrastrUcture. which can be charactc:rized as the opposition between an 
integrated approach which may sacrifice the benefits of diversity, IDd a diverse approach 
which may sacrifice tbe benefits of  intcpuion. If  our analysis is credible, neither 
approacb alone will be insumcient to promote the full potential of  the existin& 
network infrastructure for economic development. 
The p  of effident resource allocation can best be achieved by polides 
that ensure that the public parts of the network infrastructure are as open, 
acc:essable and universal as possible. Achieving this will reguire c:harises in 
emphasis in traditional regwator.y policy, but no drastic policy revolutions. 
The attainment of widespread experimentation and learning, however, 
must be encouraged partly by policies tliat fall outside of the traditional 
regulatory domam and in part  oy the achievement of a new regulatory ~ 
between the U.S. and the public: network providers. As we have seen, those 
economic actors who rely primarily on the public: network will lose the benefits 
of certain kinds of learning and ~entation. On the one~  han,  ushing the 
public network toward an advanc:id, intelligent, software-confi  le, 
capabilitr can help to rescue many of those benefits -but  only  the broad, 
cumulative knowledge base retained by the public network FOvider is diffused 
to the economic actors in question.  on the other hand, diffUsion of that broad 
knowhow base and of advanced network capabilities will only be effective i£ 
64  This is demonstrated, for example, by the success of France's Mini tel. It is also a point that 
Judge Creen finnly believes. See his decision c:omments on Minitel in U.S. vs. Wrstem Electric, 
Civil Action 82/0192, (D.C. District, September, 1987). Telecommunications policy and usage in  Japan. 
Taizo Yakushiji. 
Report presented at the  final seminar on Information networks and  business strategies,  held 
at the OECD headquarten in Paris, 19-20th October 1989. -65-
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Chapter  1  Telecommunication  Market  and  Policy  In  Japan 
The  peculiar  policy  environment  in  Japan  is  better 
captured  if  one  looks  at  the  unique  structure of  business 
relationships  among  major  companies.  Given  this  unique 
business  structure,  we  need  a  careful  look  at  the 
relationship  between  new  development  in  legal  reschufflings 
of  telecommunication  policy  in  Japan  and  its effect  on  the 
use  patterns  of  telecommunication  by  companies.  In  this 
chapter,  we  will  illustrate severla  key  characteristics  in 
comparison  with  the  case  of  the  United  States. 
First,  we  should  note  that  Japan's  regulations  on 
telecommunication  are  traditionally  not  perceived  of  as  an 
obstacle  for  business  activities.  Rather,  users·  fees,  for 
example,  have  been  regarded  as  something  like  an  inevitable 
tax  imposed  for  making  use  of  state-owned  telecommunication. 
In  this  regard,  in  Japan,  telecommunication  has  been 
perceived  as  one  of  public utilities,  which  is  similar  to 
water  supply  and  electricity. 
Second,  the  liberalization  of  telecommunication 
regulations  in  Japan  anteceded  before  the  users  captured  the 
merits  of  such  liberalization.  In  other  words,  the  recent 
relaxization  of  telecommunication  regulations  did  not  result 
from  a  market  pull  based  on  strong  demands  from 
telecommunication  users,  but  from  a  supply  push  or 
politically-driven. 
Since  Japanese  telecommunication  users  have  been 
accustomed  to  state regulations  for  many  years,  they  have 
taken  it  for  granted  that  the  state  should  provide  common 
carriers  and  private enterprises  are  dependent  on  these 
common  carriers  for  their  telecommunication  use.  Therefore, 
the  liberalization did  not  alter business  behaviors  of 
companies  so  considerably  as  expected.  This  is  a  marked 
difference  from  the  case  of  the  United  States. 
In  American  history  of  business  enterprise,  companies 
have  long  fought,  in  both  courts  and  politics,  against 
federal  regulations  in  order  to  maximize  their profits  under 
the  laissez  faire  principle.  The  federal  government  has 
then  been  confronted  with  these  aggressive private 
corporations.  A good  example  can  be  seen  in  bitter 
confrontations  between  the  federal  government  and  railroad 
companies  in  the  late  19th  century,  which  later  resulted  in 
the  promulgation  of  the  Sharman  Anti-Trust  Act  of  1890. 
Japan  is  not  such  a  pluralistic state  as  the  United 
States  where  government  and  private  business  are 
puluaristically separated.  So  long  as  policy  environment  is 
concerned,  Japan  is  more  or  less  a  state-centric  country -68-
where  companies  have  long  regared  government  regulations  for 
granted  as  a  part  of  public  goods  in  service  for  private 
business.  This  so-called  "developmental  regulatory state" 
la  a  prevailing concept  with  which  we  can  acurately 
understand  the  regulatory  environment  of  telecommunication 
policy  in  Japan.  For  instance,  there  was  no  strong 
motivation  by  Japanese  companies  to  install  private 
networks,  separetely  from  the  state-provided  com•on  carries. 
Rather,  what  Japanese  companies  requested  vis-a-vis 
government  policy  was  not  lowering  users'  fees,  but 
enhancement  of  the  quality of  common  carriers. 
For  installing a  private  network,  companies  have  to 
encounter  too  many  legal  obstacles  in  Japan.  For  example, 
if  companies  want  to  construct  a  private  telecommunication 
line  between  two  factories  across  a  road,  they  have  to  file 
many  documents  to  obtain  a  permission  from  the  Ministry  of 
Construction.  The  current  law  of  the  right  of  way  is  very 
strict  and  it  easily discourages  private parties  to  lay  out 
a  private  line.  In  the  United  States,  the  price  of  land  is 
relatively  cheap,  so  that  it  is  not  a  physical  and  legal 
constraint  to  lay  out  a  private  network  encompassing  a  vast 
distance,  while  in  Japan  it  is  not  the  case. 
The  unique  business  structure,  coupled  with  a  lagged 
response  of  the  user  companies  to  the  state-initiatiated 
liberalization  of  telecommunication,  created  a  unique  VAN 
market  in  Japan.  In  statistics,  it  is  reported  that  there 
are  more  than  700  companies  in  VAN  business  in  Japan  today, 
while,  in  the  United  States,  there  are  largely  three  VAN 
companies.  However,  the  concept  of  VAN  business  in  Japan 
differs  from  that  in  the  United  States.  In  Japan,  a  VAN 
company  is  merely  a  small  spin-off  of  a  large  corporation, 
which  was  originally its •other  company's  telecommunication 
or data  processing division.  In  other  words,  lt  ls  not  a 
newly-emerged  company  to  sell  a  sophisticated  VAN  service, 
but  rather,  it accidentally  became  a  separate  company  fro•  a 
mere  division  of  a  large corporation  when  the 
telecoamunication  law  vas  enacted  and  aet  forth  the  Type  II 
Telecoamunictlon  Enterprisers. 
Although,  legally speaking,  these  mini  VAN  co•panies 
can  sell  their  VAN  service outside  the  mother  companies, 
their service still  re•ains  within  the  mother  companies  and 
affiliated companies.  This  is  the  reason  why  there  are  so 
many  VAN  companies  in  Japan.  To  illustrate  in  a  pictorial 
way,  American  VAN  companies  are  providing  VAN  sevice 
horizontally  by  covering different  business  sectors  in  a 
nation-wide  network.  But,  Japftnese  VAN  companies  give 
limited  service  to  their  mother  companies,  so  that,  they  are 
vertically structured  without  a  horizontal  connectin.  This 
is  simply  due  to  the  difference  in  business  structure 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan,  and  not  due  to  the 
difference  in  the  concept  of  VAN  service  itself. -W-
Since  most  Japanese  companies  are  formed  in  a  coalition 
group,  such  as  old  "Zaibatsu's"  or  new  assembler-suppliers' 
relations,  there  are  hypothetically  the  same  number  of  VAN 
companies  as  the  number  of  business groups.  In  the  United 
States,  a  service  provided  by  a  VAN  company  is  a  packet-
exchange  service  with  data-base sales,  while  in  Japan,  a 
primary  business  run  by  a  VAN  company  is  to  sell  terminal 
equipment  to  link  up  host  companies  with  a  VAN  company. 
Then,  for  outside  markets,  Japanese  VAN  companies  attempt 
first  to  sell  terminal  equipment  and  second  to  provide  a 
limited  VAN  service  through  these  equipments. 
With  respect  to  future  possibility  to  develop  the 
private  wireless  telecommunication  networks  in  Japan,  there 
are  also  many  political  constraints.  The  wireless 
communication  industry  is  a  gifted  territory  for  ex-
bureaucrats  of  the  Ministry  of  Post  and  Telecommunication 
<the  MPT>.  After  retiring  from  the  ministry,  high-ranking 
officials  normally  find  equally  high-ranking  posts  at  the 
private broadcasting  companies,  which  means  that  it  is 
hopeless  that  this  ministry  will  submit  the  right  of  way  to 
install  a  private  wireless  network  without  their  consent. 
This  indicates  that  future  conflicts  will  emerge  if  American 
companies  will  try  to  enter  the  private wireless 
telecommunication  business  in  Japan.  The  recent  incident  of 
the  Motorola's  attemptea  entry  into  cellular  telephony 
business  in  Japan  is  a  case  in  point. 
In  short,  the  current  liberalization  of 
telecommunication  regulations  in  Japan  does  not  affect 
considerably  the  behaviors  of  the  user  companies.  The  real 
liberalization  might  accompany  not  with  liberalization of 
existing regulations,  but  rather  with  physical 
liberalization  of  telecommunication  means  such  as  free 
installation  of  a  network  across  roads  or  public properties. 
Until  the  time  comes  for  such  full  liberalization  of 
telecommunication  means,  real  liberalization will  not  come 
out  yet  in  Japan. 
1.1  Japan's  Telecommunication  Market 
1.1.1  The  Uniquness  of  Japan's  VAN  Market 
The  definition  of  VAN  service  which  is  commonly 
understood  in  Japan  is  as  follows:  a  concern  first  leases  a 
bundle  of  telecommunication  channels  from  a  common  carrier 
such  as  NT&T,  and  next  resells  them  by  adding  new  values. 
Thus,  VAN  service  is  basicallY  a  device  to  pool  a  limited 
channels  for  common  use.  Here,  new  added  values  are 
classified  into  two  categories.  The  first  category  embraces 
the  supply  of  new  service  such  as  softwares  and  data  bases. 
The  second  category  includes  the  supply  of  hardware  service -m-
such  as  packet  exchangers  and  protocol  adjustment. 
Customers  then  find  merits  in  cheaper  prices  for  leased 
channels  with  "a-la-carte"  softwares  and  data service.  They 
can  gain  clear  added  values  to  compare  with  otherwise  table-
d'hote  flain  service  provide  by  the  NT&T. 
Profits  of  a  VAN  company  come  from  segmented  retail 
sales  of  these  services  by  leasing  a  part  of  channels  from  a 
common  carrier.  If  we  designate  a  horizontal  coordinate  for 
a  number  of  channels  to  be  sold  by  the  NT&T  and  a  verti"cal 
coordinate  for  their  prices,  a  convex  curve  is  drawn.  This 
means  that  if  a  user  leases  multiple  channels  from  NT&T,  the 
prices  become  saturated,  so  that  if  they  resell  them  at 
further  cheaper  prices  plus  value  added  profits,  an 
individual  customer  can  gain  value-added  service  at  the  same 
cost  it  would  pay  for  leasing  a  channel  from  the  NT&T. 
Since  the  hitherto  ban  of  resale  of  channels  of  the  NT&T  was 
relaxed  at  the  time  of  promulgation  of  the  new 
telecommunicatio  law  of  1982,  a  new  VAN  business  has 
flourished  very  quickly  in  Japan. 
The  recent  statistics  released  by  the  MPT  are  rather 
confusing.  According  to  them,  the  market  size  of  Japanese 
VAN  market  ammounts  to  670  billion  yen,  while  the  American 
VAN  market  totals  to  300  million  yen.  This  does  not 
indicate  that  Japanese  VAN  market  is  much  larger  than  that 
of  the  United  States,  since  the  definitional  concept  of  VAN 
service differs  between  Japan  and  the  United  States. 
As  shown  in  Figure  1-1,  American  VANs  such  as  GTE-
Telenet  and  Tymnet,  are  defined  in  such  a  way  that  they 
fulfill  two  functions  simultaneously,  namely  to  resell 
communication  channels  and  to  add  enhanced  service. 
Historically,  until  1973,  the  resale  of  AT&T  networks  was 
banned.  Then,  a  lawsuit  case  was  put  to  the  Federal 
Communication  Commission  <the  FCC>  by  insiting  that  if 
enhanced  service  is  added,  the  resale  of  channels  should  be 
permited.  After  long  legal  debates,  the  FCC  finally granted 
a  license  for  VAN  service  under  the  rationale  that  if  a  new 
value  added  service  would  contribute  itself  to  public 
welfare,  which  could  not  otherwise  be  provided  by  AT&T,  the 
resale  of  the  AT&T's  networks  could  be  permitted.  Then, 
American  VAN  service  emerged  as  a  legal  excuse  to  open  up 
reselling of  the  common  carrier's  networks.  Later,  the 
definition  of  VAN  was  extended  to  be  one  which  has  either 
resale  of  network  channels  or  enhanced  data service,  not 
simultaneously  but  separately. 
In  Japan,  the  VAN  servic~ is  loosely  defined.  It 
encompasses  American  definiton  of  VAN,  but  adds  something 
else  that  contains  enhanced  communication  service.  Then, 
intramural  data  networks  and  private  communication  lines  of 
electricity utility companies  and  railroad  companies,  if -71-
added  with  enhanced  data  processing,  are  all  classified  as  a 
VAN  business  in  Japan. 
Now,  it  is  apparent  that,  since  Japanese  definition  of 
VAN  businees  is  so  loose,  its  market  size  of  670  billion  yen 
is  also  misleading.  On  the  contrary,  we  can  say  that  there 
has  been  not  yet  a  real  VAN  service  in  Japan  which  provides 
enhanced  network  services  in  a  horizontal  scope. 
One  MTP's  report  points  out  that  Japanese  VAN  companies 
have  not  yet  been  in  business  success  with  a  full  swing  of 
market  expansion.  One  reason  to  account  for  this  business 
staganation  is  that  since,  as  shown  in. Figure  1-2,  the 
majority  of  Japanese  VA~ companies  are  still  within  their 
mother  companies  with  respec  to  financial  relationships,  and 
intramural  VAN  service  is  classified  as  an  expense  by  these 
mother  companies.  Therefore,  in  a  balance-of-payment  sheet 
level,  these  intramural  VAV  companies  can  sirvive  even  with 
all  reds  in  account  sheets. 
1.1.2  The  Overview  of  Japan's  Telecommunication  Market 
The  number  of  companies  which  are  engaged  in 
telecommunication  business  in  Japan  is  shown  in  Table  1-1. 
Before  1985,  there  were  only  80  VAN  companies  in  a  small  and 
medium  size.  They  could  enter  the  VAN  market  under  the 
approval  of  the  1982  law.  So  that,  in  Table  1-1,  these 
small  and  medium-size  VAN  companies  are  categorized  in  the 
General  Type  II  Enterprisers.  A sharp  increase  in  the 
number  of  the  Type  I  companies  in  1987  was  primarilY  due  to 
an  increase  of  entries  by  the  wireless  paging  companies. 
The  number  of  the  international  VAN  companies  has  increased 
since  the  1987  revision  of  the  law  permitted  entry  in  this 
market.  The  General  Type  II  companies  usually  mean  the  VAN 
companies  whose  number  has  increased  even  before  the  NT&T 
was  privatized  in  1985. 
Table  1-2  shows  the  size of  telecommunication  market  in 
Japan.  It  is  forecasted  that  an  increase  in  the  Type  II 
<primarilY  VAN>  enterprises  is  three  times  faster  than  an 
increase  in  the  Type  I  <common  carrier>  enterprises.  Future 
forecast  in  this  table  is  based  on  a  rough  regression 
analysis  applied  by  the  MPT. 
Figure  1-3  shows  equipment  investment  by  the  type  of 
enterprisers.  Naturally,  investment  by  the  common  carriers 
is  large  since  network  building  requires  huge  euqipment Exhibit  1  -72-
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investment.  This  figure  suggests  the  difference  between  the 
Special  Type  II  companies  and  the  General  Type  II  companies, 
in  that  the  Special  Type  II  companies  provide  a  large-scale 
teleco•munication service,  while  the  General  Type  II 
companies  include  the  small-scale  VAN  companies. 
According  to  the  data  released  by  MPT's  data  handbook, 
the  total  sales  of  the  VAN  market  amounted  to  640  billion 
yen  in  1986,  783  billion yen  in  1987,  with  a  moving-average 
increase  ratio  of  22.3~.  If  a  forecast  is  made  based  on 
capital  increases  in  VAN  companies,  an  increase  ratio  in 
total  sales  from  1987  to  1989  would  be  something  like  35.7~. 
This  forecast  is  taken  in  the  MPT's  data  handbook,  and 
should  be  severe criticism for  its  naive  technique  of 
regresional  models  applied  to  their  forecasting. 
Figure  1-4  shows  the distribution  of  the  VAN  companies 
in  terms  of  the  size of  sales.  Although  we  observe  a 
gradual  shift  from  smaller  companies  to  larger  companies, 
there  are  profoundly  a  vast  number  of  the  small  and  medium-
sized  companies  in  Japanese  VAN  market. 
Of  Japanese  VAN  companies,  only  37~ are  those  which 
take  VAN  service  as  a  principal  business,  and  the  rest, 
namely  63~.  take  VAN  business  as  a  secondary  occupation. 
Table  1-3  shows  what  these  secondary  business  companies  are. 
Japanese  users  of  VAN  service are  predominantly 
individuals  who  are  the  users  of  electronic  mail  service 
with  their  own  personal  computers.  The  next  largest  users 
are  those  in  the  wholesale  industry  and  the  retail  and 
glossary  industries.  A  more  comperhensive  picture  is  seen 
in  Figure  1-5. 
1.2  Japan's  Telecommunication  Policy 
1.2.1  Historical  Background 
The  Meiji  Government  put  state emphasis  on  construction 
of  the  trunk  line  of  telegraph  communication  networks  in 
1869.  The  centric control  of  the  country  led  the  Meiji 
Government  to  invest  in  communication  and  to  monopolize  both 
telegraph  and  telephone  services.  For  example,  telegraph 
engineering  was  the  first  academic  curriculum at  the 
nation's  first  national  university,  namely,  the  University 
of  Tokyo. F
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Japan's  telephone  service  was  opened  only  four  years 
later after America's  first  commercialization  of  telephone 
service  began  in  Boston  in  1878.  However,  it  was  only 
applied  to  government  use,  and  public  telehone  service vas 
firstly  installed  in  1900.  This  indicates  that  telephone 
communication  in  Japan  was  developed  in  the  way  of 
government  ownership,  without  any  intention  to  privatize it. 
In  1943,  under  the  Tojo  War  Cabinet,  the  Ministry  of 
Post  and  Telecommunication  and  the  Ministry  of  Railroad  were 
merged  together  in  order  to  integrate  land,  sea  and  air 
transportation  and  communication  in  a  single  administrative 
unit  called  the  Ministry  of  Transportation  and 
Telecommunication.  However,  this  manmmoth  ministry did  not 
function  properly  because  of  its side.  After  the  defeat  of 
war,  the  Bureau  of  Telecommunication  was  separated  from  this 
gigantic  organization  and  hence  became  the  Bureau  of  Post 
and  Telecommunicat-ion,  which  was  later elevated  to  a 
ministrial  level  by  assuming  the  postwar  name,  the  Ministry 
of  Post  and  Telecommunication  <the  MPT>.  But,  its  prewar 
administrative  jurisdiction  over  air  transportation,  ship 
transportation  and  electric utility service did  not  come 
back  ~o  the  ministry. 
As  a  consequence  of  social  democratization  by  the  GHQ 
<the  General  Headquarter  of  the  Allied  Forces>,  workers' 
strikes  occured  in  every  sector  of  Japanese  industries. 
Among  them,  workers'  strikes  by  the  All  Post  and 
Telecommunication  Workers'  Union  was  one  of  the  most 
militant  in  labor  movement.  Then,  GHQ's  policy directive 
was  released  to  dissolve  the  MPT  into  separate organizations 
for  the  purpose  of  weakening  workers•  political  movement 
within  the  MPT.  In  respose  to  the  GHQ's  directive,  Japanese 
government  proposed  to  set  up  two  different •inistries,  the 
Ministry  of  Postal  Service  and  the  Ministry  of 
Telecommunication,  but  a  single minister  would  control  both 
ministries.  In  the  mean  time,  the  national  railroad service 
and  the  salt  and  tabacco  monopoly  were  separated  from  the 
Ministry  of  Transportation  and  from  the  Ministry  of  Finance, 
respectively.  They  both  became  an  independent  public 
corporation. 
In  the  postwar  polictical  reforms,  the  creatin of  a  new 
ministry  was  banned  because  of  government  budget  shortace, 
so  that  the  proposition  of  creating  the  new  Ministry  of 
Telecommunicatin  faced  a  serious  deadlock.  The 
reorganization  issue  of  the  ministry  became  inevitable  when 
there  emerged  a  serious  social  problem  of  telephone  shortage 
and  its  mulfunctioning.  The  GHQ  was  also  very  worried  about 
mulfunctioning  of  the  telephone  exchange  system  for  its 
political  control  of  Japan.  Political  debates  went  on  to 
shift  towards  the  privatization  of  telephone  service  as  was -82-
the  case  of  American  AT&T.  However,  the  question  remained 
as  to  how  to  mobilize  necessary capital  money  for  a  such 
privatization  in  the  midst  of  economic  devastation after  the 
war.  Then,  an  idea  of  transforming  the  ministry  into  a 
public  corporation  emerged  as  a  promising  future  plan.  The 
All  Post  and  Telecommunication  Workers'  Union  aggreed  with 
this  public  corporation  alternative,  since  the  workers 
thought  that  it  would  raise  their sallaries  if  a  public 
corporation  was  created. 
Under  the  process  described  above,  a  law  regarding 
reorganization  of  the  Ministry  of  Telecommunication  was 
finally  passed  at  the  Diet  and  the  Nippon  Telegraph  & 
Telephone  Corporation  <the  NT&T,  or  "Denden-kosha'  in 
Japanese>  was  established  in  1952,  and  its overseas 
telegraph  and  telephone  service  was  taken  away  to  a  new 
private  company  called  the  "Kokusai  Denshin  Denwa,  Ltd." 
<the  KDD>.  The  KDD  was  established  as  a  compromise  between 
a  privatization  plan  of  the  whole  ministry  and  a  public 
corporation  plan. 
Because  of  its  wartime  predecessor  and  postwar 
telephone  shortage  and  mulfunctioning,  the  NT&T  had  been 
basically engineers-led  company  whose  emphasis  was  placed  on 
technological  development  in  telecommunication.  This 
suggests  that  engineers  had  enjoyed  stronger  political  power 
over  non-engineering  personnel  in  the  NT&T's  decision-
making. 
3>  Ihf_IflfgrA~b-1n~-I~l~2b~n~-a~n4al_A_MAnl&~~iA1 
lnn2l!Aiig_n 
The  most  serious  problem  for  the  newly  created  NT8T  was 
capital  shortage.  In  order  to  solve  this  problem,  Japanese 
government  introduced  a  very  wise  capital  acquisition  plan, 
namely  the  Telegraph  and  Telephone  Bonds  <TTBs>.  Fir~t.  in 
1953,  the  government  asked  city banks  and  security companies 
to  form  an  underwriting syndicate  to  sell  the  government-
guaranteed  TTBs.  Since  telephone  demands  were  so  large  that 
anyone  who  wanted  to  install  telephones  must  buy  the  TTBs. 
Capital  money  collected  by  the  sales  of  the  TTBs  was  solely 
used  to  finance  for  the  replacement  of  telephone  exchangers 
and  telephone  equipment.  The  TTBs  system  worked  so  well, 
and  Japan's  telephones,  exchangers  and  equipment  were 
quicklY  renovated. 
when  Prime  Minister  Zenko  Suzuki  launched  an 
administrative  reform  plan  in  1982,  he  was  much  concerned 
with  ailing government  budgetary deficits.  His  attempt  was 
to  solve  budeget  deficits  without  politicallY unfavorable 
tax  increase.  Suzuki's  administrative  reform  plan  was 
continued  by  the  next  Prime  Minister  Yasuhiro  Nakasone,  and -83-
Nakasone  successfully  implemented  many  administrative 
reforms,  including  the  privatizations  of  the  Salt  and 
Tabacco  Sales  Monopoly  Public  Corporation,  of  the  National 
Railroad,  and  finally  of  the  NT&T. 
However,  the  NT&T  was  privatized  not  because  it gave 
the  government  a  budgetary deficit.  In  fact,  it  was  one  of 
the  most  profitable public  corporation.  NT&T's 
privatization  was  taken  place  for  three  reasons.  First,  it 
was  implemented  as  a  package  of  Nakasone's  political  slogan 
of  the  administrative  refomrs  of  the  government-controled 
public  corporations,  although  his  target  was  on  the  ailing-
by-deficits  Japan  National  Railroad.  Second,  it  was 
internally  motivated  within  the  NT&T  itself.  Thank  to  the 
successful  sales  of  the  TTBs,  the  NT&T  achieved  complete 
renovations  of  Japan's  telegraph  and  telephone  system  so 
quickly.  This  in  turn  means  that  the  NT&T  would  not  be  able 
to  expect  fast  capital  accumulation  through  the  hitherto 
TTBs  in  future,  so  that  it  has  to  enter  a  new  profitable 
business.  Unless  it  changes  the  status  as  a  public 
corporation  under  the  government's  control,  the  NT&T  cannot 
open  a  new  business  so  easily.  Then,  privatization  was  only 
option  for  the  NT&T.  Third,  the  NT&T's  privatization  was 
requested  by  foreign  governments,  in  particular,  American 
federal  government's  pressure  was  strong.  In  1982,  the  AT&T 
and  the  Department  of  Justice  reached  a  legal  compromise 
about  the  ant~-trust  lawsuit  against  the  AT&T.  Two  years 
ago,  the  British  PTT  was  privatized.  So  that,  foreign 
pressures  were  felt  to  open  up  Japanese  telecommunication 
market.  Then,  Japanese  government  had  no  choice  but 
privatization  of  the  NTIT  so  as  to  open  Japanese 
telecommunication  market,  but  with  a  careful  protective 
measure.  Under  the  new  law  of  privatization,  foreign 
investment  is  restricted  to  a  one-third  of  stock shares  for 
the  Type  I  comp4nies  which  are  common  carriers,  but 
completely  open' for  entry  into  the  Type  II  companies  which 
I 
are  engaged  in  telecommunication  service  by  leasing  common 
carriers  from  the  Type  I  companies. 
1.2.2  The  Process  of  Liberalization 
In  general,  telecommunication  is  a  typical  of  modern 
monopoly,  because  the  monopoly  in  telecommunication  meets 
following  three  requirements:  a>  public  service---the 
telecommunication  service  should  be  distributed  uniformly 
throughout  a  country,  b)  natural  monopoly---uniform  networks 
are  more  economically  efficient,  base  on  the  scale-of-
economy  principle,  and  c>  technological  standardization---at 
every  point  and  at  every  time,  a  network  should  be  conneted 
without  interfacing  problems. -M-
Under  these  rationales,  a  law  to  create  a  monopoly  firm 
was  promulgated  in  1952,  giving birth  to  the  "Denden-kosha" 
<the  NT&T>.  Two  major  missions  assigned  to  the  NT&T  were 
the  solution of  waiting  lists of  telephone  applicants  and 
the  implementation  of  the  nation-wide  auto-dialing system. 
Both  missions  were  successfully  implemented  in  1978  and 
1979,  respectively. 
As  technological  innovation  in  the  telecommunication 
area  made  progress,  above  three  rationales  for  the  state's 
monopoly  gradually  lost  its  legitimacy.  First,  since market 
needs  became  more  diversified,  the  uniformity  of 
telecommunication  public  service  lost  its  legitimacy. 
Second,  like  optical  fibers  and  satellite communication,  new 
communication  technologies  broke  the  scale  merit  of  the 
uniform  telecommunication  system.  Third,  the  new  interface 
technology  does  not  require  technological  standardization. 
In  1985,  three  telecommunication  laws  were  enacted  to 
give  birth  to  a  free  market  competition  in 
telecommunication.  These  are  a>  The  Law  of 
Telecommunication  Enterprise,  b)  The  Law  of  the  NT&T,  Ltd., 
and  c>  The  Background  Laws  for  the  Law  of  Telecommunication 
Enterprise.  Figure  1-6  shows  the  legal  configuration  of 
Japan's  telecommunication  laws. 
Since  the  NT&T  has  accumulated  technological 
preeminence,  technical  knowhows,  and  above!  all  the  national 
telephone  and  microwave  networks,  the  new  law  on  the 
privatization  of  the  NT&T  regulates  the  scope  of  privatized 
NT&T's  new  business  as:  a>  The  NT&T  has  to  perform  fair  and 
efficient  business,  b>  The  NT&T  has  to  supply  a  stable  and 
universal  telecommuntation  service,  and  c>  The  NT&T  has  to 
undertake  R&D  and  research  results  should  be  disseminated  to 
other  companies.  Other  regulations  include:  d)  one  third 
of  NT&T's  stocks  must  be  held  by  the  govern•ent,  f)  the 
appoitment  of  NT&T's  executives  need  MPT's  authorization. 
The  NT&T's  Law  is  subject  to  review  till  1990.  The  •ost 
crucial  item  for  1990  review  is  whether  NTIT  be  dissolved 
into  the  regional  companies,  like  the  dissolution  of  the 
National  Railroad  and  the  AT&T. 
The  old  Public  Telecommunication  Law  strictly regulated 
the  use  of  telephone  networks  and  special  networks.  In 
particular,  the  law  regarded  telephone  networks  as  the  most 
fundamental  media  in  telecommunication,  so  that  its  nationa-
wide  installatin  was  an  urgent  policy  objective.  Any 
attempt  by  private  parties  to  lay  out  a  private  network  or  a 
special-purpose  network  was  then  considered  as  an  obstacle 
to  the  state's  mission  to  complete  the  nation-wide  telephone 
networks. -85- Exhibit  9 
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During  the  late  1950s,  computers,  which  were  expensive 
at  that  time,  were  used  for  data  handlings  at  banks  and 
manufacturing  firms.  Between  branches,  some  companies 
started data  communicaiton,  and  in  1964,  the  Japan  National 
Railroad  <the  JNR>  introduced  the  computerized  seat 
reservation  system.  This  is  one  of  Japan's  first  VAN 
service  ever  attempted  by  a  non-NT&T  company.  The  JNR  had 
its  own  communicatin  channels  for  traffic control  and 
safety,  so  that  the  seat-reservation  system  did  not  infringe 
on  the  NT&T's  networkds  at  all.  In  1967,  the  NT&T  began  a 
data processing service,  but  users  could  not  be  allowed  to 
link  this  data  line  to  their  own  company  networks.  Then, 
naturally,  as  market  demands  of  free  data  communication 
increased,  a  political  pressure  was  mobilized  to  change  the 
Law  of  Public  Telecommunication  in  1971.  The  revision  of 
19il  allowd  only  limited  use  of  data  communication,  and 
linkage  bewteen  different  companies  was  still  prohibited. 
The  second  revision  of  the  law  came  in  1982.  In  1978 
and  1979,  respectively,  the  state's missions  to  solve  the 
telephone  waiting  lists  and  to  implement  the  nation-wide 
auto-dialing  system  were  completed,  so  that,  the  legitimacy 
of  the  state's  monopoly  of  telecommunicatin  was  lost.  Then, 
by  the  revised  law  of  1982,  inter-firm networks  were 
legalized,  but  under  the  following  conditions: 
a>  only  for  data  processing 
b>  if  not  intervene,  without  data  processing,  into 
others's  networks. 
However,  the  1982  revision  marked  a  new  era  of  Japanese 
telecommunicaiton  policies,  since  it allowed: 
a>  a  VAN  business  by  small  and  medium-size  enterprisers 
b>  a  agent  service,  without  data  processing,  for  the 
third  party's  telecommunication  use 
c>  a  connection  between  the  common  carrier  and  a  private 
line,  if  not  tripartile connection  back  to  the 
common  carrier,  and  if  accompanying  with  data 
processing,  and  furthermore  if  not  intervene  into 
other  parties's  lines  without  data processing. 
By  the  1982  revised  law,  Japanese  VAN  market  vas 
officially opened.  Three  years  later,  in  1985.  three  major 
telecommunication  laws  came  into  the  fore.  Among  them.  the 
new  Law  of  Telecommunication  Enterprise  needs  a  special 
attention. 
This  law  classifies  telecommunicatin  enterprisers  into 
two  categories.  The  first  category,  desiginated  as  the  Type 
I  Enterprisers,  implies  the  common  carriers,  while  the 
second  category,  called  as  the  Type  II  Enterprisers,  means 
the  companies  who  do  not  own  common  carriers,  and  then  by 
leasing  them  from  the  Type  I  companies,  who  can  provide  an -88-
enhanced  telecommunication  service.  There  are  two  sub-
classifications  for  the  Type  II  companies,  which  are:  a>  the 
"Special"  Type  II  Enterprisers  who  give  teleco•munication 
serivce  to  unspecified  majority  users,  or  who  provide 
international  telecommunication  service,  and  b>  the 
"General"  Type  II  Enterprisers  who  are  those  other  than  the 
Special  Type  II  Enterprisers.  Since  the  1987  revision,  the 
Special  Type  II  companies  are  granted  a  right  to  enter  an 
international  VAN  service,  which  is  a  service given  to  a 
specific  customer,  but  not  to  the  general  unspecified 
customers. 
Table  1-4  shows  the  developmental  process  by  both  legal 
con tro  1  and  market  openness.  As  of  1985,  there  were  80 
companies  who  participated  in  the  small  and  medium-size  VAN 
service.  As  of  the  end  of  1988,  there  were  658  companies  in 
the  Type  II  category.  In  1987,  an  international  VAN  was 
approved,  and  since  then,13  companies  have  entered  into  the 
international  VAN  marekt. 
Table  1-5  shows  the  typology  of  companies  which  are 
engaged  in  telecommunication  enterprise. 
1.2.3  The  Uniqueness  of  Japan's  Telecommunication  Policy 
The  liberalization  of  telecommunication  policy  is  not 
a  single entity,  but  composed  of  multiple  factors.  The 
followng  six  items  seem  most  important  to  look  at  the 
saliency  of  the  liberalization  of  telecommunication  policies 
in  Japan. 
a>  the  liberty of  market  entry 
b>  the  liberty of  business  management 
c>  the  liberty of  capital  investment  in 
telecommunication  business 
d>  the  liberty of  installing new  telecmmunication 
means 
e>  the  liberty of  network  linkage 
f>  the  liberty of  supplying  telecommunication 
equipment 
With  respect  to  the  liberty  of  market  entry,  such 
liberty  is  fundamentally  guaranteed  in  Japan.  There  is  a 
ubiquitous  word  in  Japanese  as  "gensoku-jiyu."  Note  that 
"gensoku"  implies  "fundamentally,"  and  "jiyu"  means 
''liberty"  or  "freedom."  However,  this  special  Japanese T
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idiom,  "gensoku-jiyu,"  does  not  mean  complete  liberty at 
all,  but  the  word  is  always  accompanied  by  another  special 
Japanese  word,  "kyo-ninka"  which  literally means  either 
"permission"  or  "license."  In  Japan,  market  entry  into 
telecommunication  business  is  fundamentally  free,  but 
applicants  need  a  license  from  the  MPT.  In  this  sense,  the 
entry  is  conditional,  and  not  absolutely  free. 
For  retail  sale  of  telecommunication  channels,  the  NT8T 
is  required  to  obtain  a  resale  license  from  the  MPT.  For 
wholesale  case  <i.e.,  selling  a  bundle.of  channels>,  there 
are  regulations  by  the  MPT  and  the  CCITT  since  the 
wholesales  of  multiple  channels  give  customers  an 
opportunity  to  install  a  private  network. 
For  a  domestic  investor,  there  is  no  limitation  as  to 
capital  investment  into  telecommunication  business,  while, 
for  a  foreign  investor,  a  strict  regulation  is  applied. 
Under  the  current  wired  Telecommunication  Law,  the 
installation  of  a  private  network  is  "gensoku-jiyu" 
<fundamentally  free),  but  under  the  condition  that  the  MPT 
would  grant  a  license.  This  limited  liberty  is  also  applied 
in  the  United  States  under  the  FCC's  rules  and  regulations. 
In  England,  regulat4ons  are  relatively  loose  since  a  new 
network  by  a  VAN  company  is  now  permitted. 
In  Japan,  another  constraint  should  not  be  missed.  It 
is  the  problem  of  the  right  of  way.  In  order  to  construct  a 
private  network,  a  company  has  to  apply  to  another  ministry, 
namely  the  Minstry  of  Construction,  for  obtaining  the  right 
of  way  across  public properties  such  as  roads  and  rivers. 
The  stringent  regulations  by  this  ministry almost  discourage 
any  attempt  to  install  a  private  network.  This  is  the  main 
reason  why  only  three  companies,  the  Japan  Telecom,  the 
Japan  Highspeed  Telecommunication  and  the  Daini-Denden 
<which  literally means  the  second  NTIT>,  could  enter  private 
long-distant  telephone  business.  They  can  install  private 
networks  without  infringing  on  the  Ministry  of 
Construction's  right  of  way,  since  they  use  their  own  land 
properties  such  as  railroads,  express  roads  and  electricity 
poles. 
with  respect  to  wirless  networks,  they  are  under  a 
severe  control  of  MPT's  Law  of  Electric  waves  since  wireless 
networks  require  bandwidths.  The  situation  is  the  same  in 
the  case  for  satellite communication. -91-
Currently,  to  connect  a  public  network  with  a  private 
network  is  regulated  in  Japan.  For  example,  linking  a 
private voice  network  with  a  long distance  public  telephone 
lines  is  banned  by  the  MPT  which  complies  with  the  CCITT's 
code.  However,  a  connection  between  users'  terminals  and  a 
network  of  a  VAN  company  is  conditionally  permitted  if  an 
applicant  is  granted  a  license  from  the  MTP. 
Again,  for  this  liberty,  the  principle  of  "gensoku-
jiyu"  is  applied.  In  other  words,  either  domestic  suppliers 
or  foreign  suppliers  have  an  equal  opportunity  to  enter  the 
euqipment  market,  but  in  practice,  there  are  strong  ties 
between  ~T&T and  the  so-called  NT&T  family  suppliers.  So 
that,  practicallY speaking,  an  entry  barrier  is  very  high 
against  new  comers  in  this  market. 
The  marked  difference  in  telecommunication  policies 
between  Japan  and  the  United  States  is  apparent.  First,  in 
Japan,  liberalization  assumes  the  stability of  market  order, 
rather  than  the  enhancement  of  competition  among  different 
parties,  while  in  the  United  States,  competition  is  a  key 
concept  for  liberalizing  telecommunication  market. 
In  the  United  States,  a  dichotomous  division  is  drawn 
between  basic  telecommunication  and  enhanced  or  value-added 
telecommunication,  whereas,  in  Japan,  demarcation  is  taken 
only  between  the  Type  I  Telecommunication  Entreprise  and  the 
Type  II  Telecommunication  Enterprise.  The  rationale  for 
such  demarcation  by  actors  in  Japan,  rather  than  by  the 
functions  of  telecommunication,  regardless  of  actors,  rests 
in  that,  first,  if  functional  demarcation  is  taken,  there 
would  be  controversies  over  the  definitions  of  what  basic 
telecommunication  is  and  what  enhanced  telecommunication  is. 
As  noted  earlier,  American  demarcation  was  necessary  for  the 
FCC  to  grant  a  resale  license  of  networks  to  a  second  party, 
other  than  AT&T. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  Japan,  liberalization  was 
initiated  by  the  MPT  in  the  absense  of  strong market 
demands,  so  that  the  MPT  introduced  the  most  desirable 
scheme  of  liberalization  so  as  not  to  loose  its political 
power  which  was  based  on  the  power  of  "kyo-ninka."  MPT's 
"kyo-ninka"  inludes  set-ups  of  users's  fees. 
In  order  to  keep  the  rein  of  MPT's  control,  a  concept 
of  technical  standard  is  necessary.  To  keep  the  qua~ity of 
communication  channels,  the  MPT  sets  up  stringent  technical -~-
standards  to  be  applied.  If  an  applicant  for  either  the 
Type  I  or  the  Type  II  category  cannot  meet  such  standards,  a 
license  is  not  granted.  In  the  United  States,  highly 
technical  service  has  already  been  operated  by  private 
parties,  so  that,  federal  control  by  technical  standards 
cannot  be  justified. 
The  unique  policy  environment  in  Japan  results  from  the 
unique  behavioral  patterns  of  telecommunication  users.  As 
pointed  earlier,  Japanese  users  have  been  accustomed  to 
regulations.  This  peculiar  behavioral  pattern  made  the 
users  dependent  on  the  state's  supply  of  qualified 
telecommunication  networks.  In  this  regard,  the  concept  of 
supply-push  is  more  prevailing  in  Japan  than  the  concept  of 
demand-pull. 
Currently,  Japan's  telecommunication  policies  are 
primarily  concerned  with  domestic  arenas,  without  full 
synchronization  with  international  arenas.  The  real 
liberalization  should  be  applied  to  both  domestic  needs  and 
international  ones.  So  that,  current  debates  at  the  Uruguay 
GATT  Round  should  be  reflected  in  polcy  formulation  at  home. 
Traditionally,  there  were  two  giant  telecommunication 
companies,  the  NT&T  and  the  KDD,  in  Japan.  Since  this 
oligopolistic  market  structure  had  been  in  effect  for  many 
years,  policy  makers  in  Japan  developed  strong propensity  to 
think  of  telecommunication  market  in  terms  of  the  major 
actors  who  provide  telecommunication  service  on  a  large 
scale.  Such  propensity  was  not  altered  when  the  time  came 
for  liberalizing  the  telecommunication  law  in  1982. 
Classification  of  the  major  actors  by  Type  I  and  Type  II  is 
the  case  in  point.  However,  it  is  foreseeable  that  there 
will  emerge  many  mini  telecommunication  companies  even  in 
Japan  in  future.  The  current  classification will  then  be 
outdated  soon. 
We  tentatively  propose  three  categorizations  as 
depicted  in  Table  1-6.  These  are  i>  the  telecommunication 
providers,  ii>  the  telecommunication  processors,  and  iii> 
the  telecommuniation  users.  The  second  category does  not 
mean  the  end  users,  but  those  who  convert  telecommunication 
service  into  the  producers'  goods  by  enhancing original 
utility provided  by  the  first  category. 
The  Type  II  Enterprisers  under  the  current 
liberalization  law  would  not  be  in  the  first  category,  but 
the  processors  in  the  second  category,  so  that  state 
regulations  should  not  be  applied  to  these  enterprisers,  but 
be  restricted  only  to  the  first  category.  State  regulations 
are  justfied  if  a  company  attempts  to  form  market  monopoly. 
It  is  in  fact  possible  that  the  enterprisers  in  the  first -93- Exhibit  ~2 
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category  ~ould  run  into  monopoly  in  the  absense  of  law 
enforcement  to  regulate  them.  However,  such  likelifood  is 
small  in  the  case  of  the  enterprisers  of  the  second 
category.  Thus,  strict regulations  towards  the 
telecommunication  processors  seem  to  be,  in  our  opinion,  an 
abuse  of  legal  enforcement. 
Under  the  current  WATT-C  of  the  ITU,  all  entities  who 
are  using  an  international  network  should  be  regulated  by 
the  ITU.  This  is  also  an  abuse  of  regulation  enforcement  by 
an  international  cartel  of  the  PTTs  of  all  countires.  If 
WATT-C  is  applied,  the  domestic  telecommunication  processors 
are  strictly regulated ..  If  they  are  regulated,  it will  be  a 
natural  consequence  that  the  end  users  will  also  be 
regulated.  This  chain  reaction  of  regulations  would  choke 
future  promotion  of  telecommunication  technology. 
In  Japan,  telecommunication  policies  are  in  a 
transitional  state  where  there  emerge  several  uncompromising 
contradictions.  First,  the  demarcation  between  regulatory 
policies  and  business  promotional  policies  is  unclear.  For 
example,  the  NT&T  is  a  provider  of  universal 
telecommunication  service,  so  that  regulatory policies  are 
applied  to  it.  However,  since  the  NT&T  was  privatized, 
business  promotion  policies  encourage  it  to  diversify  into  a 
franchise  business,  which  would  erect  new  entry barriers 
against  small  new  comers.  Second,  the  demarcation  between 
telecommunication  as  the  producers'  goods  and 
telecommunication  as  the  consumers'  goods  is  also  vague.  So 
far,  Japanese  telecommunication  policies  have  regarded 
telecommunication  as  the  consumers'  goods.  However,  today, 
telecommunication  is  being  increasingly  used  as  the 
producers'  goods.  Therefore,  the  hitherto  telecommunication 
policies  should  be  changed  to  couple  with  industrial 
policies  in  future.  Current  political  confrontations 
between  the  MPT  and  the  MITI  over  territorial  jurisdiction 
is  certainly against  welfare  for  all  users  and  future 
technological  development. 
Chapter  2  Japan's  Telecommunicatin  Policy  in  International 
Comparison 
In  this  chapter,  we  will  shed  light  on  the  uniqunesss 
and  the  similarity of  Japanese  telecommunication  policy  in 
an  international  comparison.  Telecommunication  policies  of 
different  countries  differ  each  other,  depending  on  the 
unique  developmental  process  and  social  condition  of  each 
country.  Generally  speaking,  from  one  way  to  another,  each 
country  has  strong  regulatory  policies  under  the  rationale 
that  telecommunication  is  an  entity  to  universally  serve  for 
public  welfare.  However,  with  respect  to  ways  and  means  of 
making  use  of  regulations,  there  are  many  variations ..  In -95-
these  non-uniformal  ways  and  means  of  regulatory policies  of 
different  countires,  we  will  try  to  locate  Japanese  case. 
The  first  section  will  be  devoted  to  an  international 
comparison  by  three  areas  of  telecommunication,  namely,  a> 
the  entry  into  common  carriers,  b>  equipment  supply,  and  c> 
enhanced  telecommunication  service. 
The  second  section  will  discuss,  in  an  analytical 
fashion,  the  patterns  of  liberalization  for  Japanese  case 
and  its  international  counterparts. 
2.1  An  International  Comparison  of  Policy  by  Area 
2.1.1  The  Entry  into  Common  Carriers 
In  postwar  Japan,  the  infrastructure  of 
telecommunication  service  had  been  developed  by  the 
government-owned  Nippon  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Public 
Corporation  <the  "Denden-kosha"  in  Japanese).  Since  1985, 
the  Denden-kosha  was  privatized  with  a  new  name,  the  NTST, 
Ltd.  The  NT&T  is  Japan's  largest  private  enterprise  and 
still  more  or  less  monopolizes  Japan's  telecommunication 
market.  According  to  the  recent  edition  of  the 
Telecommunication  White  Paper,  the  number  of  entries  into 
common  carrier  <which  are  classified  as  the  Type  II 
Enterprisers  accorging  to  the  new  Liberalization  Law>  has 
increased  to  35  from  13  in  a  year  from  1986  to  1987. 
However,  in  terms  of  market  share,  NTIT's  monopoly  is 
unquestionable.  With  respect  to  international 
telecommunication,  there  are  two  entries,  but,  again,  KDD's 
monopoly  has  not  been  shaken  at  all. 
In  West  Germany,  the  service  provided  by  the  common 
carrier  has  been  still  controled  in  the  hand  of  the  DBP. 
Even  in  near  future,  its  complete  monopoly  will  persist.  In 
France,  hitherto  bad  reputation  for  low  quality of 
telecommunication  infrastructure  has  been  considerably 
improved  when  the  DGT  introduced  a  sophisticated digital 
network  in  the  1970s.  In  future,  French  telecommunication 
will  be  still  led  by  the  state's  initiative  for  both 
promotion  and  regulation.  This  is  a  marked  difference  from 
the  case  of  England,  where,  since  1984,  the  BT  was 
privatized  to  allow  new  entry  by  the  Mercury,  Ltd.  However, 
by  law,  the  dupoly  by  both  the  BT  and  the  Mercury  will  be 
guaranteed  ti 11  1990.  In  this  sense,  the  degree  of 
liberalization  in  England  is  less  than  that  of  Japan.  In 
Italy,  the  provider  of  common  carrier  is  separated  from  the 
regulatory  entity.  The  MPT  has  sole  right  to  regulate 
telecommunication  service,  while  the  STET,  a  su~sidiary of 
the  state's  holding  company,  the  IRI,  is  engaged  in  providng -96-
common  carrier.  Unique  dual  approach  in  Italy  is  taken  in 
order  to  welcome  foreign  investment  to  modernize  Italian 
telecommunication  infrastructure.  However,  this  dual  policy 
seems  to  have  not  worked  well,  and  in  practice,  the  monopoly 
by  the state's public  corporations  is still predominant.  In 
the  United  States,  since  1934,  telecommunication  service  has 
been  regulated  by  the  Telecommunication  Law,  but  natural 
monopoly  by  the  AT&T  ~as not  shattered  by  regulatory 
monitoring.  Then,  the  FCC  strengthened  its  regulation 
aginst  the  AT&T  and  finally  divided  the  AT&T  into  the 
separate  companies  in  1984. 
Given  the  above  international  comparison  of 
telecommunication  policies,  it  seems  that  two  groupings  are 
possible.  The  first  group  involes  the  Unites  States,  Japan 
and  England,  where  liberalization  has  been  moving  on.  Among 
these  countries,  the  United  States  has  a  unique  feature  in 
that  liberalization  policy  was  initiated  by  the  Anti  Trust 
Law,  whereas  no  other  countires  have  similar  legal 
backgrounds.  The  second  group  consits  of  France,  West 
Germany  and  Italy,  where  the  state's  regulatory  power  is 
still  strong.  Among  these  strong  regulatory  countries, 
Italy  is  relatively  open  and  less  stringent  in  the  state's 
regulation,  so  that  in  terms  of  the  degree  of 
liberalization,  Italy  would  be  classified  between  France  and 
England. 
There  are  three  categories  in  the  wireless 
telecommunication,  such  as  a>  public  broadcasting,  b>  mobile 
telecommunication,  and  c>  satellite communication.  In  all 
cases,  the  crucial  constraint  is  the  limited  availability of 
frequncy  bandwidths.  Since  ~ave resources  are  limited,  all 
countries  have  strong  regulatory  controls  over  the  wireless 
telecommunication. 
In  Japan,  public  broadcasting  and  mobile 
telecommunication  are  subject  to  regulatory controls  by  the 
Law  of  Public  Broadcasting and  the  Law  of  Electric  Waves, 
respectively.  Since  the  wired  telecommunication  is  subject 
to  the  regulations  set  by  a  different  law,  namely  the  Law  of 
Telecommunication  Enterprise,  the  demarcation  between  the 
wireless  telecommunication  and  the  wired  telecom•unication 
is  laid down  very  clearly. 
Unique  development  of  policies  towards  the  wireless 
telecommunication  can  be  seen  in  France,  where  market 
competition  was  introduced  in  1986  to  break  the  hitherto 
monopoly  by  the  TDF.  Currently,  French  wireless 
telecommunication  is  controled  by  the  CNCL. -97-
With  respect  to  mobile  telecommunication,  England 
recently  approved,  under  PTT's  control,  the  entry  of  private 
cellular  telephone  service  enterprisers. 
Satellite communication  is  an  attractive area  of 
business  entry.  But,  it  is  restricted  by  the  limited 
availability of  transponders.  In  Japan,  the  broadcasting 
companies  show  keen  interests  in  entering  the  business  of 
satellite communication. 
2.1.2  Equipment  Supply 
The  supply  of  equipment  is  always  synchronized  with 
the  market  condition  of  common  carriers.  If  the  number  of 
common  carriers  is  one  in  a  particular  country,  market 
demands  for  equipment  supply  are  very  skewed,  so  that  it  is 
likely  that  such  a  common  carrier  can  control  suppliers' 
market  by  technical  specifications  or  purchasing  rules.  For 
example,  Japan's  NT8T  and  West  Germany's  DBP  apply  stringent 
techn1cal  specifications  in  order  to  control  the  industrial 
order  of  equipment  suppliers.  In  such  countries,  though  the 
suppliers·  market  is  said  to  be  competitive,  competition  is 
managed  by  the  demand  side,  namely  the  common  carriers. 
In  Japan,  since  ~TBT's monopoly·was  broken  in  1985,  the 
suppliers'  market  is  gradually  open  to  new  comers,  although 
there  are still  a  strong cartel-like coalition  by  the  so-
called  "Denden-family"  of  equipment  suppliers.  In  England, 
foreign  suppliers  can  now  enter  the  suppliers'  market, 
while,  in  France,  the  nationalized  Thomson  and  CGE  contrDl 
the  suppliers'  market.  In  Italy,  foreign  suppliers  are  now 
allowed  to  enter  the  suppliers'  market  for  the  purpose  of 
modernizing  old  networks. 
2.1.3  Enhanced  Telecommunication  Service 
Entry  barriers  for  the  business  of  telecommunication 
service  are  relatively  lower  than  those  for  entry  into 
common  carriers.  Each  country  has  its  own  policy  to  promote 
entry  into  telecommunication  service.  In  the  United  States, 
the  liberalization  of  telecommunication  service  was 
implemented  in  the  process  of  relaxing  AT8T's  natural 
monopoly.  Under  FCC's  control,  telecommunication  service 
embarked  on  by  the  subsidiaries  of  the  AT&T.  Recently, 
other  new  comers  entered  into  the  market.  This  unique 
approach  in  the  united  States  considerably differs  from 
approaches  taken  by  other  countries. 
~ith  respect  to  the  VAN  market,  there  are  some 
variations,  from  countries  to  countries.  we  have  already 
explained  the  paricularlity of  Japanese  VAN  market.  In 
France,  a  VAN  business  is  now  liberalized,  but  80~ of  French -98-
VAN  companies  are  not  new  entries  but  merely  the 
subsidiaries  of  the  DGT.  In  Italy,  the  market  is  open 
particularly  for  foreign  entry  for  the  purppse  of  welcoming 
foreign  investment  and  technical  knowhows. 
With  regard  to  the  resale  business  of 
telecommunication,  both  Japan  and  the  United  States  enjoy 
full  market  openness.  European  countries  show  unique  policy 
directions.  In  England,  it  was  opened,  but  later  the  simple 
resale  was  restricted since  1984.  In  West  Germany,  the  most 
regulatory state,  allowed  discretionary pricing  for 
resellers,  but  under  the  strict control  by  the  DBP. 
In  the  case  of  the  coupling  between  common  carriers  and 
private  lines,  Japanese  policy protects  the  common  carriers 
by  not  allowing  a  connection  with  a  long-distant  voice 
network.  west  Germany  and  England  restrict  most  severely 
the  linkage  of  a  private  network  with  common  carriers.  On 
the  other  hand,  a  connection  is  open  in  any  form  in  the 
United  States.  In  Italy,  although  a  connetion  is  allowed, 
but  to  connect  lines  between  different  companies  is  banned, 
thereby  protecting  the  state-controled  common  carriers. 
2.2  The  Patterns  of  Liberalization 
2.2.1  Analytical  Framework 
Difference  in  telecommunication  policies  among 
different  countries  can  be  better  captured  not  by  legal 
institutions,  but  by  how  these  legal  insititutions are  put 
into  practice.  Theoretically,  government  can  control 
telecommunication  market  in  two  ways.  First,  government  can 
create  a  new  market,  through  either potitive policies  or 
passive  policies.  The  best  example  of  positive polices  is 
Japan's  industrial  policy.  Government  can  also  create  a  new 
market  through  passive policies  by  minimizing  its  market 
intervention.  If  government  chooses  to  let •arket 
principles  work  with  free  entries  of  private parties  into  a 
a  new  market,  it  is  a  case  of  passive policies. 
Second,  given  the  fact  that,  in  every  country, 
telecommunication  market  has  been  monopolized  by  the  state-
owned  common  carrier,  there  are  two  options  for  government's 
policies.  The  first  option  is  approval  of  •onopoly  or  semi-
monopoly.  For  example,  government  can  exercise strong 
policy  intervention  to  create  managed  competition,  or 
managed  monopoly.  The  second  option  is  rejection  of 
monopoly  by  introducing  complete  market  competition.  For 
either  option,  government  needs  strong political  power. 
Provided  that  there  are  two  options  respectivelY  for 
the  first  and  second  areas  of  government  policies,  we  have 
now  a  two-by-two  table  as  illustrated  in  Table  2-1. -99-
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There  are  four  cells  in  this  table,  of  which  each  cell 
means  as  follows: 
a>  mAnAg~Q-m2nQ~21I: 
the  monopoly  by  the  state-owned  common  carriers, 
or  by  the  state-backed  private  companeis 
b>  ~~iXI1~_m2n2~Qli= 
the  natural  monopoly  or  monopoly  by  a  privatized 
common  carrier 
C)  IDAnAg~g-kQID2~!i!iQD: 
there  are  more  than  two  companies,  but  entries  are 
strictly reguiated  by  government,  or  entry  into  a 
different  area  by  a  monopoly  company  is  controled 
to  guarantee  free  competition 
d)  i£~~-~2mR~ii!lQD: 
no  control  for  new  entry 
2.2.2  Analysis 
Using  this  two-by-two  table,  we  will  review  the 
liberalization policies  by  different  countries.  In  what 
follows,  we  will  mainly  focus  on  the  wired  telecommunication 
market,  the  VAN  market  as  a  service  market  and  the  equipment 
supply  market. 
In  Japan,  as  we  have  noted  earlier,  the  previous  state-
owned  "Denden-kosha"  was  privatized  in  1985.  The  purpose  of 
privatization  was  to  introduce  the  principle  of  market 
competition.  However,  even  after  privatized,  the  NT&T  is 
still  a  gigantic  company  which  will  exercise  natural 
monopoly.  Whether  the  government  can  maintain  free 
competitive  market  depends  on  how  it will  regulate  NT&T's 
natural  monopoly.  With  regard  to  the  area  of 
telecomunication  service,  before  the  NT&T  was  privatized, 
Japanese  companies  had  already developed,  internally within 
their  own  factories  or  affiliated groups,  technologically 
sofisticated  telecommunication  service  such  as  software 
supply  and  data  processing.  So  that,  in  this  area,  the  law 
of  liberalization  would  accelerate  Japanese 
telecommunication  market.  However,  as  we  pointed  out  in 
Chapter  1,  Japanese  concept  of  the  VAN  business  has  a  unique 
connotation,  not  comparable  with,  say,  American  counterpart. 
With  respect  to  the  equipment  market,  since  the  NT&T 
demonstrates  natural  monopoly  as  a  common  carrier,  the 
market  is  still  controled  by  t~is giantic  firm.  However, 
since  the  market  has  no  regulations,  a  competitive  market 
will  come  soon  as  the  service  marekt  is  expanded. - 101-
In  west  Germany,  the  DBP  still  monopolizes  the  common 
carrier  marekt,  while  the  service  market  is  opened  under  the 
license  system.  As  for  the  equipment  supply  market,  free 
competition  is  guaranteed,  but  since  there  is  only  one 
common  carrier  and  the  service  market  is  regulated  by  the 
government's  license,  the  degree  of  openness  of  this  market 
is  1 i m  i ted. 
In  France,  no  law  guarantees  monopoly  by  the  DGT,  but 
practically,  the  DGT  monopolizes  both  the  markets  of  common 
carrier  and  telecommunication  service.  The  success  of 
building  telecommunication  infrastructures  by  the  DGT  shows 
no  serious  need  to  liberalize  the  markets.  French  style  of 
state  ownership  is  also  found  in  the  equipment  supply 
market,  since  two  major  suppliers,  the  Thomson  and  the  CGE, 
are  nationalized. 
In  Italy,  a  group  of  public  corporations  monopolyze  the 
market  of  common  carriers,  whereas  the  service  market  is 
open,  even  to  forei5n  companies.  Since  the 
telecommunication  infrastructure  has  been  in  a  bad  shape, 
Italy  tries  to  improve  it  with  help  of  foreign  technologies. 
Since  the  common  carrier  market  is  monopolized  in  Italy,  its 
equipment  market  is  also  regulated. 
In  England,  the  BT  was  privatized  in  1985,  and  the 
Mercury,  Ltd.,  a  private  company,  entered  the  common  carrier 
market  under  the  state's control.  British  VAN  market  is  now 
liberalized,  but  the  simple  resale  of  networks  is 
prohibited.  In  the  equipment  supply  market,  the  BT,  even 
after privatization,  specifies  purchasing  prices,  but,  other 
than  such  regulation,  the  market  is  widely  open  to  the 
domestic  and  foreign  suppliers. 
In  the  United  States,  as  mentioned  above,  policy driven 
to  maintain  free  market  competition  is  strong,  so  that 
AT&T's  natural  monopoly  was  broken  in  1984.  Today,  AT&T  is 
permitted  to  enter  into  the  service  market,  while  in  past 
only  its subsidiaries  could  enter. 
To  summarize  the  above  review,  an  international 
comparison  is  neatly  shown  in  Figure  2-1.  According  to  this 
figure,  six countries  can  be  ranked  in  the  following  way: 
1>  The  US 
2>  Japan 
3>  England 
4)  Italy,  west  Germany 
5)  France 
Note  that  this  ranking  shows  only  the  degrees  of 
liberalization,  and  hence  it  does  not  imply  any  value 
judgement  as  to  the  good  or  bad  of  liberalization.  In  some 
countries,  like  France,  the  state's  monopoly  could  function Exhibit  14 
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to  speed  up  the  renovation  of  telecommunication 
infrastructures  with  a  digital  network.  If  renovation  were 
taken  by  a  private sector  in  France,  it  would  be  more 
costly,  and  general  users  might  have  to  pay  higher  users' 
fees. 
2.2.3  Japan's  Develop•ent  Process  of  Liberalization 
As  shown  in  Figure  2-2,  Japan  took  several  steps 
towards  liberalization.  Japan's  telecommunication 
liberalization  stemmed  from  1971's  change  of  the  Law  of 
Public  Telecommunicaton.  Since  1952,  by  the  Law  of  the 
"Denden-kosha  ··  <NT &T >,  J.apan 's  te 1  ephone  networks  were  bu i 1 t 
to  supply qualified  telephone  service  on  a  nation-wide 
scale.  Later,  computers  were  introduced,  since  about  1955, 
by  forerunning  companies.  Then,  technological  development 
in  semiconductors  and  equipment  led  these  companies  develope 
their  own  intramural  communication  networks.  Thus,  there 
emerged  a  strong  market  demand  to  ask  for  the  government's 
approval  of  laying  out  companies'  own  networks.  Such  market 
pressure  led  the  government  to  relax  the  NT&T's  la~  to  allow 
such  intramural  networks.  This  •as  the  origin  of  Japan's 
libelarization process. 
To  recapitulate,  there  seem  to  be  two  factors  which 
drove  the  government  into  liberalization.  The  first  factor 
is  technological  development.  Since  Japanese  companies 
competitively  introduced  computerized  communication  networks 
within  their  organizations,  the  enhanced  telecommunication 
market  already  existed  in  a  latent  form.  Without  such 
technological  quantum  leaps  in  the  private sectors,  Japan's 
liberalization  would  not  have  come  out  so  soon.  The  second 
factor  is  the  uniformalization  or,  in  other  words, 
standardization  of  telephone  networks  by  the  NT&T.  Until 
about  the  late  1980s,  complete  diffusion  of  telephone  sets 
at  every  household  and  automatic dialing service,  which  were 
two  major  tragets  of  the  infrastrucrual  buildups,  were 
successfully  implemented.  So  that,  what  would  come  next  as 
a  development  of  telecommunication  in  Japan  is  nothing  but 
liberalization. 
2.2.4  Japanese Pattern of  Liberalization Steps 
As  shown  in  Figure  2-2,  Japan's  liberalization of 
telecommunication  market  came  first  from  the  relaxation  of 
the  service  market.  It  was  1982,  a  symbolic  year  for  a 
drastic  change  of  the  postwar  development  of 
telecommunication,  when  private  networks  were  firstly 
permitted.  Only  three  years  later,  the  NT&T  was  privatized. 
If  we  compare  Figure  2-2  with  Figure  2-1,  we  find  some 
structural  similarities,  which  indicate  that,  if  Japanese Exhibit  15  - 104-
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pattern  of  liberalization  is  a  universal  pattern  towards 
complete  liberalization  of  all  three  telecommunication 
markets,  European  countries  would  take  similar steps,  namely 
starting  from  the  liberalization  of  the  service  market, 
going  through  the  liberalization  of  the  equipment  supply 
market,  and  ending  with  the  liberalizatin  of  the  common 
carrier market. 
The  start  from  the  service  market  is  inevitable,  since, 
in  this  market,  1here  are  no  stong  needs  for  standardization 
and,  in  the  mean  time,  market  entry  costs  are  not  so 
burdonsome  if  compared  with  the  entry  into  the  market  of 
common  carriers. 
In  near  future,  since  all  countries  would  liberalize 
the  service  networks  first,  it  will  foreseeable  that  an 
internatinal  agreement  is  necessary.  Currently,  in  the  VAN 
market,  the  CCITT  advises  that  an  agreement  be  made  on  a 
bilateral  basis.  Also,  there  will  emerge  some  conflicts  in 
an  international  market  of  equipment  supply.  Such  conflicts 
will  be  similar  to  the  current  high  technology  conflicts 
where  competitions  among  Japan,  the  United  States  and  Europe 
are  very  intense. 
In  our  analysis,  we  have  focused  only  on  the  wired 
telecommunication.  But,  in  future,  the  importance  of 
wireless  telecommunication  will  become  more  acute.  As  the 
recent  political  incident  of  the  Motorola's  attempted  entry 
into  Japanese  cellular  telephony  market  indicates,  the  shift 
of  the  common  carriers  of  all  countries  from  wired 
telecommunication  to  wireless  telecommunication  is  an 
inevitable  course  of  development,  and  this  shift  will  creat 
a  new  international  conflict. - 106-
Chapter  3  The  Use  Patterns  of  Telecommunication  by 
Japanese  Companies 
In  Chapter  3,  we  will  summarize  how  the selected 
companies  have  been  using  telecommunication  in  their 
business  in  Japan. 
Our  illustrations  of  telecommunication  use  by  co•panies 
are  structured  with  four  variables:  a>  a  brief description 
of  business  of  each  company,  b>  how  they  are  usin& 
telecommunication  and  in  which  way,  c>  the  future  plan  of 
telecommunication  use,  and  finally,  d>  how  they  perceive  of 
telecommunication  as  a  competitive  weapon. 
3.1  The  Uniqueness  of  Japanese  Business  Environment 
3.1.1  Banking  Business 
Japanese  banking  business  differs  from  American 
counterpart  in  that  Japanese  banking  business  allows  the 
nation-wide  branch  networks  under  the  same  bank  names,  while 
American  banks  are  basically  locally-based,  having  only  a 
limited  number  of  local  branches.  As  is  the  case  for  the 
casualty  insurance  industry,  Japanese  banking  service  is 
also  subject  to  the  strict control  of  the  Ministry  of 
Finance  <the  MOF>. 
Japanese  banking  system  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  the 
"Convoy  Fleets"  which  implies  that  all  city banks  and  local 
banks  are  protected  to  avoid  bancrupcy  and  regulated  to 
escape  from  excessive  competition  leading  to  overlending. 
For  example,  the  opening  of  a  new  branch  and  the  entry  of 
new  banks  are  both  regulated. 
Another  feature  of  Japanese  banking  industry  is  found 
in  its vertical  structure having  the  "Zaibatsu"  companies  at 
the  top  and  related  manufacturing  and  trading  companies  in 
the  periphery.  For  example,  the  Mitsublsh  Bank  is  a  m~in 
financial  vehicle  for  the  Mitsubishi  family  companies 
including  the  Mitsubishi  Heavy  Industries,  Ltd.,  the 
Mitsubishi  Motor  Company,  the  Tokyo  Marine  Casualty 
Insurance,  the  Mitsubishi  Trading Company,  etc.  In  the  mean 
time,  each  major  city bank  has  also  vertically related  to 
the  affiliated  local  banks. 
These  unique  features  of  Japanese  banking  system  have 
many  implications  of  telecommunication  networking.  First, 
since  each  bank  shares  more  or  less  the  same  service  and 
same  operation,  banking  networks  become  similar  each  other, 
without  much  uniqueness.  Second,  telecommunication  networks 
of  banks  in  Japan  tend  to  be  large  in  size  in  order  to  cover 
all  many  branches.  Third,  installation  of  a  private 
telecommunication  network  does  not  give  an  incentive  since - 107-
all  banks  are  closely  related.  For  example,  a  client  who 
has  a  bank  account  at  the  Bank  "A"  can  transfer  cashes  to 
the  different  Bank  "B." 
3.1.2 Teletechtronic Business 
Japanese  electronic  companies  which  are  both  a  user  of 
telecommunication  and  a  supplier  of  telecommunication 
equipment  and  service  are  intrinsically  independent  without 
a  strong  government  regualtion.  They  thus  can  apply  any 
style  of  telecommunication  networks  and  service  unless 
violating  the  new  Law  of  Telecommunication  Enterprise. 
Japanese  teletechtronic  industry  is  moving  ahead  in 
overseas  investment,  so  that,  generally  speaking,  the 
companies  find  every  incentive  to  have  its  own  exclusive 
telecommunication  networks  on  a  global  scale.  In  a  sense, 
these  companies  are  comparable  with  American  private 
enterprises  in  assuming  telecommunication  as  a  competitive 
weapon. 
3.1.3  Casualty  Insurance  Business 
In  the  United  States,  the  fire  and  casualty  insurance 
agencies  are  individually  "application-driven."  In  other 
words,  the  non-life  insurance  agencies  are  not  operated  by 
the  large  nation-wide  casualty  insurance  companies.  On  the 
other  hand,  Japanese  casualty  insurance  companies  which 
normally  cover  also  marine  and  fire  insurance  have  their  own 
sales  agencies. 
The  unique  business  environment  for  Japanese  casualty 
insurance  industry  includes  the  re-underwriting  by  the 
lower-tiered  casualty  companies  and  the  joint-underwriting 
by  the  competitors,  thereby  attaining a  risk-hed&e  function. 
In  the  mean  time,  Japanese  casualty  insurance  industry  is 
subject  to  the strict control  of  the  MOF.  The  introduction 
of  a  new  insurance  plan  is  not  free  under  the  current 
survailance  by  the  MOF. 
The  features  of  re-underwriting  and  joint-undervrtting 
of  Japanese  casualty  insurance  industry creat  a  large  and 
nation-wide  sales  &Ieney  network  in  a  very  inte&rated  form. 
Thus,  there  exist  ample  space  in  which  an  electronic  network 
system  is  adopted  in  order  to  facilitate  the  quality of 
service  and  risk-hedge  mechanism.  However,  under  the 
current  regulations  by  the  MOF,  the  linking  the  auto 
casualty  insurance  network  with  the  auto  sales  network  by 
sharing  the  same  customers'  data  is  prohibited. 
3.1.4  Automotive  Manufacturing  Business - 108-
The  strength  of  Japanese  automotive  companies  lies  in 
manufacturing  performance  as  well  as  in  their dealers' 
networks.  It  is  said,  among  meny  experts  of  worldwide 
automotive  business,  that  Japan's  unique  "Kamban  System"  or 
"Just-in-Time  System"  gives  Japanese  automotive  companies  a 
strong  competitive  edge.  This  "zero-inventory"  system 
allows  Japanese  auto  makers  to  source  manufacturing 
components  quickly  and  most·efficeintly without  lowering 
quality. 
It  might  be  naturally  thought  that  the  "lamban  System" 
would  be  easily  transferred  to  an  electronically-operated 
sour  c i n  g  s y s t em ,  one  v e r s i on  o f.  t e 1  e co  mmu n i cat i on  n e two r k • 
since  the  "Kamban  System"  itself  is  a  large  and  compliated 
net~ork.  When  the  GM  bought  the  EDS,  it  was  rumored  that 
the  GM  would  attempt  to  create,  other  than  the  CAD/CAM 
system,  a  parts-sourcing  network  comparable  with  Japan's 
''Kamban  System." 
However,  an  essence  of  the  "Kamban  System"  is  not 
merely  a  sourcing  network,  but  rather  a  strict quality 
control  devices  of  purchasing  components  in  a  network 
fashion.  Therefore,  political  po~er of  personnel  at  the 
purchasing  department  is  a  key  to  obtain  qualified  parts 
from  the  family-like  parts  suppliers.  The  network  of  these 
first  and  lower-tiered  suppliers  is  paternalistically-
structured  to  allo~  the  purchasing  department  of  an  assembly 
company  to  request  highly qualified  parts  at  a  sepcific 
sequence  of  production  lines. 
Thus,  the  "Kamban  System"  is  not  a  simple  network,  but  a 
complexity  of  a  social  and  political  web.  It  is  then  a 
fatal  mistake  if  one  emulates  and  replaces  this  socio-
political  entity  with  an  electronic  net~ork. 
On  the  other  hand,  Japanese  auto  makers'  sales dealer 
system  is  in  fact  a  network  which  can  be  consolidated  by  an 
electronic  network.  Quick  information  gathering about 
consumers'  preference  through  a  computerized  dealer  system 
helps  an  assember  shorten  manufacturing  lead-time.  Thus, 
most  Japanese  auto  companies  tend  to  regard  a 
telecommunication  network  as  a  powerful  strategic  weapon. 
Automotive  companies  are  very  much  lead-time  conscious  in 
applying  a  telecommunication. 
3.2  The  Case  Study 
3.2.1  The  Mitsubishi  Bank 
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a>  Priority Area 
The  first  priority  is  given  to  security  and 
reliability,  since  the  Mitsubishi  Bank  has  several  million 
customers.  The  second  and  third  priorities are  given  to 
market  development  and  new  service  development.  Because  of 
unique  business  environment  for  Japanese  banks  which  were 
described  above,  the .competitors  are  using  more  or  less 
similar  telecommunication  systems.  The  trade  association  of 
Japanese  banks  has  a  special  committee  to  jointy study 
telecommunication  matters. 
b)  Private  Networks 
A part  of  Mitsubishi's  head  office  is  implementing  a 
LAN  network.  Almost  all  accounting  offices  of  Japanese 
major  companies  are  linked  to  Japanese  key  banks  including 
the  Mitsubishi  Bank.  If  a  new  private  network  is  provided 
by  a  third  party,  the  Mitsubishi  Bank  would  also  internalize 
it  as  a  private  network.  For  example,  today,  most 
convenient  glossary  shops  have  their  own  internal  private 
networks.  If  the  Mitsubish  Bank's  network  is  linked  to 
them,  a  new  private  network  encompasses  a  large  sevice 
network,  not  limiting  to  a  banking  service  only. 
c)  The  ISDN  Network 
Theoretically,  it  would  be  possible  to  elevate  the 
current  networks  basen  on  personal  computers  and  fax 
machines  to  an  ISDN.  However,  the  Mitsubishi  Bank  is  not 
ready  to  install  it,  because  of  cost  inbursement  incurred 
for  a  system  change. 
d>  Network  Organization 
There  is  the  system  development  division  in  charge  of 
developing users'  softwares  for  the  users'  division  in  the 
Mitsubishi  Bank.  The  system  development  division  is 
currently  in  charge  of  the  implementation  of  the  Third-Order 
On-Line  System,  a  comprehensive  telecommunication  system  to 
link all  operations  at  the  Mitsubishi  Bank. 
a>  Channels  and  Networks 
The  Mitsubishi  Bank  is  implementing  the  CAMS  network 
for  automatic  cashing  service.  This  network  is  linked  to 
other  banks'  CAMS.  In  1988,  the  Mitsubishi  Bank  developed - 110-
the  ANGEL  software  which  allowed  the  customers  at  a 
hospital,  direct  mailing  companies,  financial  security 
companies  and  sport  clubs  to  connect  with  the  Nitsubishi 
Bank  through  their  own  personal  comupters  for  cashing.  It 
is  now  considering  to  implement  a  new  network  using  an  IC 
cards. 
b>  Computer  Use 
There  are  four  IBM  3090's,  4,500  terminals  and  4,000 
ATMs  and  CDs.  All  mainframes  are  not  on  lease-based,  but 
purchased.  Software  development  for  the  Mitsubishi  Bank's 
Third-Order  On-Line  System  <which  attempts  to  computerize 
every  banking  service>  is  jointly undertaken  with  the  Japan 
IBM  and  other  software  houses.  However,  since different 
banks  are  developing  their  own  unique  on-line  systems,  the 
matching  problems  among  different  on-line  systems  will 
emerge  sooner  or  later. 
C)  Overseas  Networks 
The  VENUS-Pis  currently used.  But,  it  is  very 
inconvenient  to  use  it  because  the  Venus-Pis  always  busy. 
To  link  to  overseas  offices,  the  SWIFT  is  also  used.  For 
international  credit  card  a.uth.orization,  the  Mitsubishi  Bank 
depends  on  a  Japanese  branch  of  the  SITA. 
There  are  basically  three  kinds  of  business  for  any 
banks.  The  first  business  is  acc~unting service,  the  aeond 
business  is  international  financial  service,  and  the  third 
business  is  the  security  and  foreign  exchange  dealing.  For 
these  three  kinds  of  business,  telecommunication  is  widely 
used  with  unique  networks  and  service applications. 
Currently,  videotex  image  informatin  has  not  been  applied. 
All  written  documents  are  sent  via  faxes. 
In  1965,  the  Mitsubishi  Bank  introduced  the  First-
Order  On-Line  System  which  intended  to  mechanize  banking 
management.  In  1973,  the  Second-Order  On-Line  System  was 
implemented  to  link  all  branches  through  a  telecommunication 
network.  In  1987,  the  Third-Order  On-Line  System  was  first 
introduced,  and  its ultimate  goal  was  to  replace  teller 
service  with  computerized  automatic  tellers. 
Currently,  any  attempt  of  Japanese  banks  to  expand  the 
usage  of  telecommunication  is  subject  to  MOF's  control  and 
survailance.  For  example,  a  cashing  management  system  used 
by  all  Japanese  banks  resemble  a  VAN  network,  but  it  is 
prohibited  by  the  MOF  to  enter  a  VAN  business. 
3.2.2  The  NEC Capital 
Sales 
Personnel 
Offices 
a>  Priority Area 
- Ill -
116.6  billion  yen 
2,300  billion yen 
38,000 
109  <Japan>  96  <Overseas> 
Priorities are  g.iven  to  1)  aids. for  enhancement  of 
productivity,  including  product  design  and  production 
control,  2>  aids  for  new  product  development,  and  3>  aids 
for  sales  management.  For  example,  the  LSI  design  is 
transmitted  through  a  telecommunication  network  between 
NEC's  divisions  in  Japan  as  well  as  overseas  manufacturing 
sites.  The  NEC  has  its  own  VAN  subsidiary,  but  it  has  not 
reached  a  profitable  level. 
b>  Private  Networks 
The  NEC  is  using  the  SOG  wireless  networks.  However, 
the  quality  of  these  networks  are  vulnerable  by  weather 
condition,  so  that  they  are  primarily used  for  voice 
communication  only.  Under  current  regulations  by  the 
Ministry  of  Construction,  a  private  network  across  public 
roads  is  prohibited. 
c>  The  ISDN  Network 
The  NEC  is  willing  to  use  an  ISDN  network  though  it  is 
not  sure  about  how  to  utilize it.  There  are  merits  and 
demerits  in  using  an  ISDN  network.  The  merits  are  cost 
reduction  since  the  use  of  current  exclusive  lines  have  to 
pay  a  fixed  cost  while  the  use  of  an  ISDN  line  allows  a 
flexible  pricing.  The  demerits  are  the  lack  of 
infrastructure  to  use  such  a  network. 
d)  Network  Organization 
Historically,  NEC's  general  division  and  technical 
division  were  in  charge  of  telephone  networks,  and  the  EDP 
division  was  in  charge  of  data  network.  However,  five  years 
ago,  these  two  divisions  were  merged  into  the  office system 
promotion  division.  Some  outside  experts  point  out  that 
NEC's  integuration  of  divisions  would  be  misleading since 
the  EDP  is  different  from  telecommunication  in  nature. 
a)  Channels  and  Networks - 112-
There  are  250  PBXs,  18  packet  exchangers,  220 
multiplexes,  1,000  modems,  4  gateways  and  so  on.  There  is  a 
VAN  resale  network  from  NEC's  VAN  subsidiary.  There  are 
also  an  inhouse  telephone  exchange  service  network  and  data 
packeting  network. 
b>  Computer  Use 
There  are  numerous  mainframes  in  the  NEC.  The  largest 
one  is  an  ACOS  1500  at  the  computer  center.  There  are  250 
information  processing  centers  with  the  NEC-made  mainframes. 
c>  Network  Organization 
Throughout  all  branches  and  the  head  office,  there  are 
the  TELNET  networks.  There  are  also  the  data  networks  using 
the  packet  exchangers.  As  to  a  VAN  network,  the  NEC  is  a 
VAN  user  connecting  its  VAN  network  which  is  supplied  by 
NEC's  own  VAN  subsidiary.  Monthly,  0.8  billion packets  are 
used  within  the  NEC.  At  average,  every  2.5  NEC's  employee 
has  one  data  network.  The  NEC  spends  annually  2  billion  yen 
for  developing  networks  and  7  billion  yen  for  maintenance. 
The  use  of  networks,  including  both  telephone  and  data 
networks,  costs  the  NEC  for  10  billion  yen  per  year. 
d>  Overseas  Networks 
Since  there  is  no  regulation  in  the  United  States  to 
install  a  private  line,  NEC's  American  subsidiaries  are 
mutually  linked  together  with  NEC's  exclusive  line. 
However,  linking  those  with  NEC's  head  office  in  Tokyo  is 
not  possible  according  to  MPT's  regulation. 
Telecommunication  between  domestic  plants  and  overseas 
offices  and  plants  is  done  by  voice,  fax,  data  and  telex 
networks.  Among  American  branches,  a  l.SM  digital  network 
and  aGE-MARK  II  are  used.  The  NEC  tries  to  establish 
Britain's  offices  as  a  network  headquarter  from  which  many 
outgoing  and  incoming  networks  are  integrated.  However.  it 
might  infringe  on  the  CCITT  proposal  that  the  installation 
of  an  exclusive  European  network  is  desirable  in  future,  but 
currently,  only  public  networks  are  allowed. 
Under  current  regulations  by  the  MPT,  linking  between 
public  networks  and  private  exlusive  networks  is  prohibited. 
Therefore,  it  is  difficult  to  connect  all  NEC's  plants  and 
divisions  through  an  exclusive  line.  Also,  current  fax 
lines  cannot  be  differentiated  from  voice  telephone  lines, 
thereby  they  are  subject  to  the  government's  regulation  on 
telephone  service.  The  NEC  is  implementing  a  SOG  •ireless 
network,  but  if  it  is  used  for  a  VAN  service,  it would - 113-
infringe  on  the  law  of  the  Type  I  Telecommunication 
Enterprise. 
In  spite of  these  legal  constraints,  the  NEC  is  moving 
ahead  as  both  a  user  of  telecommunication  and  a  supplier  of 
equipment.  Historically,  an  exclusive  telephone  network  was 
implemented  at  the  NEC  in  1959,  an  exclusive data  network 
was  in  1970,  a  packet  data  network  in  1978,  and  finally,  an 
integrated digital  network  in  1985. 
3.2.3  The  Tokyo  Marine 
Capital 
Sales 
Profits 
6,200  billion  yen  <world's  largest> 
1.5-2.0 million  contracts 
700  billion  yen  <world's  third  largest) 
<Note>  Japan's  total  insurance  agencies 
Japan's  total  insurance  companies 
a>  Priority  Area 
330,000 
22 
Priorities  are  given  to  1>  aids  for  sales  management, 
2>  aids  for  customers'  data  collectin,  3>  aids  for  new 
insurance  policy  development,  and  4>  aids  for  productivity 
enhancement. 
b>  Private  Networks 
Currently,  there  is  no  need  to  implement  a  private 
network.  Current  regualtions  by  the  NOF  do  not  prohibit  a 
casualty  insurance  company  to  own  a  private  network. 
c)  The  ISDN  Network 
An  ISDN  network  is  very  promising  to  Japanese  casualty 
insurance  company.  The  Tokyo  Marine  shows  a  keen  interest 
in  using  an  ISDN  network  when  it  is  available.  However, 
Tokyo  Marine's  Kunitachi  information  center  has  not  been 
ready  to  have  infrastructure  arrangement  to  install  an  ISDN 
network.  The  Tokyo  Marine  worries  about  the  vaguness 
associated  with  cost  and  price  if  an  ISDN  is  implemented. 
d)  Network  Organization 
In  1959,  Tokyo  Marine's  first  computer  was  installed. 
Since  then,  company  reorganizations  were  repeated  f;om  the 
first  statistical  survey  section  in  1953,  the  statistical 
survey  division  in  1964,  the  system  division  in  1970,  the 
information  system  division  in  1988,  the  separate  multiple - 114-
d1visions  of  information  management  and  information  system 
development  in  1988.  There  are  two  computer  centers  at  the 
Tokyo  Marine,  one  in  Kunitachi  <in  the  outskirt  of  Tokyo> 
and  one  in  Senri  <near  Osaka>.  The  Senri  center  is  a  backup 
center  for  the  Kunitachi  center. 
a)  Channels  and  Networks 
There  is  no  private  network  in  operation  at  the  Tokyo 
Marine.  To  link  other  companies  like  banks,  trading 
companies  and  other  casualty  companies,  the  public  NTIT's 
channels  are  used.  For  an  inhouse  exclusive  network,  the 
Tokyo  Marine  has  a  private  line.  Since  there  are  so  many 
insurance  agencies,  it  would  be  difficult  to  install 
terminals  at  every  agency  office.  Currently,  some  of  them 
are  using  their  own  personal  computers  to  link Tokyo 
Marine's  main  branch  offices. 
b)  Computer  t.:se 
I~B's  mainframes  are  used  at  the  Kunitachi  center  on  a  lease 
basis.  Development  costs  of  softwares  amount  approximately 
to  1  billion  yen  for  a  three  year  span.  Annual  costs  to 
lease  computers  and  to  maintain  networks  are  about  20 
billion  yen.  However,  such  costs  occupy  only  a  small  margin 
o!  Tokyo  Marine's  total  sales. 
c)  Network  Organization 
There  are  two  chanpels  connecting  the  Kunitachi  center, 
the  Tokyo  head  office,  the  Senri  center  and  the  Osaka  branch 
office.  There  are  also  two  channels  diagonally  connecting 
these  four  nodes.  From  these  main  nodes,  there  are  numerous 
outgoing  lines  and  incoming  lines  to  link major  local 
branches  and  key  affiliated  insurance  agencies. 
d)  Overseas  Networks 
There  are  only  telephone  and  fax  lines  connecting  with 
34  different  countries.  When  re-underwriting  with  foreign 
casualty  insurance  companies  are  undertaken,  the  Tokyo 
Marine  uses  electronic  mail  and  telex  communication  devices. 
Networks  are  self-closed  within  the  Tokyo  Marine 
itself.  By  linking  bank's  networks,  the  Tokyo  Marine 
transfer  bills  to  banks.  Data  are  exchanged  with  other 
casualty  companies.  Currently,  a  network  is  being developed 
to  link  to  sucurity  companies.  Historically,  the  First-
Order  On-Line  System  started  at  the  Tokyo  Marine  in  1973  in 
order  to  consolidate  auto  insurance  management.  The  Second-- 115-
Order  On-Line  System  began  in  1982  to  expand  the  use  of 
telecommunication  within  this  company.  Today's  most  updated 
system at  the  Tokyo  Marine  is  called  the  ETS  <the  Excellent 
Tokyo  Marine  System>,  which  includes  customers'  individual 
information,  capital  operation,  general  accounting  purposes 
and  management  consolidation. 
3.2.4  The  Toyota  Motors 
Capital 
Sales 
Personnel 
Production 
Sales  Dealers 
a>  Priority  Area 
132.2  billion  yen 
6,024.9  billion  yen 
64,000 
3.64  million  cars  in 
314 
1987 
At  Toyota,  telecommunication  is  regarded  as  a  means  to 
enhance  manufacturing  productivity.  In  particular,  it  is 
used  to  shorten  manufacturing  lead-time,  namely  a  time  span 
from  market  analysis  to  a  final  product.  Currently, 
production  cycle  has  been  extensively  shorten  from  previous 
4-year  cycle  with  aids  of  telecommunication. 
b>  Private  Networks 
Within  Toyota's  plants,  there  are  internal  private 
networks.  However,  if  they  are  extended  to  outside,  they 
would  be ·subject  to  regulations  of  the  law  of  Type  I 
Telecommunication  Enterprise. 
c>  The  ISDN  Network 
It  would  be  possible  to  use  an  ISDN  network  in  future. 
However,  today,  its merits  have  not  been  fullY  felt.  Also, 
an  application  of  an  ISDN  network  requires  a  strong 
infrastructure,  and  the  Toyota  Motors  is  not  ready  yet  to 
implement  it. 
d>  Network  Organization 
At  present,  there  are  two  parallel  organizations  in 
charge  of  telecommunication  service  at  Toyota,  namely  the 
first  information  division  and  the  second  information 
division.  The  former  is  responsible  for  operating  an  EDP 
system,  and  the  latter  is  for  intramural  communication. - 116-
a)  Channels  and  Networks 
Internally,  a  digital  network  is  being  operated.  To 
link  plants  and  offices  in  North  America,  an  IBS  network  is 
applied.  For  a  packet  network,  Toyota  uses  NT8T's  DDX-P. 
The  VENUS-P  is  used  for  communicating  with  overseas 
branches.  For  data  communication,  Dentsu's  MARK-Ill  is 
applied.  There  are  totallY  about  3,500  terminals  in  use. 
Toyota's  communication  protocols  are  developed  within  the 
company. 
b>  Computer  Use 
IBM's,  UNISYS'  and  FACOM's  mainframes  are  used  for 
engineering  purposes,  while  IBM's  computers  are  solely used 
for  non-engineering  purposes.  Softwares  are  patched  for 
Toyota's  own  use  by  the  company's  software  engineers. 
c)  Network  Organization 
For  linking  a  triangle  network  to  Nagoya,  Tokyo  and 
Toyoda  offices,  a  6  mega  high  speed  network  is  installed. 
Overseas  networks  are  all  connected  through  the  Tokyo  head 
office. 
d)  Overseas  Networks 
Connection  with  overseas  subsidiaries  is  undertaken 
with  the  company's  exlusive  networks.  For  overseas  agencies 
and  dealers,  a  MARk  Ill  network  is  applied. 
All  networks  are  being  operated  on  an  on-line  basis. 
This  permits  that  market  orders  could  change  only  4  days 
before  production  is  completed.  The  "Kamban  System"  does 
not  use  telecommunication.  For  technical  information, 
Tokyota  is  using  a  SMS  data  base.  Tokyota  completed  to 
install  Toyota's  own  network  called  the  CNTS-net  in  April 
1988.  This  system  allows  to  shorten  manufacturing  lead-time 
considerably. 
3.3  Summary  Table 
The  above  discussion  is  summarized  in  Table  3-1. - 117-
Chapter  4  Corporate  Strategy  and  The  Use  Patterns  of 
Telecommunication:  A Typology 
In  Chapter  4,  based  on  our  analysis  of  the  case  study 
in  Chapter  3,  we  will  introduce  two  dichotomous  frameworks 
by  which  the  salient  features  of  telecomunication  use  by 
companies  are  better extracted.  These  frameworks  are:  !b~ 
tll~~=mA~l-1~~~ and  !b~_2r~~r=m•~~-1~~~·  The  ready-made 
type  implies  that  comapnies  are  using  telecommunication  as 
it  is  without  further  modification  to  meet  their  business 
needs.  On  the  other  hand,  the  order-made  type  means  that 
companies  are  making  efforts  to  improve  telecommunication  in 
order  to  better fit  thP;r  business  needs. 
The  patterns  of  the  use  of  telecommunication  by 
companies  are  divercifed,  depending  on  the  nature  of 
business  they  are  engaged  in.  However,  very  recently, 
companies  tend  to  regard  telecommunication  as  a  central 
nerve,  not  just  a  peripheral  supporting  means  for  corporate 
decision  making.  Telecommunication  has  been  deeply 
entrenched  within  the  so-called  ~~r~2ri!~_in1~1rA1i2D· 
An  important  device  of  companies'  central  nerve, 
whether  for  corpo~ate integration  or  for  just  daily 
supporting  operations,  is  a  n~1~2rh.  The  subsequent  part  of 
this  paper  will  thus  focus  on  the  characteristic  of  how 
companies  are  using  net~orks  for  market  strategy.  Here,  we 
define  market  strategy  in  such  a  loose  way  as  coporate 
i1An~~ vis-a-vis  a  particular  market  in  which  a  company  can 
fill  with  services  and  goods. 
4.1  Analytical  Framework 
4.1.1  Typology 
In  terms  of  whether  companies  can  provide  the  ready-
made  goods  or  services  or  the  order-made  ones,  corporate 
stance  can  be  classified  into  two;  a>  the  tlAd~:mAdl_!~~l. 
and  b>  the  2t~~r:mAg~_1%~~· 
<a>  The  Ready-Made  Type 
Companies  having  a  corporate  stance  of  the  ready-made 
type  supply  goods  and  services  in  mass  quanity.  These 
companies  are  so-called  "supply  push"  oriented.  The  merit 
of  this  corporate  stance  can  receive  merits  of  scale-
economy,  while  the  demerit  rests  in  that  they  cannot 
completely  satisfy  individual  needs  of  customers. 
<b>  The  Order-Made  Type 
Corporate  stance  of  this  type  means  that  companies 
provide  goods  and  services  to  meet  the  customers'  particular - 118-
needs.  Companies  of  this  type  are  "market-pull"  oriented. 
They  can  earn·value-added  profits,  while  they  are 
constrained  in  a  sense  that  orsanizational  expansion  or 
large scale-merits  are  impossible  because  large-scale 
procution  of  the  order-made  products  are  very costly. 
4.1.2  Features  of  Telecommunication  Use  for  Production 
Production  system  is  basically  a  feedback  operation, 
having  the  following  steps:  product  development,  product 
design,  production,  inventory control,  sales,  and  back  to 
product  development  again.  This  feedback  process  is 
ubiquitous  in  manufacturing  industries,  but  is  also 
applicable  to  other  non-manufacturing  industries  such  as 
banks  and  insurance  companies. 
Telecommunication  is  used  at  evey  node  of  the 
production  feedback  loop.  But,  the  use  of  telecommunication 
varies  depending  on  whether  corporate strategic stance  is 
order-made  oriented  or  ready-made  oriented.  In  other  words, 
the  use  is  differentiated  by  the  uniqueness  of  which  node  of 
production  feedback  is  most  applied  by  telecommunication. 
<a>  Companies  of  the  ready-made  type  absorb  in  market  needs 
from  general  mass  unidentified  customers.·  Future  product 
development  is  based  on  their  own  market  assessment  at 
present  time,  thereby  creating  a  time  lag  between  market 
needs  and  production.  Product  orders  from  retailers  and 
customers  are  then  input  into  inventory  and  production.  If 
inventory  is  full,  products  are  released  from  inventory 
stocks,  and  if  inventory  is  small,  such  information  is 
transferred  to  procution.  Telecommunication  can  integrate 
this  inventory-production  interaction cycle. 
Cb>  On  the  other  hand,  particular market  needs  are  input  in 
the  case  of  the  order-made  oriented  companies.  Then,  based 
on  these  specialized  market  needs,  product  design  and 
development  begin.  In  this  case,  the  relation  between 
market  needs  and  procution  is  rather  real-time-based  without 
unnecessary  time  lags.  Customers'  orders  are directly  input 
into  product  development,  thereby  the  use  of 
telecommunication  is heavilily  concerned  with  two  nodes  of 
the  feedback  process,. namely  product  development  and  product 
design. 
To  summarize  the  above  discussion,  the  market 
difference  between  the  ready-m£de  type  and  the  order-made 
type  is  represented  by  the  existence  of  time  lags.  The 
ready-made  type  has  a  rather  conservative  corporate  stance 
having  a  strong  feedback  consciousness  to  look  at  a'prior 
market  need.  The  order-made  type,  on  the  other  hand,  has  a - 119-
real-time  corporate  decision-making  to  directly  input  market 
needs  into  development,  design  and  production. 
4.2  Grouping  of  Company  Cases  by  Typology 
Based  on  our  dichotomous  typology  of  corporate  stance, 
we  grouped  all  company  cases,  not  only  Japanese  companies 
but  also  European  and  American  counterparts. 
We  found  that  there  are  9  cases  for  the  ready-made 
type,  3  cases  for  the  order-made  type,  and  4  cases  for  the 
mixed  type,  which  stand  between  the  order-made  type  and  the 
ready-made  type.  Note  that  we  did  not  group  company  cases 
not  just  by  their  types  of  business  activities,  but  by  the 
corporate  stances  to  use  telecommunication.  That  is  to  say, 
the  order-made  type  implies  only  corporate  stance  in  using 
telecommunication,  and  does  not  means  only  those  comanies 
whose  primary  business  areas  are  ordered  production.  We 
found  that  Britain's  GEC  could  not  be  categorized  in  either 
type,  since  the  GEC  is  not  a  single  company  but  rather  a 
conglomerate  using  telecommunication  as  a  device  to 
~ntegrated compartmentalized  member  companies  under  the  same 
name  of  the  GEC. 
4.2.1  Compapies  of  the  Ready-Made  Type 
In  Japanese  case,  the  NEC  and  the  Toyota  Motors  fall  in 
this  category.  In  foreign  cases,  the  Daimer  Benz,  the  Fiat 
Motors,  Hewlett  Packard,  the  Levi  Straus,  the  McKesson  and 
the  VISA  are  in  this  category.  Here,  we  will  discuss  only 
Japanese  case. 
1>  The  NEC 
The  NEC  produces  and  sells  telecommunication  equipment, 
computer,  electronic  equipment  and  devices  and  general 
consumer  electronic appliances.  For  all  products,  the  NEC 
produces  in  mass  quantities.  The  priority of 
telecommunication  use  at  the  NEC  is  placed  on  product  design 
and  developmnet,  production  control,  enhancement  of 
productivity,  new  product  development  by  different 
divisions,  management  system,  and  worker  training  and 
education  by  satellites. 
NEC's  telecommunication  is  operated  in  two  ways:  the 
double-layered  star-shaped  telephone  networks  <TELNET>  and 
the  double-layered  fish  net-shaped  packet  exchange  system 
for  local  networks  <DATANET>.  In  1985,  a  new  high  speed 
digital  network  began  to  operate  for  integrating  telephone 
networks  and  data  networks.  Also,  the  NEC  has  entered  into 
a  VAN  business  by  providing  various  service  through  the  C&C 
VAN  service  networks. 
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2>  The  Toyota  Motors 
Toyota  is  one  of  the  world  largest  auto  manufacturers. 
Its  production  is  a  typical  of  mass  production  based  on 
market  research  to  input  customers'  needs.  Product 
development  depends  on  its  own  assessment  of  market  for 
immediate  future.  The  priority of  telecommunication  use  is 
place  on  the  reduction  of  the  so-called  "lead-time"  betveen 
product  design  and  production,  the  shortening  of  development 
cycles,  and  the  accurate  collection  of  sales  information. 
Toyota's  production  is  undertaken  based  on  the  famous 
"Kamban  System"  which  is  not  a  computerized 
telecommunication  of  parts  control,  but  a  manual  batch 
inventory  control.  It  has,  however,  on-line  networks 
particularly  for  order  input  control  and  product  control. 
Therefore,  the  basic  nature  of  Toyota's  use  of 
telecommunication  is  for  inventory  control  per  se.  If 
shortage  of  inventory  stocks  is  forecasted,  production  is 
accelerated  to  fill  in  such  shortage. 
For  quick  response  to  order  inputs,  Toyota  created  the 
TNS  <Toyota  Network  System>  to  link  up  with  314  dealers  in  a 
a  star-shaped  network  which  is  an  on-line data  communication 
network.  The  basic  philosophy  of  the  use  of 
telecommunication  at  Toyota  is  the  realization  of  single 
integration  of  all  business  operations  at  every  point  of 
organization. 
4.2.2  Companies  of  the  Order-Made  Type 
In  Japanese  case,  only  the  Tokyo  Marine  falls  in  this 
category.  In  foreign  cases,  the  European  Ford  and  the 
Nixdorf  are  also  in  this  calss. 
1>  The  Tokyo  Marine 
Casual  ty  insurance  itself  is  an  order-made  product. 
The  Tokyo  Marine  has  been  reforming  the  use  of 
telecommunication  from  hitherto  enphasis  on  computer  control 
for  different  insurance  plans  and  sales  to  sophisticated 
data  management  for  each  customer  by  inputting specific 
customers'  needs. 
The  priority of  telecommunication  use  at  the  Tokyc 
Marine  is  placed  on  sales  promotion,  gathering  of  customers' 
individual  data,  new  product  development,  and  productivitY 
enhancement  by  a  single  integrated  accounting  system.  Tokyo 
Marine's  ETS  <the  Excellent  Tokyo  Marine  System>  is·deemed 
to  integrate different  telecommunic~tion uses  for  its 
business  management. - 121-
Centered  at  the  Kunitachi  <in  th  outskirt  of  Tokyo) 
Data  Center,  Tokyo  Marine's  telecommunication  networks  ar.e 
formed  in  a  pattern  of  fish  net-shaped  for  batch  controls. 
However,  there  are  sub-networks  of  star-shaped  at  each  sub-
data  centers  and  major  branch  offices  for  covering 
sales  agents. 
4.2.3  Comapanies  of  the  Mixed  Type 
In  Japanese  case,  the  Mitsubishi  Bank  falls  in  this 
category,  while  in  for.eign  cases,  the  Banque  Nationale  de 
Paris,  the  Barclays  Bank  and  Commerzbank  are  in  this 
category. 
1)  The  Mitsubishi  Bank 
In  Japan,  excessive  competition  among  major  banks  leads 
to  the  adoption  of  the  so-called  "electronic  banking"  in 
order  to  reduce  operating costs  and  increase  management 
productivity.  Some  banks  adopt  the  cash/account  management 
system  <CAMS)  for  directly  linking  them  to  individual 
customers  for  indepth  services.  In  the  mean  time,  banks  are 
increasing entering  in  an  agent  servive  to  substitute  for 
customer  companies'  intramural  accounting  and  saving 
functions.  This  service  is  called  as  the  "firm  banking." 
They  are  also  considering  to  give  the  so-called  "home 
banking"  by  directly reaching  individual  customers  through 
personal  telecommunication  networks.  The  Mitsubishi  Bank  is 
one  of  Japanese  banks  which  are vigorously  expanding  banking 
service  in  these  areas. 
The  Mitsubishi  Bank  places  the  priority areas  of  their 
use  of  telecommunication  on  the  attainment  of  security  and 
safety  in  handling  financial  business,  diversification  of 
business,  and  expansion  of  both  new  banking  merkets  and  new 
sales  products.  It  is  now  reschuffling  the  hitherto  use  of 
telecommunication  into  the  so-call  "The  Third  On-Line 
Implementation,"  a  today's  catchword  for  every  major  banks 
in  Japan  for  future  comprehensive  electronization  of  all 
banking  sevices  through  networking  of  all  customers, 
regardless  of  companies  or  individual  customers. 
The  Mitsubshi  Bank  has  already  implemented  on-line 
connections  with  all  branches  and  affiliated  financial 
institutions.  Currently,  the  Mi tsubishi  Bank  is  trying  to 
develop  compartmentalized  application  software  packages  for 
wider  ranges  of  computer  application  to  be  used  for  new 
product  development  in  a  flexible  manner. 
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Table  4-2 
Companies  of  the  Order-Made  Type 
lilAJilil!!  llt'le;n•••  .  ,.v~  ~f  Nil!!tw~rk  Telecom  Svstem  Note 
j£·~  ••  ,.ve' c  aa  *"J-'7-'JO)~t!  i/~'TJ..  -{-O)fth 
~+H., ~- ,.  ..  lib.  If~-· 
core-net  +  lift  0) a  - 11 '" {t,  PSTNC~~ 
European  Fore!  lfon  .. ..-.r  CAD/CAI  net 
Localization of  JI!'STN  Autc.obilt  'Dirable  Product Deai9n  ·== 
.:-,?~,_..,.,7  •••  If~-· 
~ltl2 I  PC 
Orear CD~tzoltlr  i%3t'IJ.I· 
Nixdorf  ~  ~ 
DlcBltftliae IPC  ft~lrltft 
1n~tian  by '*-'t-
-~ill:  tiW~M: ..  ..,._  • 
~  It  tlU.l ::2  ;;- t:•  a.  8$1f.iltO)i;J;C-
~Mr1ne  CUual.ty  '""'a'  f'18h  :r·~~m; 
oastan.r'  s-ori.m:.d 
Insunnce  Net 
Service 
fi4-3  ilg.fl~· 
Name  Business 
Table  4-3  Companies  of  the  Mixed-Type 
Product  Type  of  Network  Telecom  System  Note  'l'v  ...  a 
~-~  •• 
~=  a a  *-.,  I·  '7- 'J  0)~!!  '/~'TJ..  -{-O)flt! 
I~ IJ  liJ 3!11 ft  llft  *1!-tt"- ., 
~ Cclt,l~~·  GAB  **;;-' 
La  Banque  Natil>- Fipancial  t-.Net  ,.0~  On-
nale  de  Paris  Banking 
t:~  ..  (  ~  Bi *3 + itt! .n *4 )  RTC  ;;-
Service  Staz  3  national,  4  local  !Wine 
,-r_"  L;  -r arr  arr  *•ott'- BINS  iii*·ATM 
Barclays  Bank  Banking  lri~ncial 
t:~ 
ATM  for  noJI;k uae  in-branch 
~ervice  Terminaljs 
::2  j  '" '/  •  /'( ;;- 'J  an  ltli..,.- • 
2 M •  :t.  .,  t- + '1- '§: h5 l.: ·~  7'  .. - 9  *,:...-'~ 
P'i@A~cial  tar  Two-layered  Networ 
etloa•lsS  Daa  at  ~-;iu  Commerzbank  Banking  • 
M:t--,t- ;,/ . 
Service  • Net  plus  Periphery  Net  branches  ~an  known 
::::l!•ft  an  ~~~ott'- ..  M3~*;;-7..f;;- ATM·CAMS  *;;-:;  ..( 
F'inancial  Star  rhe  Third-Order On-
Mitsubishi  Ban  Banking  t:~  :t: - J.. J< ;;- ~  ;;- ?  ..  CJ6-Lig  Service  Line  System  Home  Banking - 125-
To  summarize  the  above  grouping  of  telecommunication 
uses  by  corporate  stance,  Table  4-1  is  attached  for  the 
ready-made  type,  Table  4-2  for  the  order-made  type,  and 
Table  4-3  for  the  mixed  type.  These  tables  enable  easy 
comparison  among  differnt  companies. 
4.3  Features  of  Corporate  Stance  by  Different  Networks 
In  this  section,  we  will  try  to  extract  the  salient 
features  of  networks  for  each  corporate  stance. 
4.3.1  The  Networks  for  the  Ready-Made  Type 
Mass  production  of  ready-made  products  can  be  further 
classified  in  the  follo~ing way.  In  the  cases  of  the  auto 
companies  and  the  credit  card  companies,  mass  production  or 
mass  sales  are  undertaken  based  on  small  varieties  of 
commodities.  In  the  case  of  the  electric  equipment 
industry,  a  medium  size  of  product  differentiation  is 
observed.  Lastly,  in  the  case  of  the  non-consumer  product 
areas  such  as  medicines,  a  vast  quantity  of  products  aim  at 
mass  sales. 
However,  in  all  the  cases,  a  priority  of 
telecommunication  is  placed  on  inventory  control,  rather 
than  on  production  itself.  This  is  largely  due  to  the  fact 
that  products  are  not  directly sold  by  producers  but  sales 
are  performed  by  a  great  number  of  retailers  and  thier 
affiliated dealers.  So  that,  a  feedback  loop  starting with 
order  inputs  and  ending  at  output  supply  through  inventory 
stocks  necessiates  an  intense  use  of  telecommunication 
networks  to  attain  high  efficiency  and  quick  market 
response. 
Companies  of  this  type  are  using  exclusively  a  network 
of  star-shaped.  The  reason  behind  is  rather  simple.  They 
have  to  maximize  efficiency of  complicated  processes  of 
order  inputs  at  a  start point  and  of  distribution  of  outputs 
at  an  ending point,  so  that  the  central  control  of 
information  is  indispensable.  In  the  mean  time,  they  have 
to  supply  unitary  products  for  every  retailer or  dealer, 
requirng  the  central  control  of  qulity control  with  a  star-
shaped  network. 
There  are  two  unique  cases  in  this  kind  of  corporate 
stance,  namely,  the  MacKesson  and  the  Levis  Straus.  Both 
companies  are  using  an  automatic  catalogue  order  system  to 
compensate  for  the  weakness  of  the  ready-made  products.  In 
other  words,  they  try  to  use  telecommunication  networks  to 
maximally  absorb  order  information  from  individual 
customers.  In  particular,  the  MacKesson  is  trying  to 
develop  two-way  communication  channnels  for  inputting  orders 
by  taking  an  advantage  of  the  order-made  type.  On  the  other 